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ABSTRACT
FRENCH POSTCOLONIAL NATIONALISM AND
AFRO-FRENCH SUBJECTIVITIES
SEPTEMBER 2011
YASSER MUNIF, B.S., UNIVERSITY OF BALAMAND
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF BALAMAND
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Agustin Lao-Montes

This research examines urban renewal in Clichy-sous-Bois, a suburb of 30,000 inhabitants
located in the northeast of Paris. It studies the modalities of spatial racialization, nation
building, and subject formation among Afro-French young men living in the city. It also
builds on a world-historical perspective to explore the diasporic webs in which the lives of
Afro-French are embedded. Taking spatial racialization as a point of entry, the study
attempts to understand how governmental strategies and urban policies regulate lives and
residential patterns in the city. Three lines of investigation are pursued: 1) an examination of
Afro-French racialization and genealogies; 2) an analysis of narratives and struggles of these
communities and their impact on neoliberal spaces; 3) an exploration of the various ways
spatial governmentality constrains and/or produces Afro-Frenchness.

The primary purpose of this ethnographic research is to comprehend the French colonial
history and its impact on the racialization of diasporic Afro-French living in metropolitan
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France. For this end, the study proposes the notion of “Afro-French,” an analytical concept
that designates a constellation of groups from Sub-Saharan, North African, and Caribbean
origins. The term provides a heuristic to comprehend the urban and cultural experiences of
diasporic sub-groups who have different but overlapping genealogies. Second, the project
helps understand why Afro-French living in Clichy-sous-Bois embody and at the same time
transgress official narratives of the nation. It argues that France’s nationalism, like other
forms of European nationalisms, is facing a contradictory moment in the neoliberal
conjuncture. On the one hand, discourses about liberalization of the economy involve the
deployment of narratives that celebrate mobility and flexibility. This new dependence on a
global neoliberal economy destabilizes national economies and erodes the state’s structures.
On the other hand, state actors diffuse identitarian and xenophobic discourses that blame
ethnic and religious minorities for the socio-economic crisis. Third, the study argues that
spatial governmentality and urban strategies enable certain aspects of Afro-Frenchness but
constrain others: there is no homogenous or unified logic to regulate lives and spaces in
Clichy.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This study examines the racialization of Afro-French communities through a recent
urban renewal project (2004 – 2013) in Clichy-Sous-Bois, a suburb of 30,000 inhabitants
located in the Northeast of Paris. It builds on a world-historical perspective to examine how
colonial subjects were subjugated in French colonies and later racialized in postcolonial
metropolitan France through urban planning. Using spatial governmentality as a primary
analytical grid, it pursues three lines of investigation by: 1) examining the regulation of
colonial subjects’ lives in colonial spaces historically; 2) exploring the various ways spatial
governmentality constrains and/or produces Afro-French subjectivities in contemporary
metropolitan France; 3) studying the impact of anti-colonial struggles and Afro-French
postcolonial resistances against neoliberal spaces.

1.1.

Context
In October 2005, spectacular revolts involving primarily Afro-French youth erupted

in Clichy-sous-Bois (a banlieue [suburb] of 30,000 inhabitants located in the northeast of
Paris), in response to the death of two teenagers that the police had provoked and chased.
Unlike previous revolts, the 2005 Afro-French uprising had a national spread and lasted
more than three weeks, more than any of its antecedents. Young men (although not
exclusively men) faced the police in the streets and they reported experiencing powerful
feelings of solidarity. The media’s coverage as well as intensive connectedness over the
Internet helped spread the revolts to more than 300 communes all over France in a few days
(Wieviorka 2005). These events left the political elite perplexed and provided a reason for
the government to declare a “state of emergency” which had been inactive since the 1960s
!
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when the state had used it to terrorize Maghrebians living in France during the colonial
Algerian war. It was clear that the Republic was undergoing a profound social
transformation (Hargreaves 2005). In that regard, Clichy-sous-Bois represents a strategic site
for the study of spatial racialization and its impact on postcolonial subjectivities.

1.1.1.

Afro-French: A New Ethnicity?
The focus of this study is on “Afro-French” communities who live in public

housing. It includes both French and non-French citizens from North African, West
African, and Antillean origins. The concept is not used in the public sphere or by the
communities themselves. Furthermore, the colonial history, the modalities of identifications
or dis-identification, and the present socio-cultural position of the three communities
sometimes diverge (Kakpo 2006). However, as I explain in the first chapter, I use this
hyphenated term as a political category to challenge normative notions of Frenchness and to
explore the commonalities between Maghrebian and Black youths living in Clichy-sous-Bois.
The term is inspired by postcolonial literature in general and Paul Gilroy’s “Black Atlantic”
(1993) more specifically. It allows for a study of political and urban marginalization from a
postcolonial perspective.
More importantly, the recent history of African and Black populations in France
witnessed a new revival. In 1998, Black citizens organized for the first time a highly visible
march in Paris to commemorate the 150th anniversary of the abolition of slavery in French
colonies. A few years later, the French parliament (whose MPs are all from European decent
with the exception of the representatives of overseas territories) passed a law that made
slavery and slave trade crimes against humanity. In 2005, a number of Arab and Black
intellectuals and public figures signed a manifesto called “the Indigenous of the Republic”
!
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(Les indigènes de la république). The group denounced the colonial past of France and
argued that many of the problems that minorities encounter in postcolonial France can be
traced back to that past. The same year, the CRAN (Conseil Représentatif des Associations
Noires de France), a representative council for Black organizations was established. Scholars
and activists were increasingly writing and speaking about the legacy of the colonial history
in present France (Wilder 2005, Blanchard, Bancel and Lemaire 2006, Bouamama, et al.
2007, Conklin 1997, Cooper and Brubacker 2005, Khiari 2009, Khiari 2006). A number of
social movements and associations active in the Banlieues, such as Movement of the
Indigenous of the Republic (MIR), and Movement for Immigration and the Banlieues (MIB)
have proposed a postcolonial political agenda to tackle contemporary problems. These
developments indicate that French society is undergoing important social and cultural
transformations through the creation of Afro-French networks of solidarity and political
activism.
On a theoretical level, the term Afro-French achieves several goals. Firstly, it disrupts
the unilinear official historiographies by showing that French citizenship has uneven and
dispersed origins. Secondly, it invites us to recognize the importance that certain actors
attach to identifying with multiple identities and specifically their African ones. Thirdly, the
term opens new horizons for building coalitions and establishing bonds of solidarity
between populations whose countries of origin were colonized by France and whose parents
and grandparents shared a history of colonial violence. However, those dimensions do not
constitute an invitation to embracing an uncritical Afrocentricism, or a monolithic identity
politics as the last chapter explains.

!
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1.1.2. The history of the Banlieues
The genealogy of Afro-French communities should be analyzed and understood in
the context of French suburbs. The recent history of French urban policies have gone
through three important stages. The first phase of governmental intervention in the
Banlieues took place in the mid 1950s when the state started building the first housing
projects (Castells 1983). During this period, there was an important demand for cheap
housing because many buildings were destroyed during World War Two. In addition, there
was a growing internal migration from the countryside to the suburbs of large cities. In
response to an important demand for housing, the government built Les Grands Ensembles
(housing projects) with the intention of providing cheap and low quality housing located in
the Parisian suburbs. The rationale behind building in distant suburbs was the use of vacant
lots that belonged to, or could be acquired by the state for a cheap price.
The second phase started in 1973 when the state decided to stop building Les
Grands Ensembles. In the 1970s, high unemployment rates, inadequate planning policies,
and lack of renovation plans provoked the first crisis of the Banlieues. To address that
problem, the government came up with decentralized urban policies and created
classificatory categories to control the flux of Afro-French in the Banlieues (Barros 2005).
The 1980s was a period characterized by the intensification of Islamophobic discourses,
crimes targeting Afro-French youth and workers, and the emergence of the extreme-right as
a powerful player in French politics. Simultaneously, French society experienced a structural
transformation in its economy through the weakening of the welfare state and the emergence
of the neoliberal model. These economic changes turned the Banlieues one of the main areas
of problematization; it subsequently became a major locus of intervention for political
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leaders (Tissot 2007). Scrutiny, surveillance and identity checks became the norm for the
inhabitants of the suburbs.
Revolts broke out in 1991, which encouraged the government to implement new
urban policies to regulate the suburbs. The third phase was characterized by a new plan that
had three main objectives: a slowdown in welfare and social spending and an increase in the
privatization of housing projects; the deployment of harsher security measures in the
suburbs; and finally, the dissemination of ‘authentic’ values of the Republic. The disciplinary
practices were intensified in 1995 when a Maghrebian inhabitant who lived in the Banlieue
was found responsible for a terrorist attack in Paris. The penal state became even more
pervasive and repressive in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, as chapter four shall
demonstrate.

1.2.

Research Objectives
To understand French nationalism and the modalities of citizenship, it is crucial to

situate those processes within a larger European narrative. France’s postcolonial nationalism,
like other brands of western nationalisms, is facing a paradoxical moment in the neoliberal
conjuncture. On the one hand, discourses about the liberalization of the economy involve
the deployment of national narratives that celebrate mobility, multiculturalism, and flexibility.
This new dependence on the global economy destabilizes the national economy and weakens
the state’s structures. On the other hand, the state diffuses identitarian discourses that blame
ethnic and religious minorities for the crisis. This politics legitimizes logics of Islamophobia,
racism, and security.
In this research, I study the spatial mechanisms the state deploys to regulate the lives
of Afro-French historically and more recently in an urban renewal project. I also examine the
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multiple ways Afro-French living in Clichy-sous-Bois experience, embody and transgress
narratives of French nationalism. My research investigates the different ways the state
positions the banlieues simultaneously as an exteriority and an interiority depending on the
political conjuncture. In this context, the suburbs, through their problematization (Foucault’s
description of the different mechanisms that transform a social phenomenon into a social
problem that requires the attention and intervention of certain institutions and social actors),
play a central role in policy making. Sometimes they are represented as an exteriority that
threatens the purity of the republic. Other times, they become a strategic site of intervention
where politicians and urban planners try different tactics ‘to reintegrate’ them into the
French nation. In any case, the Banlieues occupy an important discursive position in the
construction of the nation. In that sense the banlieue is a relational concept that acquires
meaning through the demarcation of imaginary boundaries between civilizing centers and
chaotic suburbs (Morel 2005). Moreover, the Banlieues occupy a liminal space: neither inside
nor outside the nation. And this location puts it in a position that challenges the totalizing
and homogenizing narratives of the Republic.
Finally, the representation of Afro-French, I contend, has important implications on
the political sphere. Afro-French as a social group, (understood as a Nietzschian form of
classification that is contingent, ambiguous and momentary but which helps us examine the
social) have a peculiar positioning within the French public sphere. It has the potential to
trouble the liberal notions of citizenship because of the hybrid identities of its members. In
that sense, Afro-French might represent a threat to the homogeneity and purity of the
republic (Bhabha 1990). In public discourses, Afro-French and French Muslim are
sometimes presented as inauthentic citizens, or foreigners. They are often blamed for being
behind high unemployment rates and the ‘contamination’ of traditional French culture. This

!
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is why Hip-Hop, which is perceived as one of the by-products of the suburb, is always
ridiculed and demonized. Afro-French Males are constructed as hyper-sexual and dangerous,
while females are presented as submissive and vulnerable (Guénif Souilamas 2000); AfroFrench become the objects of frequent studies and constant scrutiny (Wacquant 2006, Tissot
2007). They play a central role in the construction, deconstruction and reconstruction of the
Republic.

1.3.

Urban ethnography
In this research I engage with two interrelated approaches to examine national

narratives and their implications on space in the context of Clichy-sous-Bois. My work draws
extensively on French scholarship on spatiality and urban ethnography. This literature
focuses on urban marginalization and economic discrimination against Muslims and
communities of African origins (Bourdieu and Accardo 1999, Hargreaves 2005, Sayad 2004).
It emphasizes spatial discrimination in, and the securitization of the Banlieues. These studies
highlight the role of urban planning in isolating the inhabitant of the suburbs (Silverstein
2004, 76-120); they denounce social strategies that produce fragmentation and alienation
(Beaud and Pialoux 2003, Wacquant 2006); and they analyze expert and governmental
discourses that address “the crises of the Banlieues” (Donzelot 2006, Tissot 2007). I engage
with this literature to understand the genealogy of urban discourses and the state’s strategies
of spatial intervention.
This research also engages with Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality.
Foucault defines the concept as the art of improving rule at the level of the state,
institutions, and the self. He shows that if an institution faces a new situation that creates a
crisis of governance, actors within that institution come up with techniques inspired by
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current knowledge and know-how to achieve an enhanced form of government (Foucault
1991). Spatial governmentality consists of managing and governing at a distance through
urban forms and spatial mechanisms. Many institutions involved in urban planning and
renewal are actively involved in regulating lives according to governmental logics. The
objective is to shape the conduct of individuals living within a specific space, through
various spatial techniques. These techniques range from urban planning, and transportation
networks, to surveillance cameras, hygiene, and various discourses about the city. Steven
Robins argues that, the state is increasingly utilizing the management of territory as an
effective way, to control and regulate the lives and wellbeing of the population. This
constitutes a move away from the coercive mechanisms that the state had traditionally used
to discipline individuals (Robins 2002).
In general, scholars of governmentality examine the processes that lead to the
governmentalization of lifestyles. In this research, the emphasis is put on urban
governmental mechanisms. Therefore the main challenge ahead of this study is to
understand the effects of spatial governmentality. The last chapter shifts the focus away
from governmental regimes to the resistance of Afro-French.

1.4.

Research Methodology
This study is located at the confluence of ethnographic and archival approaches and

is inspired by historical anthropology. This framework allows me to read past field notes as
archives and, archives as ethnographic work (Axel 2002). The combination of ethnographic
and archival research is not meant to increase our understanding or triangulate the findings.
It is part of strategy that aims to comprehend the breaks and the discontinuities in the
histories of Afro-French. A genealogical analysis allows for such connections to be made

!

)!

!
between the ethnographic and the archival. Ethnographic work allows for 1) an examination
of the processes of identification and racialization among Afro-French youth; 2) the
minutiae of postcolonial nationalism in the spaces of Clichy; 3) the modalities of citizenship
in the city. My dissertation research is based on 15 months of fieldwork that takes the form
of participant observation in Clichy-sous-Bois (11 months), along with archival research (4
months). The choice of Clichy-sous-Bois is particularly important for research on AfroFrench subjectivities since the city provides a strategic entry point to understanding spatial
logics. Clichy-sous-Bois has a large Afro-French population (no statistics are available since
the French state doesn’t recognize ethnic or racial identities). Moreover, as explained above,
Clichy was pathologized and became a major site of intervention for policy makers after its
high visibility in 2005. More specifically, the government allocated important subventions to
help the city solve its problems marginalization and isolation as it claimed (Mauger 2006,
Lagrange and Oberti 2006).

1.4.1. Archival Research
I spent four months at the municipality’s archives where I was mostly interested in
the socio-political history of the city; the different waves of migration; and the construction
and renovation of public housing. Since the early 1960s, the municipality has been archiving
newsletters, flyers, local newspapers, and municipal documents in addition to maps and
various reports. The archival services were extremely helpful and gave me access to most of
their archives. I analyzed the files on urban renewal, migration, delinquency, the city politics
in their entirety. Some files, such as the one on security, were confidential. The municipality
archives were also an important site to meet researchers and students. In addition, I spent
some time at the archives of the city of Montfermeil. The two cities are organically
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connected through les Bosquets, an important housing project located in both communes.
Interestingly enough, the infamous project is thought to be in solely Clichy while its larger
part is located in Montfermeil. This is due to Clichy’s negative image in public discourse.
Finally, I gathered documents and references from local associations and construction
companies involved in urban renewal (2004 – 2013).

1.4.2. Ethnographic research
The ethnographic research spanned over fourteen months (March 2008 - May 2008;
Nov 2008 – Aug 2009) and went through three different phases. The first period was
exploratory and lasted three months. During the initial phase, I had only a few contacts and
limited access because of what some of the youth call the “law of silence.” Early on, the
youth lose their faith in journalists, undercover policemen, and researchers who demonize
them and often misrepresent their ideas. Journalists are often targeted when they visit Clichy
without being accompanied by a local resident. They learn to distrust foreigners and avoid
interacting with them or answering their questions. On multiple occasions, I was told
mockingly that since I worked for the CIA or the French police, they would not answer my
questions. Many youth were not willing to give me their phone numbers and sometimes they
hid their real names. On one occasion, a young man overheard my conversation with his
friend and shouted, “You can easily pass for one of us, that’s smart!” What he insinuated in
reality is that I am an undercover policeman. When I inquired about the best way to present
myself to the youth, a street educator explained that I should introduce myself as a historian
instead of the incomprehensible “sociologist,” as I was doing. Another educator informed
me that it took him up to seven years in some cases to win the confidence of certain young
men. The second phase started when I met a charismatic young Sub-Saharan man with a lot
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of connections and popularity. He gave me valuable information and more importantly, he
opened many doors for me. During this period, I was meeting young men at the social
center, in the street, and in coffee shops. The third phase of ethnography debuted when I
found a room for rent in one of the projects and decided to live in the city for the last three
months. It’s only then that I was able to understand the isolation of the city and have a taste
of everyday life in the city. During this period I met a number of neighbors through the
family with whom I was living.
In addition to public spaces, the study focuses on a social center devoted to youth’s
activities and an association that helps residents move to new apartments once their old ones
are demolished as part of the urban renewal project. At the Social Center, I followed the
activities in which the youth participated (hip-hop dance, rap workshops, and various
debates). I interviewed animators and administrators in addition to working with three music
groups for six months. At the relocation association, I interviewed volunteers and animators
as well as a number of youth who attend the activities the association organized. Overall I
conducted 33 interviews with young men who live in the projects. In addition, I conducted a
total of 23 interviews with individuals involved with urban renewal directly or indirectly.
Some of these interviews were with individuals who work at the municipality as well as with
architects and planners involved in urban renewal. I also interviewed street educators,
animators and social actors who work with residents and the youth. I attended a number of
debates and sessions that the municipality organized to inform residents about urban
renewal. My questions revolved around the perception of the residents of the Banlieue in
general, Clichy-sous-Bois, France, Africa, the Maghreb, the Antilles and the Sub-Sahara. I
asked them questions about the physical and imagined borders of the neighborhoods and
the city. I paid close attention to the ways the youth and other residents relate to and cherish
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certain places while they fear and avoid others. Finally, I gathered information about my
respondents’ understanding of French colonial history. Group interviews highlighted the
heterogeneous modes of identification among the interviewees.

1.5.

The Structure of the Study
The first chapter of my dissertation explores the history of Afro-French migration to

France as well as their multilayered and complex narratives. The chapter focuses on the
history of public housing in relation to Afro-French narratives. It studies spatial segregation
of Afro-French populations and traces their roots in French colonial history and
postcolonial narratives. This chapter is based on archival research. Using a foucauldian
framework, the chapter explores the genealogies of Afro-French diasporas in the longue
durée. It proposes a genealogical analysis to comprehend the imperial French history and its
impact on diasporic communities. It traces the points of convergence and divergence
between the different colonial populations, namely Sub-Saharan, North African, and
Antillean.
In the following three chapters, I analyze spatial racialization using spatial
governmentality as a framework of analysis. Chapter two explores the impact of sovereign
power on the racialization of certain spaces and groups. It argues that sovereign power uses
coercion and violence to maintain a strict separation between the inside and the outside. By
doing so, it racializes simultaneously both, the inside as well as the outside. In that sense, the
chapter shows that urban planning was complementary to military interventions in the
colonies. Sovereign power imposes racial identities that revolve around space. It produces
the radical alterity of Afro-French, which is necessary to police the contours of authentic
French identity. The third chapter shifts the focus to biopolitical power and its relation to
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sovereign power. It shows that biopolitical modes of racialization are very different from the
ones that sovereign power produces. Instead of using violence to impose specific racial
identities, biopolitics interpellates individuals through their needs and desires. Individuals
embrace the racial logics and construct their subjectivities accordingly. At the same time, the
chapter argues that the separation between sovereign and biopolitical powers is impossible
since they are intrinsically interlinked. The separation between the different forms of power
is performed only as analytical strategy. In reality, these powers work together or against
each other within a larger nexus. Biopower acts upon specific spaces rather than an entire
territory as is the case of sovereignty power.
Chapter four explores the third dimension of governmentality, namely disciplinary
power. It studies the spatial mechanisms implemented through urban renewal to enclose
bodies of Afro-French within specific and narrow spaces. It assigns specific functions to
each space. The primary goal of fragmentation is to undermine the formation of an AfroFrench community. Instead, disciplinary power fragments them into Moroccan, Malian, and
Martinican communities. Finally, chapter five shifts from governmental strategies to examine
diasporic subjectivities and their impact on space. While spatial governmentality is extremely
helpful in analyzing structural logics it does not say much about agency; It does not highlight
the struggles and resistances. Using Stuart Hall’s concept of diaspora, I propose a different
approach to understand the narratives of Afro-French from below. The chapter explores the
narratives of Afro-French youth from below. The focus shifts from dominant discourses to
dispersed and plural narratives. It examines the resistance of Afro-French to the violence of
urban renewal. The chapter is based on the interviews I conducted with the youth and
ethnographic observations I collected during my field research.
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CHAPTER 2
A GENEALOGY OF AFRO-FRENCH COMMUNITIES

Time becomes other than a linear process. The past is yet to be determined as we
overwrite or restructure the past. It is both/and. It is a virtuality of the present
and future.
Jean Hillier

2.1.

Introduction
This chapter provides a genealogical reading of the racialization of Afro-French

communities living in postcolonial France. Taking spatial racialization as a point of entry, it
attempts to understand the mechanisms that regulate urban grids and residential patterns in
metropolitan France since the 1950s. The analysis is also based on the colonial history of the
French empire in three specific regions: 1) Algeria; 2) the French West Indies; 3) and West
Africa. More specifically, it explores the urban and spatial mechanisms that French
administrators and policy-makers have deployed to restrict the movements of colonial
subjects and postcolonial migrants in specific spaces and regulate their lives. By doing so,
French authorities have racialized the various spaced inhabited by Afro-French
communities.
The racialization of Afro-French groups living in public housing today is the point of
departure for this investigation. The chapter argues that several racial projects were
competing for dominance in post-WWII France. It examines the various spaces inhabited by
Afro-French communities and the production of racial identities within these localities. It
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analyzes the spatial techniques, architecture, and urban forms that are deployed to regulate
the lives of Afro-French. By presenting the different types of housing available to three
postcolonial groups, namely the Algerian, Antillean, and Sub-Saharan communities, the
chapter examines the spatial techniques and codes that have been employed to racialize
Afro-French groups unevenly since the 1950s. Although each of these communities is
constituted of heterogeneous and complex elements, I argue it’s possible to identify
paradigmatic spaces, which have been utilized as primary modes of racialization for each one
of these groups. The genealogical analysis I provide below is not holistic nor exhaustive but
rather focused on a history of the present. The studies and monographs that are available to
us today demonstrate that each community inhabited paradigmatic spaces at particular
periods. This is not to deny that these groups have inhabited various spaces but rather to
show that for each ethnic group, there was a dominant spatial paradigm, which racialized
communities in specific and unique ways. The reason for different forms of housing is
motivated by a need to racialize each group according to specific sets of requirements.
Whenever the state tried to confine Afro-French communities within a specific space
(the shantytowns in the 1950s for the Algerians or the foyers for West African in the 1970s),
they fought back and raised the social cost of maintaining such practices. Every time, their
resistances incited the state to find new spatial alternatives that are less costly (in the
foucauldian sense). There are two dynamics at work here. Hegemonic racial discourses were
deployed to shape racial identities within urban spaces. Conversely, Afro-French
communities produced new spaces by inhabiting them and by doing so, altered their own
racial identities. Spatial racialization of Afro-French should therefore be decrypted and
analyzed at these different levels. The struggles of these various communities created a crisis
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that the French elite has attempted to resolve by opening the door of public housing to
Afro-French, which for the most part was closed until the 1980s. The following chapters will
argue that it’s only in the 1980s that a genuine Afro-French community has emerged as a
result of its concentration in public housing. Before then, traces of Afro-Frenchness could
be discerned whenever the trajectories of the different colonial groups have intersected. It
can also be located in the margins of the French imperial network, which formed a common
ground for dispersed communities to share similar destinies.

2.2.

Who is Afro-French
The term “Afro-French” refers to a constellation of different racial and national

communities who share a history of colonial violence. The main sub-groups that the term
attempts to designate in the context of this study are North and West African communities
as well as Caribbean. The present study tries to test the viability of such a racial category.
The vast majority of French scholars have rejected race or ethnicity as valid social categories.
Other social scientists have been studying these sub-groups as distinct communities who
function according to different social mechanisms and logics. In this and mostly following
chapters I show that the usage of “Afro-French” as a critical analytical term can be justified
in three different ways. Firstly, these populations share a collective memory of oppression
rooted in the history of French colonialism and slavery. Secondly, they belong to
communities who self-identify in various ways with a certain idea of blackness or
Africanness. Finally, they have an everyday experience that can be qualified as postcolonial in
the context of contemporary France. The chapter traces the genealogical emergences and
constructions of Afro-Frenchness without downplaying the conflicts among the different
sub-categories.
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The reference to the genealogical reading of history comes from Nietzsche through
Michel Foucault. Foucault opposes the genealogical reading to traditional history. Through
genealogy, Foucault attempts to disrupt the linear, continuous, and evolutionary
historiography. He writes, “[g]enealogy does not resemble the evolution of a species and
does not map the destiny of a people. On the contrary, to follow the complex course of
descent is to maintain passing events in their proper dispersion; it is to identify the accidents,
the minute deviations…” (198481). Therefore, he is clearly critical to the way historians have
been tracing the history of nations and communities in a predetermined fashion to locate
them in mythical origins. Those historians consider that the present is the unavoidable result
of a set of historical events. Therefore, the duty of the historian, according to them, is to
trace back that present in order to unravel the underlying deterministic mechanisms that led
to its emergence. There is consequently a form of teleological affirmation in writing history
according to traditional historiographies.
As an alternative to traditional history, Foucault proposes effective history. He
argues that historiography can avoid metaphysical explanation or predetermined trajectories.
He notes ““Effective” history deprives the self of the reassuring stability of life and nature,
and it will not permit itself to be transported by a voiceless obstinacy toward a millennial
ending” (88). In other words, the role of effective history is to highlight what is usually
presented as accidental. It cannot cast certain historical event as irregularities, or posit certain
traces as unimportant in order to reaffirm the accuracy of an abstract historical mechanism.
Effective history favors a perspectival reading, and acknowledges the importance of
historical discontinuities as well as cultural fissures. A genealogical reading that focuses on a
racial group, is always partial, plurivocal, and heterogeneous. It should not, in any event be
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considered an attempt to look for a fixed origin or a stable point of emergence.
Finally, Foucault reminds us that a genealogical reading pays close attention to the
body. It is in the body that history inscribes itself. Everything in the body is historical,
whether it is its attitudes, gestures, diets, or postures. The body generates certain modes of
thinking and suppresses others. Therefore, Foucault explains, “[g]enealogy, as an analysis of
descent, is thus situated within the articulation of the body and history. Its task is to expose a
body totally imprinted by history and the process of history’s destruction of the body”
(Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History 1984, 81). Historians, therefore, have to pay close
attention to the body in order to produce genealogical readings. The objective of this
historical chapter is to adopt a genealogical approach to examine the intersection of race,
space and Afro-French multiple identities. It rejects the assignment of an origin, in the
millennial sense of the term, to a diasporic community. On the contrary, the study shows the
boundaries of the group are fluid and evolve constantly.
Afro-French communities constitute what Howard Winant calls “a racial formation.”
In Racial conditions (1994), he writes, “[…] the key element in racial formation is the link
between signification and structure, between what race means in a particular discursive
practice and how upon such interpretations, social structures are racially organized” (4).
Racial formation operates on two levels. On the subjective plane, it refers to racialized selves
which are interpellated by discursive formations at the macro level. Winant insists on the
idea that racial formations operate on two different but interconnected planes. On the one
hand racial logics circulate on the cultural plane, on the other these logics undergo a constant
transformation as racialized subjectivities act upon them. How is it possible to undertake a
genealogical analysis that examines the racialization of Afro-French and be faithful to the
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Foucauldian approach? As we saw above, Foucault warns us against attempts to map out
groups of people or species. Foucault would be opposed to the idea of studying a group by
tracing its origins. Therefore it is imperative to think critically the concept of a genealogical
reading of “Afro-French.” How is possible to undertake such a project without falling in
one form of teleology or another? Aren’t we putting the actual existence of the group as a
pre-condition for the study of Afro-French? Shouldn’t we perform a deep and scrupulous
historical reading before claiming the existence of the group?
The scope of this chapter will not permit answering all these questions. However,
one of the purposes of this analysis is to delineate the contours of a concept that I deploy in
the following chapters to assess its explanatory power. In this sense, the concept is used to
disturb the rules of the game in scholarships that addresses the racial question in France. It
attempts to circumvent the categories that were built by state bureaucrats or institutional
sociological scholarship. Following Gilles Deleuze, the concept of “Afro-French” is a pure
invention that has the potential to provide a new vista to understand nationalism and racial
relations in France. In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Félix Guattari define philosophy as
“the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts.” The stakes of adopting such a
rationality are high. What if the reasoning that applies to philosophy doesn’t transpose easily
to the social sciences? What if there is a complete disjuncture between the analytical category
I propose here and the categories of practice that social groups use in their everyday? Such a
category might be helpful to grasp social relationships that are in perpetual flux. That’s the
challenge before us. To undertake a genealogical reading, I propose an analysis that travels
constantly between center and margins. Foucault reminds us that the “genealogist sets out to
study the beginning – numberless beginnings, whose faint traces and hints of colour are
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readily seen by a historical eye” (Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History 1984, 81). The
chapter starts with a partial and selective history of race. Then it explores briefly the spatial
and urban logics in Paris. These logics, I argue in the following sections, inform the spatial
racialization in the margins, namely Algerian, Antillean, and West Africans. When racial
techniques travel back from the colonies to the metropole they have already been altered. I
show that since the 1950s, two main tendencies have emerged in the history of migrants
housing in the metropole and both were imported from the colonies: 1) French authorities
tried to concentrate Afro-French communities within marginal spaces to better control them
and keep them away from white spaces; 2) experts also feared the formation of ghettoized
spaces and were always inclined to disperse these communities. The regulation of migrant
housing since the 1950s sheds light on the contradictions and tensions within the French
racial order and the fluidity in which the question of colonial and postcolonial subjects was
handled. Finally, the last section, examines the convergence of these different communities
in public housing and the emergence of Afro-Frenchness since the 1980s.

2.3.

Rethinking Race
Many scholars have shown that racial classifications operate on a global level and

have developed concurrently with capitalism (Winant 2001). Other have demonstrated that
racialization of people is a modern phenomenon (Quijano 2000, Fredrickson 2000, Dussel
1998). These authors suggest that the racialization of the modern world is the appropriate
framework to understand the analytics of race. Quijano explains that the existence of racial
domination doesn’t necessarily come with colonial administration. He argues that
colonialism preceded coloniality. The specificity of coloniality is that it deploys a racial
matrix in order to consolidate the European structures of power on a global level. European
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knowledges are systematically valued and universalized through these structures of power.
The logic of coloniality justifies coercive practices of the West over the Rest through the
racial classifications that give rights and ‘responsibilities’ to Europeans. The globality of the
racial signifier doesn’t prevent it from being specific within a geographic or a national
context.
The political economy of empire was intertwined with dominant racial ideologies
that tried to justify and naturalize the oppression and exploitation of colonized and enslaved
populations. Historians of colonial France show that the logics of racialization that were
utilized to legitimize slavery are very different from those deployed to advance the colonial
project. However, racial ideologies should not be understood as simply the byproduct of a
specific political economy. Instead they are co-constitutive of these projects. The racial
debates were revolving around whether the humankind belonged to one specie as certain
scientists suggested (using the New Testament as a proof), or to several species as certain
advocates of scientific racism were arguing. The proponents of slavery claimed that human
races differed substantially among each other. They developed a polygenist reading of the
human family according to which, races belonged to distinctly different species. What
polygenist theories shared is the idea that Africans are inferior to Europeans. Polygenist
theories were therefore used to rationalize slavery. Imperial powers argued that it is
acceptable to enslave Africans since they are not exactly humans. According to them human
races have different lineages and are bound to stay different.
There is on the other hand the pseudo-scientific theory elaborated by Arthur de
Gobineau. He is considered the prominent father of scientific racism, which to a large extent
was based on a biblical narrative. In An Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races (1853), he
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explains the human specie belongs to the same family but it degenerated with time. He was a
staunch anti-imperialist because he believed the European breed would be contaminated
through imperial and colonial conquests. Explaining Gobineau’s idea of miscegenation and
quoting him, Michael Burleigh writes, “Ongoing ‘miscegenation’ would eventuate in a
Europe in which the population would ‘be overcome by a dark desire to sleep, living
insensitively in their nothingness, like the buffaloes ruminating in the stagnant puddles of the
Pontines marshes” (Burleigh 1997, 156). The idea of preserving the whiteness of the
European race has a long history and important implications on racial formation in the
French empire. It is best exemplified through the debate between Gobineau and Alexis de
Tocqueville. The debate was important since it demonstrated the tension between two
important camps in France. Gobineau was interested in preserving whiteness by explaining
that the degeneration of the white race is due to the colonial mixing. Tocqueville on the
other hand was trying to convince the political elite of the importance of colonizing African
regions and spreading French culture and civilization.
The discussion between Gobineau and Tocqueville was part of an intense debate
that took place in Metropolitan France in the mid-nineteenth century. Simply put, it was a
debate between the pro-slavery and the abolitionist camps. The former was opposed to
ending slavery since its wealth and profits were based on the Atlantic slave trade and the
enslavement and exploitation of Africans. Abolitionists on the other hand, like Tocqueville,
were planting the seeds for French expansionism in Africa. They argued slavery might
threaten the colonial project in Africa because imperial powers were emptying the continent
from its manpower. Their argument was often motivated by the emerging ideas about free
labor and industrial capitalism. They were also interested in ending slavery and pursuing a
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civilizing mission instead. Their philanthropism suited the colonial spirit according to which
the conquest of Africa was mostly meant to civilize the natives. It’s interesting to trace the
evolution of Tocqueville’s thinking as the debate about the colonial project was developing.
In 1837, describing the relationship between Arabs and French he wrote, “There is… no
reason to believe that the passing of time cannot succeed in blending the two races. God is
not preventing it, only human failings can put obstacles in its path” (Jardin, Davis and
Hemenway 1989, 334). Few years later, after finally visiting Algiers, Tocqueville did a break
with his previous ideological framework. He started writing about the undesirability of such
amalgamation between races. Furthermore, his examination of the oriental context
convinced him that what the French race should not amalgamate with the Algerian but solely
civilize it. His work established a foundation for colonial thinking, which is still with us
today. During his trip to Algiers, he expressed his disdain for the Algerian political system,
sexual practices, and the Arabs’ private sphere in the following terms, “polygamy, the
isolation of women, the absence of all political life, a tyrannical and omnipresent government
which forces men to conceal themselves and to seek all their satisfactions in family
life”(Richter 1963, 377). Tocqueville’s thinking shifted probably because of his growing
interest in pushing for the colonial project in Algeria. George Fredrickson (2000) notes that
European missions were accompanying European expansion in the eighteenth century. The
civilizing face of empire complemented its military dimension in a symbiotic relationship.
The primary targets of these civilizing missions were “barbarous” people such as populations
living in Sub-Saharan Africa. These populations were considered inferior to Europeans but
they had the potential to evolve. William Cohen, the prominent historian of French
colonialism, writes, “[i]mperial ambitions cast the Africans as a passive creature in need of
white mastery. His person and his land were to be dominated by the European. The imperial
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program was yet another manifestation of the tradition of black inequality in French
thought” (Cohen 1980, 180). “Savages” on the other hand were considered a lost cause since
they “were difficult to domesticate and civilize.” The “barbarous” and “savage” represented
the radical alterity of the European. Traces of this alterity can still be found in the ways West
Africans are racialized today.
As Fredrickson shows, the process of racializing the non-Europeans served specific
purposes at different times. For example, there was the register of “savagery” which was
utilized in Australia to justify the killing of the autochthons population and make the
appropriation of their lands by white settlers, possible. In Africa there was a multiplicity of
registers that were deployed by colonial powers. The discourse about the savagery of certain
Africans was sometimes employed but it wasn’t the only one. Between savagery and
civilization, there were several categories. Fredrickson notes that Europeans were facing a
problem with those in-between categories; those who were not barbarous neither civilized.
He writes, “[t]he most problematic category were those sometimes designated as
“semicivilized” because they had cities and developed commercial economies, written
languages, and religious that competed with Christianity in their intellectual and institutional
sophistication” (103). Among those considered semicivilized were Muslim populations who
were sandwiched between barbarianism and civilization. The semicivilized could evolve if
they were exposed to the right type of culture and civilization. This is the kind of discourse
that Tocqueville utilized to describe the living conditions in Algeria. The semicivilized were
the ideal candidates for civilization as the colonial powers found out. They were in the
middle of the racial hierarchy and were disposed to evolve gradually. The genealogical
analysis demonstrates that traces of the colonial past can be found in the present
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racializations of Afro-French communities. For example the debate between Tocqueville and
Gobineau about whether white races should conquer and diffuse civilization or should
isolate themselves to preserve their racial purity and superiority. There are two logics at
work: the process of diffusing whiteness through assimilation and the civilizing mission and
the process of preserving whiteness by separating it spatially from non-whiteness. It is a
spatial metaphor in which the Mediterranean Sea plays the role of either a separator or a
bridge. This metaphor has deadly consequences in both cases as colonial and postcolonial
history has demonstrated multiple times. When the French empire strived to establish a
bridge during the Algerian war of independence, it ‘sacrificed’ a million lives to maintain this
‘organic’ relation. More recently, the Mediterranean has become a tragic mass grave as
thousands of Africans try to cross it each year and many perish as a result of the lethal
separation between the two continents.
During the early nineteenth century, the world system went through an important
transformation. Until then, the transfer of wealth from the periphery to the imperial centers
was sustained through slave labor and the production of agricultural goods in the
plantations. With the industrial revolution and the need, within the center, for more free
labor (in the Marxian sense), the capitalist system operationalized a structural transition. In
the periphery on the other hand, several forms of labor coexisted. Capitalist accumulation
sustained by slavery was withering away, while indentured work was becoming dominant. In
the case of the French empire, which experienced several humiliating defeats in the new
continent at the hands of the British, a shift centered on the black continent was necessary.
Instead of simply exercising its coercive force on the coasts of Africa, the French started
their violent exploration in the depth of the continent. The colonization of Algeria by the

!

#&!

!
French should be posited in that context. The justification for the colonization of African
territories should be thought according to the logics of the nineteenth century.
Starting with the second half of the eighteenth century, the imperial/colonial project
became intertwined with the national question. Etienne Balibar explains that every nation
occupies a specific position within the world-system. Hegemonic nations are located at the
core while weaker nations are positioned in the periphery of the world-system. The
mechanisms of exploitation and accumulation are therefore dependent on a global web of
power and the international division of labor. He also reminds us of the importance of
relationality and co-dependency within the world-system. He writes, “every nation is a
product of colonization: it has always been to some degree colonized or colonizing, and
sometimes both at the same time (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, 89). Balibar considers
colonization a central component in the global political evolution of the system of nationstates. He notes the construction of national identity is a dual process. It is based on an ideal
notion of the nation, which interpellates people and creates a form of togetherness. At the
same time, he argues, the national project needs individuals who identify with it. For the
nation to materialize and become a dominant signifier, people are expected to become
national subjects and embrace the national project. To do so, they construct an identity
based on a myth of origin and assumed common biological attributes. The common origin is
believed to be “both biological and spiritual” (100). Those who identify with the national
ideal adhere to a ‘fictive ethnicity’, which is a socio-historical formation that combines a set
of identities and differences. Not only do they belong to an imagined community but they
also share a collective animosity toward a racialized other. The rest of the chapter takes
Balibar’s conceptualization seriously by engaging with the idea of the national as a web of
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power based on relationships between an imperial center and colonial peripheries. The
genealogical analysis explores the French imperial network as a pluri-dimensional formation
crisscrossed by a multiplicity of temporalities.
2.4.

Nineteenth Century housing in France
The focus of this study is on the racialization of Afro-French through spatial

mechanisms. The analysis explores the urban forms and spatiality implemented by the
French in Algeria, West Africa, and the Antilles to regulate the racial identities of the
populations. In each case, I examine how urban fabrics were developed in the metropole to
suit the racial logics that French developed to racialize these communities in France.
Architectural forms and urban planning doesn’t have an absolute significance that transcends
culture or time. They must be articulated within a web of power and grounded in specific
places. I attempt to discern the relations of power that are nested within architectural and
urban forms. The history that I examine here focuses on the convergence of racial
discourses with urban forms. However, it’s not possible to read racial discourse simply by
analyzing urban forms. The genealogist deciphers the multiple histories taking the present as
a point of departure. Prominent anthropologist Paul Rabinow explains,
Foucault is absolutely not maintaining, as has sometimes been alleged, that
architectural form by itself carries with it an inherent political significance or
function. Rather, he maintains only that spatial localizations, and particularly certain
architectural projects, have been part of political strategies at certain historical
moments: “Architecture begins at the end of the eighteenth century to become
involved in problems of population, health, and the urban question… [It] becomes a
question of using the disposition of space for economic-political ends (2003355).
The intersection of urban infrastructures, knowledge, and power produces unique identities
as Rabinow explains. These are the axes that Le Baron de Haussmann utilized to redefine
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the urban meaning in Paris during the mid-nineteenth century, as we will see in the following
chapters. It’s only at the end of the nineteenth century however, after the defeat of 1870
inflicted by Prussia and the Paris Commune, that the state felt an urge to engage in urban
planning to control space better. This embryonic form of urbanism will develop only
minimally during the first half of the twentieth century. In the aftermath of World War Two,
policy makers engaged seriously for the first time, in a systematic urban planning with
specific underlying logics. The urge to build on a massive scale allowed the state to
implement important construction projects for migrants and French workers. The
knowledge used in these projects was often experimented in the colonies as Rabinow notes,
“But in the interim a good deal of discourse about the need for it was generated, and an
impressive amount of experimentation in urban design, which combined political, social, and
cultural factors, was carried out in the colonies” (361).
When the state started building housing for workers in the metropole by
experimenting different ideas, migrants were still invisible for the most part. Certain plans to
build specific housing for the working class started emerging in the mid-nineteenth century.
Conservatives were opposed to such endeavor since such spaces, they argued, would be a
fertile terrain for the brewing of revolutionary ideas. The working class on the other hand
was unhappy to live in such spaces since the regimentation was excessive and harassing. The
gates of workers’ housing were usually closed by 10 at night and residents were watched
closely. The proposal never went beyond the experimental level (Harvey 2003, 195).
Until the Second World War, there was no specific policy to organize housing, or
reflection on how to solve the housing crisis in France. In 1882, an important typhoid
epidemic followed by a cholera epidemic put the question of hygiene on the forefront for
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public debate. Scientists and doctors argued these epidemics are directly related to the
question of housing’s over-crowdedness in popular and poor neighborhoods (Lemoine
1987). With the Exposition Universelle of 1889, the international fair that took place in Paris
to demonstrate the power of colonial France, emerged a new thinking on questions of
poverty, hygiene and housing.
The Siegfried law was voted in 1894 to address the crisis of housing for supposedly
low-income classes. It envisaged to create Low Cost Habitat (Habitations à Bon marché or
HBM), and is considered to be the first law to address the question of social housing and
strive to bring adequate answers. The new law is the result of several trends that dominated
the political scene during that period. On the one hand, there were philanthropic
organizations that believed the question of poverty is not a private matter and required
public involvement. These organizations are symptomatic of the emergence and
consolidation of a colonial power that embraced a civilizing agenda in the colonies and in the
metropole as described above. In 1894, the Colonial Ministry was established and the
colonial question passed from the military control to a civilian one. As Alice Conklin
explains in a Mission to Civilize, the priority for the colonial power became economic rather
than military. The civilizing mission created a terrain more conducive to economic coercion
in the colonies (Conklin 1997).
In the metropole, philanthropy constituted an efficient technique for the elites to
boost their image. On the other hand, there were reformers and politicians who thought it’s
the responsibility of the state to improve the city. They advocated for a more proactive state
intervention in housing, hygiene, and poverty alleviation. Unlike philanthropists, reformers
were not opposed to state interference in an environment of free market. They don’t believe
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the state’s interference in the public domain would disturb the stability of the free market
(Dumont 1991). Their ethics emanates from a belief that lack of hygiene and poor housing
conditions would affect the city as a whole negatively. Consequently, finding solutions for
these questions should not be the sole responsibility of individuals but also the society at
large. They argue the lack of hygiene has and will have dire consequences on inhabitants
regardless of their status or their residential locations. Furthermore, they argued, the
improvement of social conditions in the city would ameliorate the conditions of production
and increase productivity. At this stage however, both reformers and philanthropists were
mostly interested in solving social rather than spatial problems. The law of 1894 is about
alleviating social problems rather than tackling spatial issues. Urban planning and housing
questions were not the prisms through which poverty and lack of hygiene were tackled yet.
The law of 1894 was inconsequential for immigrants since they were not a priority for
politicians whose focus was French workers. Even French poor working class individuals
without stable income would not qualify for HBM. The immigrants were not forced to live
in specific areas. They lived mostly in working class neighborhoods and nearby factories.
The majority was living in intra-muros Paris (Blanc-Chaléard 1998).
On the other end of the French empire, in the colonies, other spatial strategies were
implemented. These strategies were the products of specific racial matrices and differed
from one place and another. They also evolved each time there was a need to alter the racial
hierarchy or the modes of racialization. Often times, the Christian and Civilizing missions
would go with a specific agenda but once in the colony, they would adjust their racial logics
to meet the needs of the local elites and the conditions of possibility. The spatial racialization
would undergo another transformation once colonial subjects started migrating to the
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metropole in large numbers. The racialization of Algerians, Antilleans and West Africans was
informed by the colonial history of each group but had to face new constrains in the
metropole. With time however, these uneven techniques of racialization would converge as
more Afro-French lived in the housing projects in the early 1980s.

2.5.

Algerians

2.5.1. Three Waves of Colonization in Algeria
The colonial project in Algeria started in 1830 and was initially meant to divert the
attention of the French population away from a domestic political crisis. Charles X wanted
to diffuse criticism and evade domestic opposition to his rule by turning the popular
attention to an external event. He proposed a colonial adventure that would create national
unity behind him. Paul Silverstein notes, “[i]n 1827, the minister of war wrote to Charles that
an invasion of Algiers would be a “useful distraction from political trouble at home” which
would allow the government “to go to the country at the next election with the keys of
Algiers in its hand” (Ageron 1991:5)” (Silverstein, Algerians in France: Transpolitics, Race,
and Nation 2004, 42). The colonial project should be understood here as an organic part of
domestic politics rather simply an exteriority to the national project. In that regard,
colonialism could be considered a latent enterprise from the standpoint of the French
empire. It can be, and was reactivated repeatedly when the ruler faced a challenge and
needed to solve a domestic political or economic crisis. To appease his population, Charles
X tried to rally the population around a non-controversial project. By colonizing Algeria and
creating a new enemy, he was hoping to draw a racial line between white Christian French
and Muslim Arabs. Undermining domestic opposition by strengthening the racial solidarity
of French citizen seemed a viable solution. By doing so, Charles X tried to produce a new
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discourse around race to overcome a political crisis. The proposed relationship between the
“nation” and the “colonies” was designed to create a new hegemonic racial discourse. The
boundaries between nation and colony were in constant flux specifically to provide a certain
flexibility that could be activated to allow for political maneuvering.
The racial project that Charles X proposed consisted of civilizing the natives. Alexis
de Tocqueville argued that the main obstacles before French colonizers were Arabs’
nomadism and fanaticism. The portrayal of Arabs as nomads was useful since it signified
they didn’t really have any legitimate claims or rights over the land. The invocation of
fanaticism was recurrent in Christian Europe and therefore its redeployment anew was
possible (Silverstein, Algerians in France: Transpolitics, Race, and Nation 2004, 49). The
colonial project enveloped itself with a civilizing mission to achieve multiple goals. First, it
justified the colonial project by showing that the natives were actually benefiting from it. Its
declared goal was to introduce Algerians to ideas of the enlightenment and modern life.
Second, it implied an inherent French superiority, which in return gave a sense to the racial
project that Charles X and others hoped to implement. Finally, it rationalized the
implementation of an economic infrastructure, which was necessary for the penetration of
the capitalist logic.
An engagement with the racial question is therefore not only important but also
crucial to understand the French colonial logic. Michael Omi and Howard Winant suggest
that to comprehend the racial project within a specific socio-historical context, it’s necessary
to examine the racial formation, which consists of the emergence, evolution, and dissolution of
various racial categories. They write,
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[a]n alternative approach is to think of racial formation process as occurring through
a linkage between structure and representation. Racial projects do the ideological
“work” if making these links. A racial project is simultaneously an interpretation,
representation, or explanation of racial dynamics, and an effort to reorganize and redistribute
resources along particular racial lines” (Omi and Winant 1994, 56).
In this context, the racial formation within the Algerian context should be understood as the
endeavor to translate metropolitan dominant racial logics into practical techniques of
government in the colony. Spatial racialization, as this chapter demonstrates, is a corner
stone in the French colonial project. A better understanding of the formation and
maintenance of racialized spaces in the colonies sheds light on the evolution and
reproduction of these spaces into the present. Such a historical reading is necessary to
undertake a genealogical analysis.
The racial project that was unfolding in Algeria was based on an early form of
scientific racism. Charles X sent his armies not only to colonize a new territory and subdue
its population but also to civilize the natives and bring them closer to Western Civilization.
In other words, the violence incurred by the natives was necessary for the implementation of
the French civilizing mission. British historian, Neil MacMaster, remarks that the French
colonial project in Algeria went through three main phases. Although he doesn’t use the
language of racial formation, he distinguishes different forms of racialization during each one
of these phases. Each period has its specific form of violence and unique techniques of
uprooting Algerians from their lands and exploiting their labor. The French imperial design
was a long and uneven process of social transformation. During each period, white settlers
changed their alliances with local groups and redefined racial categories to maintain the
colonial project. When settlers grabbed the land, they pauperized the Algerian population
and transformed them into landless peasants, and ultimately turned large portions into poor
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urban dwellers. The “creative violence” of the colonial project was also a necessary condition
for the consolidation of an emergent industrial capitalism. Peasants were turned, after much
resistance, into a productive proletariat.
MacMaster explains that the first phase, which started in 1830 and lasted until 1870,
consisted of the military conquest of Algeria. During this preliminary period, the French
military turned vast and collectively owned territories into privately owned parcels. The
limited migration of white settlers from the metropole to Algeria and the high rate of
mortality due to extremely difficult living conditions prevented the colonial project from
evolving at a fast pace. The French project introduced a racial project in which white settler
were naturally at the top while Algerian Jews were deemed civilizable. Since the French
needed local allies to consolidate their power in the newly occupied territory, they granted
Algerian Jews the French citizenship under the Crémieux Decree of 1870. The in-between
position within the racial hierarchy was reserved to the Kabyle who were considered less
religious than Arabs and therefore more amenable to internalize Western civilization and
assimilate French values. At the bottom of the hierarchy were Arabs because they were
religious and nomadic. The imposition of this hierarchy was slow and difficult. The French
were at war with Kabyles who took up arms to prevent colonizers from taking their lands.
The colonial expedition and penetration into the Algerian depth was difficult and faced with
fierce resistance. The military operation lasted a year and ended the Kabyle uprising in 1871.
It led to the confiscation of communal lands and the establishment of private property. The
Republic introduced a new legal order that disseminated the local traditions and cultures.
However, it’s only when peasants were drawn into the market economy through a heavy
taxation system that peasants were forced to sell their lands on a massive scale. Between
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1870s and 1920s agriculture underwent an important mechanization and therefore required
less labor. The other important implication of the French campaign was the violent
destruction of the social texture, which led to important migrations from Kabylia to larger
cities as well as to the French metropole.
It’s only during the second phase, roughly from the colonial expedition of 1870 to
the aftermath of World War I, that the colonial project finally penetrated the country in
depth and altered its social fabrics. After the French defeat at the hands of the Prussian
army, the objective of Louis Bonaparte was to consolidate his domestic power through a
foreign conquest that, he thought, would unify most parties behind his rule. One of the goals
of the Third Republic at that point was to integrate the Algerian territory and make it an
extension of the metropole. Jonathan Gosnell notes, “French colonial advocates envisioned
[the Mediterranean] sea as being more of a bridge connecting parts of the same whole than
an

impenetrable

border”

(Gosnell

2006,

204).

These

geopolitical

and

spatial

conceptualizations were the foundation of empire building and had important racial
implications. This type of metaphor was used up until the 1950s to indoctrinate the French
population. Many politicians, including De Gaulle used variants of it. It was even introduced
into children’s history books in the form of a powerful emotional image: “the Mediterranean
crosses France as the Seine crosses Paris” (Gross 2002, 370).
If the Mediterranean is simply an internal boundary, then the populations on the
other side of the sea would be included in one way or another to the French nation. But
giving full rights to the native would be contrary to empire building. Therefore, Algerians
started occupying an in-between position. They were not full citizens nor foreigners. To
regulate the lives and destinies of the natives, the French authorities promulgated the code of
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the native (Code d'Indigénat), on 28 June 1881. The debates surrounding the status of Muslim
subjects of the French empire were at the core of the new code. The code detailed the
punishments the natives would endure if they offend white settlers. The lack of respect for
the settlers was one among many punishable offenses. The questions around the inclusion or
exclusion of the natives did not stop the dispossession of Algerian peasants from their lands
nor their integration into the capitalist mode of production more fully. The French’s
imposition of private property was very destructive since it signified a transfer of wealth
from the native inhabitants to white settlers. Cash transactions became the main mode of
economic exchange. While the colonial military machine disseminated pre-colonial social
patterns by crude force, the new economic and legal apparatuses destroyed traditional
cultures and life styles through soft power. Finally, the third period, which lasted until the
start of the Algerian war of independence as explained below, was characterized by social
and political instability, in addition to a crisis in the political economy of colonialism,
constituted a period of decline for the colonial project (MacMaster 1997, 22-33).

Figure 2-1: French Colonial Postcard, Algerian Types, 1898-1906 (Assus 1898).
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The French deployed complex racial matrices in the colonies to consolidate their
power. Many groups and cultures coexisted in Algeria before the French conquest. Patricia
Lorcin explains that,
[Algeria’s] principal components were Arabs and Berbers, but it also included Turks;
Kouloughlis (the offsprings of Turks and North African women); Andalusians
(descendants of the Moors exiled from Spain); blacks (mainly soldiers, emancipated
slaves and slaves); Jews; and ‘Infidels’ (non-Muslim slaves and renegades, many of
whom held high office under Turkish occupation) (Lorcin 1995, 2).
French argued that the diversity of the Algerian society prevented the constitution of a
homogenous identity, which was a prerequisite for the existence of a nation-state. The
presumed absence of a national community was in reality a necessary justification for the
colonialism of the country. The French demonized these “fragmented groups” in different
ways to deny them autonomy. With time however, the colonial power felt the need to have
local allies. It invented the Kabyle Myth as an effective form of racialization to distinguish
the good subjects from the bad ones. French experts explained that Kabyle, unlike Arabs are
more amenable to assimilate French culture. As a consequence a large percentage of the
migrant workforce were recruited from the Kabyles and Berbers. French administrators built
a strategic relationship with Berbers because they were considered less attached to Islam and
more educated. They were therefore valuable assets for French metropolitan employers who
often came to Algeria to recruit these workers.

2.5.2. Colonial Urban Planning
The geography of racialization, which was deployed in Algeria, was twofold: it was
operationalized through colonial geography and urban planning. When the French empire
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started its Algerian conquest, the spatial logic was primarily driven by military
preoccupations. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, the main concern for the French
authorities was to produce spaces that they would be able to defend and preserve. These
military considerations were the driving force behind the spatiality of cities and villages
throughout Algeria. A military grid was developed and deployed throughout the Algerian
territory. MacMaster explains, “the single most powerful mechanism for dispossession arose
from the destruction of communal landownership through the imposition of a European
legal system that recognized private individual property rights and the sale of land”
(MacMaster 1997, 27). The brutality of the colonial project was so extreme that Napoleon
III issued polices aimed at protecting the native population. The introduction of money as
the principal means of exchange and the imposition of high taxes on peasants led to the
destitution of many peasants from their land. The dispossession of Algerian peasants of their
lands constituted a radical break with the Algerian pre-colonial past and was lived as a
traumatic experience by many. Frantz Fanon, who witnessed this process, presents the
radical transformation of peasants into urban dwellers in the following terms:
Abandoning the countryside and its insoluble problems of demography, the landless
peasants, now a lumpenproletariat, are driven into the towns, crammed into shanty
towns and endeavor to infiltrate the ports and cities, the creations of colonial
domination. As for the mass of the peasantry, they continue to live in a petrified
context, and those who cannot scrape a living in the countryside have no other
choice but to emigrate to the cities (Fanon 2004, 66-67).
The account of Fanon is a reminder that there is an intrinsic relationship between urban
formations, colonial violence, and the integration of Algerian society into the web of the
global capitalist economy. The colonial power started building extensive infrastructures to
support the penetration of colonial power and pave the way for capitalism.
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The violence of urban planning was less direct and visible but its impact is as
profound as the geography implemented by the military. For example, in Algiers, the military
logic was regressing to be replaced by an alternate logic. Algiers was the capital of French
Africa and it represented the façade of the French empire. From that perspective,
monumentality was another directing vector. The city was therefore a showcase of the
French empire. These spatial considerations generated new racial categories and shaped
racial identities of the groups who lived in the city. For example, the split between the
Casbah, the part of the city inhabited by the natives, and the new European city was clearly
demarcated. Once colonization became a fait accompli, the city started a gradual transition
from a military dungeon to a city of commerce in the 1920s and 30s (Çelik 1997). During
this period, the Muslim population was deemed civilizable and was therefore invited to
assimilate French values. Experts’ interventions through the urban hoped to achieve military
goals.
By the end of the nineteenth century, experts were able to achieve much more
through space. Paul Rabinow explains that an important paradigm shift occurred at the dawn
of the twentieth century. He notes, “Modern urbanism and the totalizing social planning it
embodied were born only at the end of the century, when a form was invented that
combined the normalization of the population with a regularization of spaces” (Rabinow,
French Modern Norms and Forms of the Social Environment 1995, 76-77). At that
conjuncture, urban planning is utilized to achieve many goals beside the military ones.
Through it, French experts attempted to colonize various fields of the social. The dominant
logic of planning during this period was based on the separation of areas within the city with
specific functions. In the metropole, planners created work zones, and residential areas.
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Disciplining the population through a rigorous spatiality didn’t disappear but stopped being
the only preoccupation. The new urgency for planners and other social actors was to
improve the lives of the population. Better hygiene was often perceived a point of departure
to improving urban planning and living conditions. Improving the living conditions was the
duty of the white settlers. It was part of the white settlers destiny. Jules Ferry, the father of
French secularism and a fervent proponent of colonial expansion, who is still very respected
today, reminded his fellow parliament members in 1881 “that superior races have a right,
because they have a duty. They have the duty to civilize inferior races” (quoted in (Keaton
2006, 102). The language of civilizing mission, which became coded later on, was still a
source of pride at the turn of the nineteenth century.

2.5.3. Algerian Migrations to France
Most of the imperial processes that shaped racial identities of Algerians were taking
place in the colony up until the beginning of the twentieth century. With World War I, the
number of Algerian who lived in France was less than few thousands. During WWI, North
Africans were forced to fight alongside France and more than 25,000 Algerian and 12,000
Tunisians were killed in the process. During the same period, the violence of the colonial
project in Algeria intensified. Many Algerian peasants were dispossessed of their lands or
were unable to work on the land anymore because of mechanization, had to migrate to
Algerian cities and increasingly to the French metropole. The uprooting of peasants from
their lands combined with an increasing need for labor in the metropole provoked a large
Algerian migration after WWI. The number of Algerians who lived in France in the 1920s
exceeds 100,000. Algerians were making up for the French workforce that disappeared
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during the war. Metropolitan industrialists appreciated Algerians because they constituted a
cheap labor and were perceived as a docile racial group.
For French capitalists in Algeria, migration was a setback; they felt the urge to stop
the hemorrhage of the Algerian working class. Colonial lobbies were dissatisfied with the
migration of Algerian because it represented a depletion of the much needed labor force in
the colony (Jim House 2006). They argued the Algerians would be exposed to radical ideas in
the metropole through their daily contact and interaction with the French working class and
the communist party and might potentially contaminate Algerians with revolutionary ideals
once they return home. In the 1920s, the colonial lobbies funded a campaign in metropolitan
France to demonize North Africans and transform them into undesirable others to slow
down the pace of the migratory flux or stop it completely. After a newspaper published a
short news item about an Algerian man who murdered a white woman, the media started a
campaign against immigrants. Other media outlets reported the same item and used racial
descriptors already available in the French imaginary. Algerians were portrayed as unreliable,
dangerous and hypersexual. Under the rubric “Africa on the Seine shore”, L’Intransigeant, the
leading right wing newspaper, titled one of its articles in 1933 “A Grand Arab City within the
Grand Paris: 2000 African males and two African females live in the shacks” (Dubard 1933).
The journalist is appalled by the poverty and living conditions but the emphasis of the article
is on the lives of two white females and two indigene females who live in ‘the Arab city.’ The
piece denounces racial mixing and, while indirectly, calls for the regulation of the sexuality of
the indigenes who live in the metropole. This type of coverage, in addition to the colonial
lobbies previous efforts to demonize Algerians in the media had important repercussions on
the racialization of Algerians and other North Africans living in metropolitan France.
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The media campaign against Algerians incited the government to conduct a study
about the status of Algerians living in the country. Most of the questions revolved around
mixed marriages between Algerian men and French women, and the number of children
each couple has. The study was a clear indicator that the government was not interested in
the hygienic and housing conditions of Algerians as it has initially claimed. Instead it was
preoccupied by the contamination of whiteness in the metropole and was thinking about
ways to halt that process (Noiriel 2007, 311-316). William Oualid who represented the
official policy towards immigration in the late 1920s, explained that the republic should be
selective in bringing migrant workers. He pointed that the influx of male workers was
creating a demographic problem due to the imbalance between male and female ratios. That
was a source of worry for him and many others in the ruling class since, as he puts it, the
increasing number of mixed marriages would degenerate the French race, a fear that
Gobineau had almost seventy years earlier. To prevent such a prospect, “there is a need to
impose a strict selection that would prevent external elements to the French race from
mixing with it and bringing to it germs that it had already discarded” (Noiriel 2007, 324).
The idea that Algerians were a potential threat to French society transformed them
into an enemy from within. From that moment and on, they were under constant
surveillance and had to go through special registrations once in France. They were confined
to specific spaces whether for housing matters or other everyday activities. The FrancoMuslim Hospital of Bobigny (l'hôpital franco-musulman de Bobigny), which was inaugurated in
1935, was meant to separate the medical spaces of les indigenes from those of white French.
Despite the isolation of Arabs and their segregation in specific spaces, they were perceived as
second-class citizens of the same nation. Rene Gonthier, author of Towards a French Racism
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(1939), reminds his readers that the main enemy of the French nation is the Jewish individual
not the Arab. He also explains that Arabs and Berbers, unlike Black and Yellow races, are
assimilable to the French nation. In the book, Jews were presented not only as inferior but
also as an antagonistic racial group since they ‘were taking’ the jobs of lawyers and doctors
(Noiriel 2007, 469-470). After World War II, with a new need for labor force from the
colonies, the process of surveillance became less urgent. Instead French authorities were
interested in implementing techniques to integrate colonial subjects since Algeria would
ultimately be part of France on the longer range. The control of migrant workers became
more paternalistic and less police oriented. The French savoir-faire would be employed to
improve the hygiene of Algerians while at the same time Algerian vagabonds would be
coerced to work (Lyons 2006).

2.5.4. The Second Phase of Spatial Distribution
Franco-Algerian sociologist, Abdelmalek Sayad proposed a framework to explore
Algerian emigration/immigration based on socio-historical and economic evolution of
Algerian society. The flux of these populations should be understood, he contends, in a
dialectical fashion, which highlights the implications of migration not only on the host
country but also the homeland. Sayad provided a grid of analysis that is more appropriate for
the phenomenon he studied since it made colonial mechanisms comprehensible when they
were transnational. He identifies three ages of Algerian emigration with their social
implications on the colony. During the first period, Algerian immigrants were mostly coming
from the countryside and were middle-aged. They usually spent few years in France and sent
a substantial part of their income to their families back in Algeria. They didn’t develop a
substantial emotional relationship with France since they had a strong attachment with, and
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were nostalgic for Algeria. As explained below, the second phase represents the slow
detachment of migrants from Algerian life styles while the third phase announces the
formation of a “little country” within the host country (Sayad, Les trois "ages" de
l'emigration Algerienne en France 1977).
The framework proposed by Sayad is very useful to rethink the geography of
Algerian migration as well as the spatial practices of migrant workers. Sayad’s theorization
renders the violence taking place in the colony visible while at the same time highlighting the
processes of racialization that workers went through in France. In other words, migration
was punctuated by a history of colonial violence in the homeland and coercive everyday and
institutional racisms in the host nation. For example, the end of the war signified a day of
liberation for metropolitan French whereas for Algerians, that same day, May 8th 1945,
represented the beginning of colonial massacres in the region of Setif and Guelma in Algeria.
Once in the metropole, workers had to endure an aggressive white supremacy. At the end of
the fifties, de Gaulle redefined the contours of Frenchness and whiteness and reminded
Algerians of their radical alterity:
It is very good that there be yellow Frenchmen, black Frenchmen, brown
Frenchmen. They prove that France is open to all races and that she has a universal
mission. But on the condition that they remain a small minority. Otherwise, France
would no longer be France. We are after all primarily a European people of the white
race, of Greek and Latin culture, and of the Christian faith. Try to mix oil and
vinegar. Shake the bottle. In a moment they will separate again. Arabs are Arabs and
French are French. Do you believe that the French nation can absorb ten million
Muslims, who perhaps tomorrow will be twenty million and the day after forty
million? If we adopt integration, if all the Arabs and Berbers of Algeria were
considered as Frenchmen, what would prevent them from coming to settle in
mainland France where the standard of living is so much higher? My village would
no longer be called Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises, but Colombey-les-deux-Mosquées!
(De Gaulle 2005)
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De Gaulle’s statement was pronounced during the Algerian war of independence and
should be understood within that specific context. However, his words highlight a tension
that all empire building goes through. One the one hand there is an inclusive dynamic that
constantly transform its outside, the “yellow Frenchmen, black Frenchmen, brown
Frenchmen,” into an organic whole. On the other, there is a logic of exclusivity that needs to
protect the core, the “European people of the white race, of Greek and Latin culture, and of
the Christian faith,” which is the raison d'être of empire building. These two contradictory
mechanisms operate at once by producing porous boundaries and policed contours. They
are behind two general trends of racialization of Algerians who live in France. On the one
hand, Algerians are very visible and often perceived as a threat that could contaminate the
purity of the white race as de Gaulle’s statement demonstrates. On the other, Algerians are
reduced to invisibility and are relegated to specific spaces that hide them.
The sexuality is another realm that was always a source of concern for French
authorities. In the thirties, as mentioned above, Algerians worried the French authorities
because of the large number of males and the quasi absence of females. In the 1950, this
became more of a concern since it was clear to demographers and policy makers that a large
part of Algerians would stay in France. With the ‘unbalance’ in numbers between male and
female, experts worried that the white race might be contaminated if Algerian men married
white women in large numbers. In 1954, Les Cahiers nord-africains (a journals established in the
fifties to study the Maghrebian population and provide colonial knowledge to the
government), explained that familial reunification is crucial and without it, the Algerian male
would be psychologically unstable, less productive, and more rebel. The consequence is “that
migrant workers become more open to subversive ideas and propaganda, they leave behind
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their Muslim families back in Algeria, they adventure themselves into mixed and hasty
marriages, they live in cohabitation, and finally they become hostile in an unreasonable
fashion towards European civilization” (cited in (Lyons 2006, 43)).
This type of analysis shows that the regulation of the racial matrix is fundamental in
these experts’ thinking. The entry point to analyze spatial racialization is by examining the
spaces inhabited by migrant workers. Algerians living in France form a heterogeneous
population, with groups coming from the countryside and others from large Algerian cities;
they also belong to various cultures and social backgrounds. An exhaustive history of
migrant workers in France is therefore beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, what is
proposed here is a genealogical reading that attempts to grasp a history of the present by
focusing on specific nodal points. A history of the present suggests that le bidonville (the
shantytown) constituted an important space in the racialization of Algerians. Most could not
evade it during their metropolitan stay, even if briefly. There are no precise statistics about
the spatial distribution of Algerians in each type of housing but some scholars have
suggested many did not experience life in the bidonville for extended periods (Lyons 2006).
These Algerians inhabited many different spaces such as overcrowded and insanitary
furnished rooms (hôtels meublés), slums (taudis), and later temporary housing (cités de transit),
and foyers. The chapter argues however, that bidonvilles constituted a paradigmatic space
because of its visibility in the media; its control by the police; and its regulation by various
urban and political actors. The high visibility of the inhabitants of the bidonville transformed
it into an ideal space (in the Weberian sense) for the racialization of Algerians.

!

%'!

!
2.5.5. The Formation of the Bidonville
The bidonvilles were already a social reality in the French urban texture in the
nineteenth century. These spaces were located in poor neighborhoods at the center and
periphery of Paris. Poorly conceived houses were erected in a random fashion and using
light construction material. The grid of roads and streets that usually structured the urban
fabrics is not present in the same regularity in these spaces. The Bidonvilles were perceived
as filthy, non-hygienic, and poor spaces struck by various social vices. When Le Baron
Haussmann was asked to restructure Paris’ urban texture, one of the spaces he tried to
eradicate or remove completely from the capital was the bidonville. “The plan for Paris to
assume the mantle of imperial Rome and become the head and heart of civilization in
Europe was part of Haussmann’s mandate” (Harvey 2003, 209). To a large extent, modern
bidonvilles were still spaces that irritated the power elite who wanted to displace or remove
them. In the mid-twentieth century, the bidonville shared many of the characteristics of its
predecessors such as poverty, isolation, and misery. In the fifties, there were two types of
shantytowns. Ethnically homogenous groups (Spanish, Portuguese, Algerian…) inhabited
the first type with few exceptions such as the bidonville de la Coureneuve. The second type was
constituted of dispersed micro-bidonvilles, which regrouped only few dozens shacks each
(Paskins 2009). The shacks were often made of wood and corrugated iron sheets.
The most notorious of these bidonvilles was in Nanterre, which is located in the
western suburb of Paris. In 1948, North African who couldn’t find space in the furnished
rooms in the vicinity started building shacks and light structures on unused land to stay in
the neighborhood, nearby their families and friends who often came from the same village.
Nanterre was located approximately three kilometers from the Eiffel Tour and yet
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symbolized an abject poverty and marginalization. It was a colonial space located within the
core. The number of dwellers between 1960 and 1965 was around 14,000. It didn’t have
water, heating nor electricity while the mud was surrounding the houses. Inside, the shacks
were lit with candles. Often times, several families shared the same bathroom. The space of
the bidonville was constituted of several unconnected pieces of land. These early microbidonvilles did not only provide a place to live but also provided halal meat from the local
butcher, coucous, and other ingredients from the Maghreb. The bidonville was also an
crucial place for sharing information and telling stories from home. The space was a safety
net for many new migrants.
2.5.6. The Logic of the Bidonville From Inside
Living conditions in the bidonvilles were extremely difficult. Running water and
electricity were unusual. Often times several hundreds used to share one faucet of water.
Mud was the norm, and rain often times found its way inside the shakes. For an external
observer, the bidonville represented a chaotic space (Rosello 2002). This is how it was
presented in the media and public discourses. For policy makers, the bidonville was often
conveniently presented as an exteriority, or a space located outside the realm of the republic.
However, things were different from within. What seemed like a disorder for an
inexperienced gaze was in reality a space with very precise internal logics and rules.
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Figure 2-2: Bidonville of Nanterre (Pottier 1956)

To better comprehend the internal logic of the bidonville, one should link it to the
history of migration that sustained it. The framework that Abdelmalek Sayad proposes to
analyze the genealogy of Algerian migration could be helpful in this context. He argues that
the second and third waves of migration are structurally different from the first. The FrancoAlgerian sociologist explains, the second generation of immigrants was less attached to the
land back in Algeria. This is because their uprooting has been too prolonged and for some of
them they have never been peasants since their ancestors had lost their lands. Unlike the first
generation, which often fought all its life to preserve traditional culture, the second
generation went through a process of “de-peasantification” as Sayad puts it. They didn’t
have much of a peasant culture; they were mostly urban dwellers even before coming to the
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French metropole. Their relationship with money was also different compared to the first
generation since transactions and exchange in their everyday lives have been monetarized for
the most part. The emigrant of the second generation occupied an in-between position; he
had lost his identity of peasant but was not a worker yet. He was a worker in becoming. He
was often in France for longer periods compared to the migrant of the first generation but
his stay was still temporary. It’s the “sentiment of the temporary,” or a “durable temporary
state” as Sayad puts it (Sayad, Les trois "ages" de l'emigration Algerienne en France 1977).
The migrant of the second generation started constructing his homeland in the bidonville.
The bidonville was a substitute for the homeland. The interior of the house often contained
artifacts from home.
The third age of emigration represents the emergence of an Algerian colony in the
metropole; several factors made it possible. Instead of a migration simply composed of
single men, more families were part of the third wave. Migrants realized their stay in France
was going to be prolonged. Their return was constantly deferred without any prospects in
the horizon, back at home. Sayad explains that migrants needed to construct a temporary
homeland in the metropole. The bidonville made this possible because of the high
concentration of Algerians living within its boundaries. Sayad has shown that the bidonville,
which seems at first to be a chaotic space, is in reality structured according to precise rules
and logics. Algerians will attempt to construct home in the bidonville despite the harsh living
conditions. In doing so, they transform both, the spatiality of the bidonville is altered and
the idea of the homeland is hybridized. The bidonville becomes the paradigmatic space not
only for outsiders but also for the residents as Sayad explains.
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2.5.7. Between Colony and Metropolitan France
Between metropolitan bidonvilles and ones located in the colonies, there were many
parallels. Colonial planners and administrators exported the disciplinary techniques and
urban mechanisms they implemented efficiently in the colony to the metropole. Their logic
was simple: since it is the same population in the colony and the metropole, what worked
‘there’ should also function ‘here.’ The Algerian uprising started in 1954 and by 1958 it had
become a violent imperial campaign. The Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) was able to rally
most of the population behind its war of independence. The Algerian population has
become very determined in few years and colonial violence was not sufficient to deter or
silence the population. One of the privileged techniques the colonial power implemented to
pacify the population was urban planning. Zeynep Çelik explains that in the 1950s, one
Muslim family out of seven lived in the bidonville in Algiers (Çelik 1997, 110). After a close
study of the housing and living conditions, French administrators proposed a redevelopment
plan they named Constantine Plan. Çelik explains,
According to Jean Fabian, the municipal inspector for the casbah, the sociocultural
project involved establishing new clinics and schools, and encouraging commercial
enterprise. As congestion was the main issue, ventilating the casbah by means of
demolition would allow for good traffic circulation and improve the transportation
problems, as well as endowing the quarter with a "decent and modern" face, one that
would be perceived as "a very great French work." According to the Plan de
Constantine, the residents would be relodged in new housing projects specifically
designed for them (Çelik 1997, 46-47).
The Constantine Plan was a complementary facet to the military war that the French
were fighting. De Gaulle promised to build 200,000 new housing units and create 400,000
new jobs. This was the first time the natives were the primary beneficiary of a renewal
project. The Constantine Plan was generalized starting in 1961 and each city with more than
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10,000 inhabitants would follow the planning experimental principles developed in Algiers.
The main theme in the Constantine Plan was to provide the natives with housing inspirited
by traditional forms. Instead of the horizontal traditional fabric however, a vertical
implementation was proposed. High rises became the new norm (Chemrouk 2004, 18-20).
2.5.8. Spatial Racialization of Algerians
The French ruling class viewed the culture of resistance and solidarity that built in
the bidonville as a threat and could be detrimental to the future of French Algeria. Fanon
notes in the Wretched of the Earth that criminality among immigrants has virtually disappeared.
He explains, since the War of Algerian independence, “Gone are the quarrels, the disputes
over minor details ending in homicide. Gone the explosive fits of rage because the neighbor
caught sight of my wife's forehead or left shoulder. The national struggle appears to have
channeled all this anger and nationalized every affective and emotional reaction” (Fanon
2004, 230). All the immigrants’ energies were now channeled toward fighting the colonial
power and achieve independence for Algeria.
From the imperial perspective, the Parisian bidonville, like its Algerian counterpart,
became a dangerous space, not only for hygienic or esthetic reasons, but also for political
imperatives. The Algerian Front de Libération Nationale was well implanted in the bidonville
and able to rally most Algerians behind its cause, sometimes using coercive techniques to
make certain individuals pay their monthly dues. As a result, the bidonville was highly visible
while other spaces inhabited by Algerians were relegated to invisibility. Many of the
techniques the French implemented in Algeria started emerging in France. For example, the
authorities started gathering information through surveys and partial studies but also through
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informants. However, it’s only in 1966 that the government decided to undertake the first
exhaustive study of the bidonville (Gastaut 2004).
For many experts, the point of reference to regulate the bidonville was the colonial
margin. The bidonville was perceived as an outpost of uncivilized culture and practices. Yves
Gastaut cites a study conducted by the ministry of housing and reconstruction in 1955,
where the authors explained the number of beds should be limited in each household in the
bidonville to prevent the formation of indigenous villages at the gates of large French cities.
They also suggest that certain architectural forms should be utilized to prevent the
emergence of exotic/foreign urban forms. These experts suggest, “The Casbah formula with
a minaret and a patio, without mentioning “the oriental décor of the interior” is foreign to
our occidental landscape” (Gastaut 2004). For white inhabitants who live in the vicinity of
the bidonvilles these spaces were also rejected. Sometimes they complained about the noise
and smells of the bidonvilles (Paskins 2009, 5).
To manage these spaces, the state deployed soft and coercive power. When soft
power was not sufficient to discipline the inhabitants, the authorities used violent techniques
imported from the colonies. Many officers who fought in Algeria were recruited to coerce a
population they supposedly knew well. To regulate lives within the bidonville and patrol its
contours, the police created the Brigade Z. They were specialized in the disciplining of the
Maghrebian population. For example, they marked houses with specific codes to prevent the
construction of new shakes. When inhabitants transgressed their power, they were punished.
For example, the brigade would destroy the new house and sometimes burn it. When they
needed to gather information about the FLN, they did not hesitate to torture a militant in a
van, nearby the bidonville, to scare and discipline the population who hear from inside
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(Gastaut 2004). One of the most traumatic experiences for the populations of the bidonville
took place on October 17th, 1961 when the French government decided to quell the
organizing of the FLN in France by imposing a curfew on the Maghrebian population. They
were forbidden to leave the bidonville during the night. The FLN refused to abide by the
French effort to its marginalization. They organized a successful demonstration, which
ended in a bloodbath. That night, the police killed several hundreds Algerians and threw
many in the Seine. The massacre was not investigated and the media either chose to be silent
or was coerced to so.
2.5.9. The dismantling of bidonvilles
In the 1960s, the state considered the foyer the preferred form of housing for
immigrants since it was easier and more effective to control. The Sonacotral, a public
organism, whose aim was to erect foyers for immigrant workers, was created in 1956. In
1964, the government decided to eradicate the bidonvilles, accelerate the construction of
foyers, and transfer undesirable migrant populations to these contained spaces. The
organism was under the control of the ministry of interior who was interested in collecting
information about Algerians while at the same time, undermine the FLN political organizing.
In 1959, the Sonocoral started building foyers to accommodate the most needy families.
They built 19 such projects during that year to move the inhabitants of Nanterre bidonville.
The number of foyers reached 300 in Paris and its suburbs in 1961, a pivotal year for the
Algerian war. Beside the militarization of the foyer and the regulation of its residents’ lives,
the new spaces were not sufficient to absorb the whole bidonvilles population. Many of
those who lost their homes when the bidonvilles were destroyed, didn’t have an apartment
to replace it with and as a result became homeless (Lyons 2006, 45-6).
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The last bidonvilles were torn down in 1975. But most Algerians were not
considered fit to have apartment in the public housing the state has started constructing
since the 1950s. Communist mayors, who were often elected in working class cities,
requested a ‘better’ and ‘fairer’ distribution of foreigners. They asked for the implementation
of quotas on Algerians and other immigrants who would be eligible to live over their
territory and have access to the public housing. These mayors initiated a long debate about
the appropriate percentage of immigrants who could live in a specific space (Masclet 2005).
The debate was revived again more recently in the late 1980s, under the label of ‘threshold of
tolerance.’ The quota policy makers and demographers were discussing was about
determining the most appropriate ethnic distribution that would allow the assimilation of
foreigners and preserve white French culture (Silverman 1992, 74). Communist
representatives wanted to get rid of the migrant population since it didn’t have any voting
power. Right wing governments on the other hand, tried to concentrate large number of
immigrants in communist municipalities to burden a powerful communist party with a
pariah population “with many problems” and with no voting power (Tissot, Une «
discrimination informelle » ?. Usages du concept de mixité sociale dans la gestion des
attributions de logements HLM 2005). At the same time they wanted to undermine the
working class leftist culture by introducing the racial question.
In parallel with the foyers, the state built what was known as the Cités de transit
(transitional projects), which were created to relocate families out of the bidonville. These
spaces were perceived as transitional where migrant workers and their families could move
to once they lost their habitat in the bidonville, and before they could move into public
housing. Experts explained that transitional projects were supposed to civilize migrant
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families who never had access to electricity and running water. Administrators argued this is
a necessary period to civilize immigrant families and teach them French values and culture.
Migrants would not be able to function properly in the public housing without this prior
education. Initially, these families were told their stay would be provisional; that they would
spend two years at most before moving to the HLM. British anthropologist Ralph Grillo,
whose writing was probably faithful to the dominant thinking of that period, wrote the
following about Algerians,
There are some from cities, but there is no comparison between a city in North
Africa and a city in France. It is necessary, therefore, to give them support, to teach
them neighborly relations. This is not racism. It is only a question of personality. The
aim is to round out the men morally, and tea the women to cook and sew. It is
necessary to prepare people for cohabitation, to train them so that they can be
admitted into an HLM (Grillo 1985, 130).
His assessment was an accurate depiction of French administrators’ mindset. The Cités de
transit were supposed to be temporary constructions since French authorities were hoping
migrant families would go back to their countries after few years. Algerian families had to
live in this type of habitat for two years to adapt to French life style. In the end however,
they lived in light and poorly built structures for up to twenty years. The Cités de transit
were inspired by the colonial model developed in Constantine and which was built to civilize
Algerians and oblige them to accept the Frenchness of Algeria. We know today that both
models failed, whether in the colony or the metropole.

2.6.

Antilleans

2.6.1. The Colonial History of the French Caribbean
The Antilles is the second node I explore in the French imperial web. Its racial
matrix within was multifaceted and often specific to each locality with an overarching logic
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of white supremacy that ordered the racial hierarchy. The French Antilles were part of an
imperial web in which, the complexity and fluidity of race relations were a defining
characteristics. Initially the differences between white indentured laborers and African ones
were minimal. With time however, in order to preserve white privilege, the ruling class
constructed a white identity in which white indentured workers could identify with. By
forming an alliance with poor white laborers, the landlords wanted to protect the imperial
project in the Indies. Poor white laborers stopped being part of the system of bondage while
blacks became slaves and their lives were regulated by the black code. The first version of
the code was operative as early as 1685, and explained that slaves are meuble or movable
property. The code also regulated slavery and slave trade in a detailed fashion.
The racialization of non-white populations was multilayered and complex. For
example, free slaves played an important role in shifting the balance of power one way or
another. In certain historical contexts, when whites were outnumbered and felt the need to
consolidate their political or economic power, they gave certain privileges to freemen. These
alliances were made in a way that would not undermine white supremacy or slavery. The
ruling class considered the racial code could be loosened in specific situations to save the
racial system. This was the case, for example, in the second half of the eighteenth century as
the resistance of enslaved Africans was building up. Certain slave owners suggested “a man
of color removed from his black ancestry by six generations should be considered white. His
somatic features would virtually be indistinguishable from whites’ and thus there would be
no reason to keep him apart” (Cohen 1980, 106). This allowed whites to redefine blackness
and whiteness in ways that enabled them to recruit new allies among the subjugated groups.
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The emergence of slavery in the Indies was a defining moment not only for the
constitution of the French empire but also for the transformation of the world-system. In
Capitalism and Slavery, Eric Williams contends that slavery was the engine of capitalist
expansion and evolution. Based on a Marxian methodology, he explains that accumulation of
capital generated by West Indian slavery financed the British industrial revolution. In the
same vein, Williams explains, the decline of slavery should to be explained in Marxian terms.
He argues, as the rate of profit was declining, slavery became less and less useful as a system
of exploitation. In economic terms, it doesn’t matter whether slavery declined and
disappeared because of humanitarian sentiments or due to the struggles of black slaves.
Williams writes, “In 1833, therefore, the alternatives were clear: emancipation from above, or
emancipation from below. But EMANCIPATION. Economic change, the decline of the
monopolists, the development of capitalism, the humanitarian agitation in British churches,
contending perorations in the halls of Parliament, had now reached their completion in the
determination of the slaves themselves to be free. The Negroes had been stimulated to
freedom by development of the very wealth which their labor had created” (Williams 1994
(1944), 208).
The thesis advanced by Williams has been discredited by a number of historians.
Cedric Robinson has labeled their scholarship as “Bourgeois historiography” because they
strived to delink industrial capitalism from slavery. Instead of being the driving force behind
industrialization, slavery was portrayed as irrelevant in this revisionist history. For these
historians, the distinction that Williams instituted between the nineteenth century’s industrial
bourgeoisie and the pro-slavery mercantile ruling classes of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries doesn’t hold. The implication of their work is that, those who fought for the
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abolition of slavery didn’t have an economic incentive to do so. By delinking the economic
system

from

slavery,

Bourgeois

historiography

reduced

the

question

of

emancipation/abolition to a question of ethics. Robinson notes that what Williams achieved
in Capitalism and Slavery is show that, “the British industrial bourgeoisie could only be seen to
have taken an ethically, spiritually and ideologically superior direction by historical
suppression” (Robinson 1987, 136). Robinson shows that even if there is no mechanical
relationship between the end of slavery and the emergence of industrial capitalism, it’s
important to acknowledge the important role slavery had played in organizing the social and
political systems in ways that made it possible for industrial capitalism to function.
Eminent historian Frederick Cooper points out, even if there is no direct relationship
between the withering away of slavery and the emergence of industrial capitalism, the
coercive social relations and the disciplinary culture capitalism inherited from slavery were
extremely important. One of the questions that intrigued the embryonic industrial class in
the nineteenth century was how to transform free slaves into docile workers. This transition
was extremely important at the level of the world-system; it prepared the terrain for a new
form of coercive labor. Cooper and Scott write, “a parliamentary committee asked itself
whether “the slaves, if emancipated would maintain themselves, would be industrious and
disposed to acquire property by labour.” They add, ““Slaves had to learn that free labor
meant the “dread of starvation” instead of “the dread of being flogged”; this was what the
architects of emancipation meant by the “transition from the brutal to the rational
predicament”” (Cooper and Scott, Beyond Slavery: Explorations of Race, Labor, and
Citizenship in Postemancipation Societies 2000, 20). The fear of uncertainty of what might
come after slavery led the architects of emancipation to think about different disciplinary
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and coercive mechanisms to incite slaves to become obedient free laborer. The authors show
that the transition from slavery to free labor is a very heterogeneous and complex process. It
took many forms and depended on specific social formations and historical conjunctures.
One could also explore the question of emancipation for the standpoint of enslaved
Africans. Kevin Santiago-Valles explains that slave rebellions constituted a wave of revolts
on a world-historical scale. He shows that the rivalry between Britain and France combined
with a number of rebellions between 1722 and 1815 weakened and then destroyed slavery as
a social institution. These revolts made slavery too expansive to maintain from a capitalist
perspective. Abolition of slavery from this standpoint is the logical result of slave resistance
(Santiago-Valles 2005). The French elite in the metropole as well as in the colonies opposed
abolition and tried to delay it as much as possible. William Cohen explains that “Napoleon
contemplated evacuating all blacks from the West Indies (since they had been “infected” by
the virus of revolution) and sending them to West Africa” (Cohen 1980, 169).
In any case, the emancipation of slaves raised a new set of problems. The French
elite had to restructure the racial matrix in ways that preserved its political and economic
power. One of the problems it had to resolve since 1848, with the abolition of slavery, was
to assign a new status to the brown and black subjects who were not slaves anymore. Should
they become full citizens of the French empire? Were they citizens of an independent
country? What were their new legal and political statuses? This is one of the questions that
was deferred for a century as Michelle Chilcoat explains. She argues that the Indies occupied
an in-between position. On the one hand the French celebrated the abolition of slavery as
the work of white intellectuals and philanthropist. She writes, “Attributed almost solely to
the work of a great white French man, Victor Schoelcher, this abolition with its granting of
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freedom signified the most French of acts, ‘‘a generous gift of the mère-patrie [mother
country]’’” (Chilcoat 2004, 57). She adds, “As the story goes, it was France’s civility that
broke the chains of their enslavement and took on the burden of civilizing them, promising
to elevate them to the status of loyal citizens who would show themselves to be such by
dying for the nation” (Chilcoat 2004, 61). During a century, the French ruling class was
willing to do whatever it took to defer the question of citizenship of Antilleans. Their
territory belonged to France but their legal and political statuses were deferred. The
inhabitants of the French Caribbean remained trapped in an ambiguous but revealing
imperial category: they were “colonial citizens.” They were not slaves any more but not yet
citizens either.

2.6.2. Migration to the Metropole
The racial matrix sheds light on why the status of black and brown Antilleans was
deferred for a century. The deferral explains why their presence in the metropole was not
appreciated. Before emancipation, slave owners were afraid that if men of color were able to
visit France, they would learn and internalize the monarchy’s values, which were more
egalitarian than the colonies. They would be exposed to subversive ideas that they would
bring back to the colonies. The second concern was about the presence of blacks in
metropolitan France and the fear they might contaminate the white race. Marriages between
white women and men of color were therefore illegal. For these reasons, the French king
issued a decree that made the presence of blacks illegal by law. Cohen notes, “By the royal
order of 1778 the slaves in France were all sent back to the colonies or kept apart in
stockades. Free men of color were not allowed to enter the country, and those who legally
resided in France because they had arrived before the promulgation of the decree were
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forced to register with the authorities and were forbidden to marry whites” (Cohen 1980,
112). Even today, certain media commentators sometimes evoke this historical episode,
reminding their viewers “there were no slaves in France,” to show how egalitarian and
ethical France was.
The intellectual movement of Negritude should be understood within this long durée
context as a form of resistance to the status of “colonial citizen.” Aimé Césaire who was one
of the founders of the new movement in the 1930s, stressed the importance of revising
Francophone history and denouncing slavery and colonialism. The movement highlighted
resistance and cultures of African and diasporic blacks. As David Macey explains, there is no
pre-colonial history in Martinique and Guadeloupe to which enslaved Africans could refer to
since the Caribs that white settlers had disseminated were the sole indigenous inhabitants of
the islands. Africa was therefore the main reference point for the movement. The movement
of Negritude also proposed a revisionist history of France and Europe. In their pamphlets,
manifestos and writings, these intellectuals, along with French surrealists denounced the
French “Murderous Humanitarianism.” Although white supremacy was the social structure
that Antillean blacks struggled against, race relations should not be over-simplified. They
were far from being organized around a binary line. For example, black Antilleans
sometimes formed alliances with the békés, the descendents of slave-owners, against békéFrance, the metropolitan white settlers that the government helped migrate to the islands.
(Macey 2005, 21).
The debate over the departmentalization of the Antilles should also be read within
this complex Antillean racial matrix. Aimé Césaire who was one of its proponents didn’t
have much illusion about how much racism was entrenched in French culture and society.
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Early on, Césaire questioned the official history of the French republic. In 1948, in front of a
metropolitan audience, he explained that slavery was commonsensical and symptomatic of
an era. Unlike the dominant history of that period which viewed slavery as accidental and
therefore out of place, he noted, that with slavery “everything [was] in order.” He added,
“true emancipation is not that which is decreed, but which men conquer for themselves, it is
not behind them but before them, and it is their responsibility to prepare it in common with
the people of France in the luminous wake [sillage] of 1848” (Wilder, Race, Reason, Impasse:
Césaire, Fanon, and the Legacy of Emancipation 2004, 33). By fighting for the
departmentalization of Martinique and Guadeloupe, he was basically denouncing the status
of “colonial citizen.” He wanted to end the unjust legal, economic and social conditions of
Antilleans. Césaire demanded that Antilleans be treated like metropolitan French and be
legally assimilated to the French republic. Antilleans had acquired the French nationality
after the abolition of slavery in 1848 but did not have the privileges and rights that white
French citizens had. In 1946, after much struggle, Antilleans became citizens and the French
overseas colonies became French departments. Yet, the political and administrative classes
who were deployed in the Antilles were mostly white and racist. Fanon disagreed with
Césaire’s strategy and called for an open opposition to the colonial status of the islands. He
argued that the marginalization and poverty of the islands are the logical consequences of
French colonialism. He criticized the Negritude’s approach, which was mostly geared toward
a distant African past.
The legal inclusion of French colonies into the republic created a new racial problem
for the political elite. Their new challenge was to prevent the contamination of the white
race by limiting Antillean migration to the metropole. The adjustment of the racial matrix
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was taking place in the midst of important economic and political crises. High rates of
unemployment due to the restructuration of the colonial industries and agricultures, in
addition to policies still entrenched in a colonial order led to the eruption of important
revolts in Fort-de-France in December 1959. The state’s response to the revolts was swift
and violent and left several dead. The fact that the police and most administrators were
white and often came to the island, from North Africa, with a colonial savoir-faire, amplified
the crisis. Commenting on the revolts, Fanon wrote, “Let them yell out: ‘Look what the
colonialists have done!’ But they won't do anything of the sort. They’ll vote a series of
symbolic motions and start dying of poverty all over again. In the end, this outburst of anger
reassures the colonialists. It’s merely a way of letting off steam…” (Fanon 2004, 243-4) As
Fanon had predicted, in the aftermath of the revolts, instead of tackling the real problems,
the state implemented several changes to prevent future revolts. Firstly, the government
restructured the urban grid to protect police stations from future attacks. Secondly, black
soldiers were transferred from Martinique and Guadeloupe to other locations to prevent any
sympathizing with demonstrators, as was the case in December 1959. Finally, the state gave
local governors extra power; according to the new schema, they acquired the right to transfer
to metropolitan France, administrators and public employees who were considered
troublemakers, (Kréyol 2009).
One of the important changes, after the revolt was the creation of a new program to
facilitate the migration of Antillean workers from the Caribbean to metropolitan France.
Historian Stephanie Condon points out that the goal of the program was to help solve the
problem of unemployment in Martinique and Guadeloupe, which was immense in the
colonies. She explains that migration of both sexes was organized in a way to prevent
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disequilibrium in the islands. She also notes that migrants had the possibility to use their
airplane return tickets up to five years after its purchase, as a form of governmental help
(Condon 2008). One could argue however, that the incentive for the government to create a
special status for Antilleans was to motivate them to go back to the Caribbean, and
consequently reduce their number in the metropole. This policy constitutes a parallel with
the decree issued by Louis XVI almost two centuries earlier and which reminded Antilleans
that they were still not welcomed in metropolitan France because their presence there might
alter the racial grid.
To comprehend the implications of the revolts on the racial regime, one should
examine the policies implemented since then. The inclusion of Martinique and Guadeloupe
into the French republic led to a rethinking of race relations. One of the central questions
for French experts was the management and regulation of these relations within a new
context. French authorities launched two programs: 1) they initiated programs of birth
control; 2) they launched an important migratory program. Emptying the islands from the
army of unemployed male was a strategy to prevent radical ideas from developing there.
Aimé Césaire qualified these acts as genocide through substitution.
At the same time, administrators’ aim was to avoid creating a surplus of blackness in
metropolitan France. They tried to transfer a portion of the unemployed to French Guiana
(Childers 2009, 185). In reality it was an effort to revive an old program, which had existed
few centuries earlier. Early on, the French monarchy tried to populate Guiana but because of
harsh environmental and weather conditions the project failed. The high rate of mortality
and unfavorable climatic conditions for certain agricultures made the territory undesirable
and unviable for metropolitan settlers. Few centuries later, Antilleans were not attracted by
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the futures that policy-makers were envisioning for them. After the failure of the program,
French authorities decided to handle the demographic Antillean surplus by creating a
program of migration in the direction of the metropole.
In 1963, the Bureau for the Migration from Overseas Departments (BUMIDOM)
was created to transfer part of the population’s surplus from the Caribbean to the metropole.
This program was controversial since the beginning; many argued it was designed to
undermine the movement’s resistance, which gained momentum after the revolts of 1959.
The aim of the program was to move metropolitan whites to the Antilles and bring black
Antilleans to the metropole. French administrators explained that by bringing Antillean
females to the metropole, women would internalize French values and culture and would
subsequently have fewer children. Antillean Women and men were separated either by the
program, which sent one member to the metropole while keeping the other in the island or
by employers who often sent each one in a different area in the metropole. By separating
them, administrators were hoping to decrease the birth rate of Antillean women (Childers
2009).
The context in which these policies were implemented was problematic. Since the
1950s demographers and policy makers tried to increase the birth rate among metropolitan
white women while attempting to decrease it among Antillean women. These programs were
not very effective and were definitely not making up for the shortage in manpower. De
Gaulle wanted white Europeans to migrate to France to fill up the gap but European
migration failed since most countries needed their workers, especially that most of them had
lost many men during the war (Faes and Smith 2007, 13-15). It is only after the failure of
these different programs that the French established the BUMIDOM.
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In metropolitan France, Antilleans migrants performed specific functions. They were
recruited for jobs that required French citizenship and were therefore not open to North
African and Sub-Saharan migrants. They included low ranking civil servant positions that
were not attractive to white French. Antilleans were also hired in construction and industries
where North Africans were already present. The history of migration indicates that
Antilleans were transferred to the metropole to reduce the number of North African
migrants, who were less desirable since the Algerian war. Antilleans were willing to take jobs
that were not attractive for many white French; it was thought their presence in the
metropole would reduce the number of North African migrants. Antilleans occupied an
ambivalent position: they were not exactly insiders nor completely outsiders. David Beriss
explains “Debates about the role of France in the enslavement of Africans and as their
eventual liberator encapsulate current controversies about the value and possibility of
assimilation into French culture for Antilleans. As French citizens, Antilleans are cultural
insiders, but as dark-skinned postcolonials, they are visibly marked as outsiders” (Beriss
2004).

2.6.3. Spatial Regulation of Antillean Populations
The Spatial distribution of Antilleans in France has its own specificity and dynamics.
The BUMIDOM rarely did provide housing to Antillean migrants and had access only to a
few foyers to accommodate them in the metropole. Moreover, Antilleans could stay at the
foyer for three months at most and had to look for housing for themselves. Many Antilleans
lived with their relatives and friends in Paris and its suburbs. Since many arrived to the
metropole through Paris, and were hired in the public sector (transportation, post office,
French Airline company) located in capital, there was a high concentration of Antilleans
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there. In the 1970s and 80s, between 65% and 75% of the Antillean population lived in the
Parisian region. While the concentration of Antilleans living in Paris and its suburbs today
dropped to around 50%, it’s still considered very high. This high concentration of Antilleans
in the Parisian region led scholars to call it the “Third Island,” after Martinique and
Guadeloupe (Dobie 2004).
Alain Anselin who did research on Antilleans in the 1970s had denounced the
ghettoization of Antilleans. He explains that Antilleans who lived in the Parisian region were
mostly concentrated in the capital where around 50% of the population lived while the other
half lives in the northern and eastern suburbs of Paris. In the 1950s and 60s only very few
had access to social housing. It’s only in the 1970s that they started to be integrated into the
housing projects. The public sector in which they worked had a quota in public housing and
opened the door to them for the first time. During that period, public housing was still
reserved to white middle and working classes. In his study, Anselin argues, “one quarter of
the immigrants resided in hostels and furnished apartments” which he compares to a
“vertical shantytown.” Another half lived in dilapidated housing mostly located in Paris. As
in the case of urban renewal in the United States, these areas were the targets of important
redevelopment plans, which intended to remove poor and non-white populations. Finally
the last quarter lived in public housing located in a few specific suburbs (Anselin 1979, 179180).
Although the ghetto doesn’t exist in the American sense of the term, one can discern
several neighborhoods with high concentration of Antilleans. Anselin explains that
Antilleans faced two main problems. Firstly, almost 70% lived in overcrowded housing while
the average for the French population was around 40% during the 1970s. Secondly, the
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majority of Antilleans (64%), according to official studies, lived in poor housing conditions.
While almost 90% of the Antilleans felt their living conditions should be improved (Anselin
1979, 188-196). These poor living conditions and high concentration of Antilleans in specific
areas is due to the racialization of the population in ways that made it almost a foreign
community. Scholars have shown that Antilleans are not considered authentic French
citizens because of the colonial history of France and the different ways these populations
have been racialized. Their racialization has put them in a difficult position. They were/are
caught between a deferred citizenship and an inability to transcend Frenchness.

2.7.

Sub-Saharan Africans

2.7.1. Colonial Expansion
The incentive for the colonization of African territories was both economic and
political. To that end, both formal colonization through direct conquest and informal,
through the building up of alliances and rule through local leaders were considered and used.
The dominant narrative in favor of colonization was that Africans were passive people and
needed the help of white Europeans. Christianization of the African continent was the main
entry point in early colonization. Later, it was replaced by a narrative of civilizing mission,
which was led by Christian missionaries, military leaders, and imperial functionaries with
medical, planning and administrative expertise.
On the political front, the European nations were interested in controlling as much
territory as they could to consolidate their global power. By the end of the eighteenth
century and beginning of the nineteenth, European powers started exploring the African
interior. In the beginning, expeditions were tedious and not always successful. The French
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had constructed a liberal and flexible racial matrix in Senegambia to build alliances with the
local elites. Unlike in the Antilles where slave owners imposed a rigid racial hierarchy to
preserve the social order, Senegambia had only a small number of whites who needed the
help of the black elites to facilitate their conquest of the African continent. The more fluid
race relations in Senegal made it also possible for a certain African elite to forge alliances
with the French and benefit from it. Instead of exploring the complexity of race relations
and their unevenness in African regions colonized by the French, only a sketch of this
history is provided here to better understand the implications of these relations on the
present. It is a genealogical reading that only concentrates on nodal points to reconstruct the
present.
On the economic front, the rise of French imperialism in Africa was possible due to
the flexible racial regimes and was therefore not based on the exploitation of free labor. The
racial web on the West African coast was more dynamic compared to the one in place in the
Antilles. This fluid racialization made it possible for the French empire to conquer African
regions making alliances with various African communities. Furthermore, the emerging
industrial capitalism didn’t necessitate a direct enslavement of African populations. William
Cohen explains, “ the abolitionists, in fact, became the most important propagandizers for
expansion. To a large extent, imperialist ambitions were focused on the Senegambia, an area
as valuable in itself and also as a base for further penetration inland, especially to the
Western Sudan, reputed to be rich beyond imagination” (Cohen 1980, 155). Instead of
slavery becoming a dominant institution in the newly colonized territories, indentured labor
and other forms of coercive labor were implemented to create room for various forms of
racialization.
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In the French imaginary, Sub-Saharan Africans were less threatening than North
African or Caribbean populations. Unlike “the Arab” who was a threatening figure because
of the long conflictual history between Europe and the Muslim World, “the African” was
often portrayed as a savage who needed the help of the white man. While the Arab was
often portrayed as a fighter mounting a horse and holding a green flag symbolizing the
Muslim conquest of Europe, the Sub-Saharan African was presented as animal-like with
promiscuous sexuality (Bancel and Blanchard 2008).

2.7.2. Migration and Housing
During the nineteenth century, the number of blacks living in France rarely exceeded
a thousand. Their image as mentioned above was that of the savages. By the end of the
nineteenth century, the French empire identified three types of “indigenes.” Those who
came from the West Indies were at the top of the hierarchy, while Africans coming from
four different Senegalese regions were in the middle and finally, at the bottom of the
hierarchy was everyone else(Faes and Smith 2007, 4). The ranking of these different
populations seemed to depend, to a large extent, on how much contact white French had
with them. After World War I, there was a shift in the way Africans were perceived in the
French imaginary. 190,000 Sub-Saharan fighters participated in the war along with French
troops against the German Army and around 20% of them died during the war. French
officers praised West-African troupes and claimed they were better fighters than Algerians
and Tunisians. From savages, they were becoming childlike Africans with good combat
skills. While Madagascan and Indochinese were considered non-warrior races (race nonguerrière), North African, and more so West Africans, were considered excellent warriors (race
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guerrière)(Fogarty 2008, 72-74). Again, the war had re-organized racial categories according to
the priorities of the war.
Three phases of African Sub-Saharan migration can be identified. The first phase
started after World War I and lasted until the 1960s. Before the second wave of migration in
the mid 1970s, the percentage of Sub-Saharan African was inferior to 2% of the total
migrant population. In the 1990s, with the third wave, the percentage rose to 7% (Dobie and
Saunders, Introduction 2006). The first phase, which started with a prolonged direct contact
between indigenous troops and Native French during World War I. The relationship
between Africans and French was a source of concern to the French elite. On the one hand,
they wanted to minimize the contact between Africans and White French by isolating the
former in specific locations. On the other hand, the colonial power was preoccupied with
the return of African troops back to their villages and homes in Africa, which might be a
source of subversive ideas (Bernardot 2005). This state of mind was also applicable to
Algerians who in the beginning of the century were treated in the same fashion. To avoid
such problems, the French elite decided to isolate colonial subjects socially and spatially, to
‘protect’ them from French citizens’ discrimination.
In the 1950s and 60s, single males migrants mostly Soninke and Toucouleur in
addition to Mandjaks started coming to France in larger number. French authorities favored
the latter since they were catholic and thought to be more open to assimilation. These single
men were in constant flux between West Africa and the French metropole. The second wave
of migration started in the mid-seventies and was prompted by new policies. Due to the
economic crisis in the early seventies and a strong sentiment against Muslim migrants mostly
form Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, French authorities decided to stop migration from
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these countries. The French government welcomed the Algerian’s decision to end its
population’s migration as a form of protest against the wave of anti-Arab crimes. To replace
the Maghrebian workforce, the French state opened up the borders to Sub-Saharan
migrants. During the 1970s, black Africans were thought to be more docile than Algerians.
Furthermore, the state believed it would be able to return these Sub-Saharan migrants once
their labor was not needed anymore. Once in France, Africans often lived in specific foyers
to reduce their living costs and be able to send more savings to their families. French
administrators appreciated that type of housing since it was easy to regulate the movements
of its inhabitants and control their political activities. In addition to surveillance, the living
conditions were dreadful and temporary which, from the French perspective, would
ultimately incite African migrants to return back to their countries (Poiret 1996, 61-66).

Figure 2-3: African Foyer in Paris
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While a portion of Sub-Saharan Africans lived in slums and poor and temporary
housing, beside the factories where they worked, many lived in foyers. In the late 1960s, 35%
of Sub-Saharan African lived in foyers (Lévy-Vroelant 2004, 153). In 1982, less than 20%
resided in these spaces, while this number dropped to less than 10% in 1990. The foyers
were booming in the 1970s with almost 265,000 beds. Statistically speaking, the percentage
of Africans living in their own rented room or staying with relatives was higher than those
living in foyers. However, like Algerians, the foyers constituted a paradigmatic space for
many Malian and Senegalese. Unlike Algerians who were transferred from the bidonvilles to
the foyers, black Africans appreciated the environment of the foyers despite the harsh living
conditions. Many were able to build social networks in the foyers because they interacted
with different communities and had access to a variety of information and various other
resources. As the last comers to the imperial capital, they viewed the foyer as a space of
encounter, exchange, and interaction. The foyer also provided safety to those who didn’t
have alternatives or the resources to rent their own rooms. Many would go to a foyer as
soon as they arrived to Paris to meet a relative or a friend. They can spend some time with
their relative in a tiny room for several weeks or months while they looked for a job and
housing. Furthermore, the foyer was a hub where people could escape the Parisian isolation
and the distance from their villages or cities. They could get news from their parents or
friends through someone who just arrived from a trip from Mali or Senegal. Algerians on the
other hand, as we have seen, perceived the foyer as a space of confinement and surveillance.
Sometimes, they felt nostalgic for the bidonville. They don’t have the same trajectory or
history as Sub-Saharan Africans. Even today, many single and old Africans still live in the
foyers because they have built a community and are unable to start a new life elsewhere.
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Many younger Sub-Saharan Africans have left the foyers to avoid the harassment and
control of French administrators.
The foyers as explained above were proposed as a solution to undermine the
struggles of Algerians and their political involvement with the FLN. Sub-Saharan Africans
were not perceived as a direct threat to state security. The best way to break the Algerian
organizing was to mix them with African groups from different ethnic backgrounds, cultures
and religions. Administrators suggested that small ethnic islands of 20 to 40 individuals
would be put in the same foyer to undermine political activities and labor organizing. The
more the group was heterogeneous, they explained, the less troublesome it was (Barros 2005,
43). The same logic was implemented in the car industry. Workers from different
backgrounds who often didn’t speak the same language were put together to prevent
communication on the assembly line (Daboussi 1980). These efforts were not enough to
prevent the migrants from organizing. In the late 1960s and early 1970s migrants organized
strikes in many car factories followed by strikes in the foyers in the mid-1970s. The
communist party attempted to undermine the organizing while the radical left was very
involved in these strikes.
The isolation of Africans in foyers was suitable for French citizens and policy
makers. French didn’t want much contact with Sub-Saharan communities. The foyers were
mostly concentrated in four northeastern districts in Paris and in the northern and Eastern
suburbs of Paris. In the same fashion, once it appeared that these Africans workers might
stay longer periods than the state had initially anticipated, a family reunification was
implemented. To avoid mixed marriages between African males and white French female,
the government thought the best strategy would be to allow families to reunite. During the
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third period, the migration from Sub-Saharan Africa became more diversified. While
Senegalese and Malian were still composing the majority of the migrants, many started
coming from Congo, Cameroun and Zaire. According to official studies, the number of
Africans in 1990 is 235,000 while non-official estimate put the number more around 500,000
(Poiret 1996, 68).

2.8.

Is There An Afro-French Community?
This chapter provided an analysis of racial formations within the French empire.

Taking the present as an entry point, it examined the longue durée history of three racialized
communities who have been subjugated to colonial and postcolonial violence. Instead of
writing a linear history of these communities starting with a point of origin and ending with
the present, instead, the present has been strategically used as the arena from which to read
the past. The periodization of imperial French history I suggest here challenges dominant
historiographies. This alternative historical account is imperative to explain the social
conditions of minorities who lived in France. However, an exhaustive account of racial
formations in the longue durée is evidently beyond the scope of this study. Static and
homogenizing taxonomies of French minorities were avoided. The goal was instead to
provide guidelines for the conceptualization of a counter-history. It is a counter-history of
populations that France has enslaved, colonized, and subjugated through different
mechanisms and in various locations in the African and American continents.
In order to produce such a genealogical reading, I propose the concept of “AfroFrench.” The concept however should be explored through the genealogical reading I
proposed above. It’s a constellation that regroups the multi-layered and complex histories of
the three groups analyzed in this chapter. The spatial racialization of Algerians, West
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Africans, and Antilleans is uneven and heterogeneous. Since the 1950s urban planning and
thinking has targeted different groups using asymmetric logics. As explained above, the first
group to migrate in large numbers to France was Algerian workers. Many Algerians lived in
the bidonville in 1950s and 1960s. French authorities confined them to these spaces in the
1940s and 1950s to hide them and separate them from white French. These bidonvilles were
often located nearby a factory and reminded Algerians the only reason for their presence in
France was their cheap labor. Their housing and stay in France were therefore temporary. In
the mid-fifties, with the intensification of the Algerian war, the bidonville became a
threatening space for the police and policy makers. In both cases, the colonial management
used in Algeria migrated and was deployed in the metropole to regulate everyday lives in the
bidonvilles.
The Antillean migration differed from the Algerian. In the early sixties, the French
decided to transfer the surplus of population from the islands to the metropole to solve the
problem of unemployment in the island and the lack of manpower in metropolitan France.
At the same time, French demographers and policy-makers believed black Antilleans would
be willing to perform the tasks Algerians were already doing. This way, the Antillean transfer
of population would slow down and ultimately stop Algerian migration. Their spatial
racialization was different from Algerians. Only a minority would spend some time in foyers
but the large majority was supposed to find housing for itself. Many stayed with family and
friends in apartments dispersed in northeastern Paris. During the sixties a debate erupted on
the public sphere about the ghettoization of certain population and the ghetto in the United
States. The state was determined to face the problem and was absolutely opposed to the
formation of such a space in the metropole. By pushing Antillean migrants to secure their
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own housing, French experts were persuaded that they would disperse and become invisible.
This spatial topology would also help the assimilation of Antilleans that the state was trying
to achieve for reasons explained above.
Finally, West Africans were part of the third wave of migration and were supposed
to replace North Africans that the government was finding gradually more problematic. SubSaharan Africans were thought to be less aggressive and religious while more docile than
Algerians and other North African migrants. Like the Algerians during the forties and early
fifties, the state wanted to keep Sub-Saharan away from white French and make their stay in
France temporary. The foyers were the ideal housing mode since they were often kept in
spaces far from white French and under the gaze of post-colonial experts.
These different discourses/practices about spatial racialization are reminiscent of the
colonial debates during in mid-nineteenth century France between Tocqueville, Gobineau
and others. The difference is that the current debate is about how the regulate spaces within
metropolitan France instead of simply thinking about the racial line that separated France
and its colonies a century and half ago. In the sixties and seventies, for historical and political
reasons explained above, Antilleans were spread in space while Sub-Saharan and Algerians
were concentrated. Furthermore, while Algerians were closely watched because of their
political activities, Sub-Saharan, were perceived as submissive and benign. The Foucauldian
framework shows that these uneven spatial mechanisms penetrate bodies and shape
subjectivities in different ways. The violence of spatial logics reminds these populations that
what they were experiencing was a form of internal colonialism. These divergent and uneven
racializing strategies did not prevent Antilleans, North, and West Africans from struggling
together and showing solidarity for one another.
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The argument I will develop in the following chapters is that an Afro-French
community has been emerging and consolidating since the end of the 1970s and early 1980s.
However, the genealogical analysis shows that Afro-Frenchness can and should be traced in
the longue durée of imperial history. One can go as far as the slave revolts that SantiagoValles describes and which were strengthened by the Jihad in the African continent against
Europeans. These actions were not necessarily coordinated but they show that the struggles
of Africans on both sides of the Atlantic did ultimately undermine the French and British
imperial webs. More recently, Antilleans included the departmentalization of Algeria in the
proposal they handed to the national assembly after World War I about the legal inclusion of
overseas department into the French territory. Fanon’s struggles in and political writing
about Algeria is symptomatic of a dense and rich exchange between these different
postcolonial groups. Finally, the struggles of Afro-French in the foyers and their organizing
of a long strike in the seventies in which Antilleans, Algerians, and Sub-Saharan Africans
participated exemplify the kind of solidarity bonds that were forged among these
communities. The following chapters will show that the concentration of these different
communities in the public housing has solidified these relations. It forged a novel AfroFrench identity, which forms a complex unity, within which there are conflicts but mostly
interchange and construction of new subjectivities.
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CHAPTER 3
SOVEREIGNTY AND MODALITIES OF RACIALIZATION
IN FRENCH SUBURBS
The condition or paradox of the emigrant is that he goes on ‘being present despite
his absence’.
Abdelmalek Sayad

3.1.

Introduction
This chapter investigates urban planning in the colony and spatial designs in the

metropole. It studies the coercive techniques deployed by sovereign power to control
territories and regulate Afro-French lives. In the following two chapters, biopolitical
programs and disciplinary techniques are analyzed. The combination of these powers
represents the three dimensions of governmentality. Different combinations are employed to
change the conduct of individuals and make it fit specific governmental logics. Planners and
administrators utilize these spatial techniques as a way to propose ‘solutions’ for the
problematization of Afro-French housing.
The first section explores the emergence of the suburbs in postwar France. It studies
the social conditions and political incentives under which public housing was erected. The
second part analyzes the colonial genealogy of French suburbs. It shows that urban planners
and architects used the colonies as experimental fields to test various spatial techniques.
They scrutinized the impact of dispersion and concentration of colonized populations on the
colonial project. One of the paradigmatic figures of this era is Le Corbusier, the Swiss
architect who was highly influential in the colonial planning of Algiers. Many of his
techniques were developed in the colony and brought back to the metropole after the war, to
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control Afro-French spaces and racialize African and Caribbean communities in specific
ways. The third part briefly explores the genealogy of sovereignty and its spatial significance.
Finally, the last section analyzes the gradual inadequacy of sovereign power to regulate AfroFrench spaces. It argues that sovereign power failed to subjugate these spaces and racialize
the population according to dominant logics due to the resistance of Afro-French. In the
1970s, spatial governmentality adjusted to the new situation by creating new techniques of
government that aimed to undermine the resistance that Afro-French.

3.2.

The Construction of Postwar suburbs
After WWII, the housing shortage in France was acute and the situation was

particularly critical in Paris. The housing problem was not new but it became more
pronounced with the destruction of the urban structure in certain areas in addition to a lack
of new constructions during the war. In 1953, a wave of cold weather killed several homeless
and provoked an important public debate about the right to have a proper shelter. The
progressive priest, Abbé Pierre, was at the forefront of this battle. He requested housing
centers and cité de transit to host a growing number of homeless. Due to his work and an
intense public debate surrounding the death of several homeless, the government voted Le
Plan Courant that same year. To solve the crisis, the government proposed the construction
of 240,000 housing units every year. The major concern of the government was the
construction of cheap and affordable units. Using cheap materials, these units were
constructed very quickly; all apartments were modeled after a few standard designs. In a few
years, small villages surrounding Paris saw their populations triple or quadruple due to the
new plan. The number of units built in each one of these villages varied between 1000 and
8000 depending on the amount of land available and the interest of the government and
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construction companies in building social housing in specific regions. Public housing, or
what French authorities calls “habitat social,” was meant in the beginning to provide a
decent apartment to working and middle class families with a steady income. Those who had
low salaries were not selected because they government thought they wouldn’t be able to pay
the rent on a monthly basis. Between 1955 and 1975, one million new units of public
housing were built in addition to another 100,000 private apartments which were modeled
after the public housing units and sold to the middle class (Peillon 2005, 7). The
construction were chaotic to a large extent. Instead of coming up with a strategy to urbanize
the suburbs, the government was interested solely in cheap constructions that would solve
the housing crisis quickly.
French historian, Annie Fourcaut (2004), explains that the urbanization of the
suburbs was to mostly experimental and disorganized. Between 1962 and 1975, the suburban
population grew from 11.8 millions to 15.9 millions (Stébé 1999). In 1960 the state
implemented a roadmap to guide the urbanization process but the plan was abandoned very
quickly because of its inefficiency. Initially, French authorities had adopted a strategy of
containment to slow down the anarchic expansion of the suburbs. In the years preceding
WWII, individuals built houses in a chaotic way without following a specific urban grid.
Houses were mushrooming with each wave of migration coming from the countryside. The
idea of a roadmap was dropped shortly after its adoption because it turned to be inefficient
and incapable of stopping the random evolution of the suburbs. Urban experts realized that
only the construction of large housing projects in locations chosen by the state would slow
down the random urban texture of individual housing and would redistribute the population
more evenly. The state couldn’t stop the construction of individual houses if it didn’t offer
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any alternatives. Fourcaut notes that from 1955 to 1958, the grands ensembles (housing
projects) were perceived by the government as an ideal solution for the housing crisis. These
projects were meant to “modernize the suburbs while at the same time control urbanization
patterns” (Fourcaut 2004, 212). The end result however was perceived as a failure. Instead of
favoring central planning, the housing projects were dispersed in a random fashion in the
Parisian suburbs and where usually built wherever there were empty and cheap pieces of
land. Today one can identify uneven areas of individual houses juxtaposed with regions of
very dense housing projects. There is no organic relation between housing projects and
individual houses (Fourcaut 2004).

Figure 3-1: The distribution of housing projects in 1970 (Fourcaut 2004)
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The housing crisis was accentuated because planners were unable to develop a well
thought urban grids to respond adequately to an urgent demand for housing. The high
demand was due to internal and external migration as well as a growth in the population of
the baby boom. The housing crisis was therefore aggravated when the degradation of new
constructions started in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Planners and politicians who decided
to build housing projects during the Trente Glorieuses (Thirty years following World War II),
were in reality reacting to the crisis of the previous era rather than planning for the
urbanization of the future (Fourcaut 2004, 217-218). In 1973, the government decided to
stop building any new projects finally realizing that public housing should be reorganized.
The next generation of experts and planners spent most of their time trying to resolve the
problems inherited from this period.
The map above shows the random distribution of housing projects built around
Paris in the 1970s. These projects were badly connected to transportation networks and to
the center of Paris. In the next chapter, we will see that this is also the case for Clichy-sousBois. Overall housing projects were overcrowded and poorly maintained. Elevators were and
often still are frequently out of order while hot water is sometimes unavailable. The interior
of apartments is poorly designed and sunlight doesn’t always filtrate to the inside. The cheap
construction material doesn’t age well and is rarely well maintained by landlords. Common
facilities decay rapidly and have lost their initial meaning and function. Inhabitants survive
within these spaces on an everyday basis often because alternatives are unavailable to them
(Wacquant 2006, Dubet 1987, Didier and Dubet 1988).

3.3.

Le Corbusier and the colonial trajectory
The architecture and planning of public housing was inspired, to a large extent, by
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the ideas of Le Corbusier. Many planners involved in the projects’ construction in postwar
France were the disciples of, or influenced in one way or another by Le Corbusier (this is the
case of Bernard Zehrfuss, the architect who built several important projects in Clichy in the
1960s). Historian of colonial France, Amelia Lyons, notes that the minister of urbanism and
reconstruction Eugène Claudius-Petit was an admirer of Swiss architect Le Corbusier and
the Bauhaus movement. Claudius-Petit was also the first president of Sonacotral, which was
founded in 1956 and provided housing to immigrant workers. More importantly, he met in
Algiers with a number of architects and technicians to envision a plan for urban
reconstruction in France (Wakeman 2004, 136). The meeting in Algiers should not be
regarded as anecdotic. Scholars have shown that the colonial experience is one of the criteria
for the recruitment of top-level administrators involved in urban planning in France (Barros
2005, Bernardot, Loger les Immigres: la Sonacotra 1956 – 2006 2008). Claudius-Petit played
a central role in the urbanization of postwar France and was highly influential in the choice
of prototypes for collective housing” (Lyons 2006, 44).
Following a hygienist perspective, Le Corbusier proposed in his most influential
work, The Charter of Athens (1971), a theory according to which the urban grid should be split
into different spaces, each of which organized according to specific urban functions. For the
Swiss architect, four distinct spaces should orchestrate life in the city, namely, spaces of
residence, work, circulation, and entertainment. His philosophy is based on a modernist
approach that values rational planning and universalist dimensions over traditional ones
(Peillon 2005). Universalism is considered a corner stone in the Corbusian framework and is
based on the idea that there is an ideal typical man (l’homme type) with typical needs. These
initial units that Le Corbusier used throughout his work allowed him to come up with
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standardized housing units that serve the normative needs of his ideal typical man. Le
Corbusier’s, and his disciples’ universalism signified that cultural and historical contexts
could be disregarded or downplayed. For these planners and architects, the new city should
be constructed on a ‘tabula rasa’. Only monumental forms deserved to be preserved from the
past to contrast them with ‘monuments’ built by modernist architects. Historians Jean Castex
and Jean-Charles Depaule show that Le Corbusier’s urbanism holds a “strong social
engineering agenda” which is symptomatic of the modern era. He believed that modern
architecture which he called “machine for living” could produce a new man who would be in
phase with the new era (2004116) while “all reference to an urban life, to a traditional
neighbourhood life, is abolished” (118). The focus of the Corbusian urbanism is on
liberating a maximum area by building vertically and allocating the rest of the terrain to other
functions such as leisure or work.
The architecture of Le Corbusier was contested by prominent thinkers for its lack of
understanding of the importance of streets (Mumford 1986, Jacobs 1961) and is still
criticized today for its inability to create what Oscar Newman calls defensible spaces (1996).
In addition to the inherent problems in Le Corbusier’s architecture, experts involved in
recent renewal projects in France believe that a downgraded version of Le Corbusier’s
urbanism and architecture were implemented in the banlieues. For example, instead of
providing important green areas as Le Corbusier had suggested, the housing projects that
were built in the 1960s and 1970s were surrounded by cemented spaces. In addition, the idea
of separating the living and work spaces proposed by the Swiss architect was not very
relevant in the early 1970s because of the high unemployment rates due to the economic
crisis. Poor suburbs where most of these projects were located were hit the most by the
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crisis. Finally, transportation networks did not connect these projects to urban centers and
often accentuated their isolation and marginalization.
The importance of Le Corbusier resides in his influence not only in the metropole
but also in French colonies. Many of his ideas and initial projects were the thought and
executed in a colonial context. As sociologist Marc Bernardot explains, there are three
intertwined logics behind Le Corbusier’s planning and architecture. They consist on
controlling and managing the population in addition to building solidarity among individuals
(200851). These logics emerged first in French colonies, and more specifically Algiers where
Le Corbusier worked and proposed urban plans to complement the military control over the
Algerian population. The primary aim behind his proposal was to manage the indigenous
population and regulate its movements according a colonial grid. Le Corbusier justified his
modernist planning by arguing that it was primarily directed against poor housing conditions
that existed in the French metropole in the 1920s. To take up this challenging task, Le
Corbusier used a holistic approach that tackled every sphere of social life. Describing his
approach, American anthropologist Paul Rabinow writes, “Le Corbusier's famous formula
that to "renovate [amenager] the cities first you have to reorganize [amenager] the countryside”
(Rabinow 1995, 3). The implications of such a vision on the colonial project are clear. In the
colony this translate into an improvement of colonial power’s over spaces perceived as
impenetrable or incontrollable.
One of Le Corbusier’s powerful notions was to provide a technical answer to a
functional problem. This approach made his project seem apolitical and helped imposing it
on the public sphere. He often claimed that his architecture was devoid of any political or
ideological incentives. He writes in The City of To-morrow and its Planning, “I have been very
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careful not to depart from the technical side of my problem. I am an architect; no one is
going to make a politician of me. Everyone, in his own domain where he is an expert, can
apply his special knowledge and carry his solutions to their logical conclusions… Things are
not revolutionized by making revolutions. The real Revolution lies in the solution of existing problems”
(1987301). Le Corbusier was therefore interested in producing functional spaces that would
keep workers healthy and productive. The production of these healthy spaces requires not
only hegemony but also force, or in the foucauldian terminology, an either sovereignty or
“authoritarian biopolitics” (Padovan 2003). The Corbusian logic fits in this productivist
model, which is mostly interested in raising workers’ productivity. Technique became a
foundational dimension in his architecture. The depoliticiation of his approach was an
important move because it allowed him to evince political criticism. It’s also a clear shift of
the locus of power from the sovereign to the expert: expert knowledge is the new form of
power.
Zeynep Çelik demonstrates that one of Le Corbusier’s goals was to unify a
heterogeneous French empire through a coherent urbanism and architecture. The sketch
below shows that Le Corbusier was always concerned about creating an axis between the
imperial center and the colonial peripheries. The drawing represents Le Corbusier’s vision
for creating an organic relationship between, on the one hand Algiers, the capital of the
French colonies in Africa, and Paris on the other. The architectural and urban concepts of
Le Corbusier represent an important aspect of knowledge traveling between center and
margins. Various scholars have shown that there is a constant process of knowledge coproduction and expertise exchange between core and periphery and also within the margins
of the French imperial web (Çelik 1997, Rabinow 1995, Abu-Lughod 1980, Wright 1991,

!

))!

!
Silverstein, Algeria in France: Transpolitics, Race, and Nation 2004). The design of colonial
spaces by Le Corbusier and other French experts had to address three interrelated themes
among other questions. In the next chapter I examine the significance of these questions in
the context of Clichy. The first question concerns the degree of separation or isolation of
indigenous spaces from European ones. The second revolves around hygiene and public
health in colonial spaces and the need to avoid epidemics. Finally, the third logic addresses
the question of gendered spaces and the management of sexuality in colonial.

Figure 3-2: A Sketch by Le Corbusier - Algiers was supposed to become the capital of
French Africa (Çelik 1992: 67).
Zeynep Çelik examines the urban texture of colonial Algiers through what she
identifies as the “cultural dimension of empire building” (Çelik 1997, 1). In her study, she
analyzes the discourses and techniques deployed by French administrators in Algiers to
understand how the colonial project has structured everyday life. She shows that one of the
priorities of colonial experts was to institute apartheid in Algiers by separating spaces
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inhabited by Europeans and those occupied by indigenous populations. The idea behind the
division was not based solely on military logics. French experts were interested in conserving
local cultures and also preventing the contamination of European ones. Çelik notes that the
idea of separation was one of the driving logics in Le Corbusier’s intervention in Algiers.
Among other things, the challenge for the architect was to create elevated spaces in which
Europeans would live and at the same time supervise the colonial population. The symbolic
intention of Le Corbusier was to impose a clear racial and social hierarchy on the local
population, through urban planning (199743). Urban experts were particularly interested in
what Çelik describes as “the politics of contact” and which concerns in-between spaces and
which are used to separate the two populations. The challenge was to sustain the colonial
project on the long term without altering racial hierarchies or colonial power structures.
While the separation was almost total and well delineated between the European population
and the poor Algerian social classes, the question was more complex for those who were
perceived as “evolved Muslims”. Çelik notes,
For the “evolved” Muslims, the “normal HLM [habitations à loyer modéré ] formulas” in
mixed settlements were seen as preferable to isolation, because a “politics of
contact” would bring the indigenous people and the Europeans together. For the
non-evolved sectors of the Muslim community (rural, but also urban—bidonville
residents and newcomers to the casbah), low-rise housing was the best solution.(117)
The degree of separation depends therefore on the level of adaptability of Muslim
populations. It forms a continuum that goes from total autonomy to organic intermixing.
These patterns were developed in the colony before being exported to the metropole as
explained in the previous chapter. Le Corbusier’s the plan to alter urban texture of Algiers in
a radical fashion would have benefited all inhabitants since the living conditions there were
dreadful. Quoting Le Corbusier, Çelik writes, ““the ‘civilized’ live like rats in holes,” whereas
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“the ‘barbarians’ live in solitude, in well-being” (Çelik 1997, 4). His depiction of imperial
citizens’ living conditions is symptomatic of colonial thinking. The colonized population is
envied while colonial citizens are portrayed as victims. What is important here is that the
Swiss architect perceived his project as an improvement of the colonial citizens’ and
colonized subjects’ living conditions. Both would have benefited.
The second important theme in French colonies was the handling of hygiene and
wellbeing of the colonial population living in the city. Hygiene is a strategic site where the
colonial power can intervene to improve the living conditions and at the same time
consolidate the colonial structures. Paul Rabinow shows in French Modern (1995) how urban
planning evolved gradually in the colony. From a simple intervention on space in the
beginning, it turned into a holistic intrusion that aims to transform space through social,
psychological, spatial, as well hygienic dimensions. The work of Le Corbusier is emblematic
of this period and that colonial state of mind. Çelik writes:
At the time of Le Corbusier's involvement in Algiers, this crowded quarter, occupied
by residents of diverse nationalities, was the most problematic area for the city
administration due to a lack of “material and moral hygiene.” Provisions had already
been made for its “destruction and complete reconstruction.” Le Corbusier's
cleansing would be urban and social, at once providing for controlled activities for
Arabs and racial contact in an ordered environment(199271).
The gradual interest of French officials in questions of health and hygiene had a decisive
impact on modern urban planning. It’s interesting to note in passing that Michel Foucault
chose to examine plague in seventeenth century France to understand the problematization
of health in urban spaces, at a time where the French colonial project would have been a
more obvious choice. Algiers constituted an important laboratory for some of the techniques
that would be implemented later on in Metropolitan France and more specifically in spaces
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inhabited by Afro-French. Public health became an important entry point to intervene in,
and alter urban spaces in the name of improvement.
A third crucial theme preoccupied French administrators. It was the idea that brown
women could enhance and further the colonial project as well as possibly threaten it. Various
colonial administrators have addressed the question in various ways. This careful analysis of
the place of women in colonial Algiers has been one of the important tropes in Le
Corbusier’s work. Çelik notes,
Le Corbusier himself provoked the association between his projects and Algerian
women by describing at length his enchantment with the women of the casbah and
by likening the city of Algiers to a female body: “Algiers drops out of sight,” he
noted, viewing the city from a boat leaving for France in 1934, “like a magnificent
body, supple-hipped and full breasted.... A body which could be revealed in all its
magnificence, through the judicious influence of form and the bold use of
mathematics to harmonize natural topography and human geometry(199271).
The gendering of a colonial space was one of the recurrent ideas in the colonial French
minds. This is because colonialism is a holistic project that necessitates economic
exploitation, political domination, and socio-cultural hegemony. One of the strategic sites for
the manifestation of imperial power is the colonized city and by extension the subjugated
nation. These arenas are often feminized and sexualized in order to be conquered, rescued,
and beloved by a savior who is also a white male (McClintock 1995, Stoler 2002). Colonial
spaces are also gendered at another and more intimate level. For example, the distinction
between the private/feminine and the public/masculine has always been a focal point for
planners as well as military stratagems. The colonial power strived to regulate these spaces as
part of a larger strategy of control. At the same time these spaces have been contested
terrains due to the resistance of colonized populations. As Fanon has shown in A Dying
Colonialism (1965), the symbolic and social place colonized women occupy within the colonial
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space has been a main preoccupation for the imperial power. Fanon explains however,
colonial knowledge about these spaces is partial and often skewed.
These three logics travelled as administrators and planners went back and forth
between colony and metropole. Today, urban planners use similar entry points to rethink
and redesign spaces inhabited by Afro-French populations. These spatial logics have been
codified in a new language that hides their colonial origins. Like in the case of Le Corbusier,
the spatial tools that planners of the twenty-first century use are presented as technical
problems rather than political discourses. The examination of the recent history of AfroFrench communities and the urbanization of Clichy-sous-Bois necessitates a detour through
Foucault and his genealogy of power. Examining Afro-French spaces in relation to the
history of power enables us to comprehend space formation according to specific
temporalities. It’s worth quoting Paul Rabinow at length because his approach is important
to examine the spatial meaning of each regime of power. The American intellectual writes:
Let us therefore look briefly at the relations of space and power in these three
schemes. In the sovereign regime of power, the basic spatial unit is the territory which
must be supervised and given a harmonious order such that all relations of science,
the arts, the law, industry, and commerce, as well as agriculture, fall under the
benevolent government of the sovereign and serve to increase his glory. In the
disciplinary technology of power, the problem is the control and distribution of bodies
and individuals in a spatial ordering whereby they can be made to function in such a
manner that efficiency, docility, and hierarchy are simultaneously achieved. Finally,
under the technologies of bio-power, power is exercised on a population existing in a
specific milieu which is both natural and historical. The components of both the
population and the milieu must be known empirically so that the specific historical,
demographic, ecological, and social forces which compose the population and the
milieu can be systematically regulated and made to flourish (2003356-57).
These three forms of power and their impact on space are the focus of the present and
following chapters. Below, I present a brief sketch of sovereignty and its history of
emergence.
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3.4.

Foucault sovereign power
In the early 1970s, Foucault started his attentive analysis of the modalities of power.

This interest in power relations lasted at least until the end of the decade but as we shall see,
some scholars would argue that his exploration of power continued until his death (Nealon
2008). The foucauldian investigation follows a diachronic axis where the conditions of
emergence for the different relations of power are explored. The historical account that
Foucault provides is complex; it allows him to conceptualize a multilayered genealogy of
power. His work provides a strategic vantage point to comprehend the various modalities of
power along a synchronic axis. The main site of his historical analysis is France, although
several of his studies take place in a larger European context. The theoretical framework that
he proposes to examine power relations is critical of dominant historiographies of
modernity. Instead of the prevalent humanist framework, Foucault’s analytics proposes a
perspective that is critical of the enlightenment and its paradigmatic sovereign subject. In
What is Enlightenment, Foucault undertakes a de-centering of the subject in the following
terms: “we must obviously give a more positive content to what may be a philosophical
ethos consisting in a critique of what we are saying thinking and doing through a historical
ontology of ourselves” (Foucault 1984, 45). Foucault’s statement shows that he is not
looking for an essence or an intrinsic meaning. Unlike phenomenological or hermeneutic
philosophies, genealogy investigates how power relations interpellate subjects.
Studying the history of power from a genealogical standpoint allows Foucault to
provide an unconventional narrative. This is particularly important in a project such as this
one. The history of Afro-French is to a large extent silenced. The linear and hegemonic
French historiography should be questioned, as explained in the previous chapter, to unravel
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different and more inclusive historiographies that are not centered around a metropolitan
“panoptical time,” to use McClintock expression(199544). This critical problematization of
historical transitions from one era to another one permits to explore the narratives of AfroFrench more adequately. Cultural critic Jeffrey Nealon explains that the driving question in
Foucault’s investigative work is “what does it cost?” According to him, the concept functions as
a guiding thread throughout Foucault’s work. The question allows us to understand why
regimes of power evolve in the way they do. To demonstrate the importance of that
question, Nealon cites a passage where Foucault reflects on his methodological approach.
He writes:
What the conditions of this emergence were, the price that was paid for it, so to
speak, its effect on reality and the way in which, linking a certain type of object to
certain modalities of the subject, it constituted the historical a priori of a possible
experience for a period of time, an area, and for given individuals (Nealon 2008, 1718).
This question constitutes an important entry point to understand Foucault’s scholarship. It
demonstrates how the French philosopher go about to study the processes of
problematization that are central to his work. Examining periodization of European history
by asking, “what does it cost?” avoids the hegemonic framework of the enlightenment as an
exclusive explanatory grid and according to which national history follows a path of rational
evolution towards more progress. The transition from Medieval Ages to Liberalism becomes
more than a simple byproduct of a Cartesian revolution rooted in a solid rational framework
as certain historians want us to believe. By proposing a different approach where every
period is examined according to its specific “conditions of emergence,” Foucault is in reality
conducting a genealogical study that doesn’t fall within the deterministic logic of dominant
historiographies. In other words, what interests Foucault are contingent specificities where
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he can comprehend not an origin but a place of confrontation and the various local struggles
that allow for an emergence. Jeffrey Nealon explores the relationship between Foucault’s
“conditions of possibility” and “conditions of emergence” and shows that only the latter
illustrates his genealogical methodology (1998). To describe Foucault’s approach, he writes,
“Genealogy consistently “opposes itself to the search for ‘origins’” (77); that is, it opposes
itself to the search for conditions of possibility, to the continuous exposure of the Ursprung’s
historical-transcendental traces in philosophy and in the human sciences”(18-19). The
conditions of possibility that many Foucauldian scholars attribute to Foucault is in reality
foreign to his work and antithetical to his genealogical method. Following Naelon’s advice,
one should search for the conditions of emergence and the question of cost to start
comprehending the genealogy of this complex gird of power.
Providing a comprehensive account of the multiple forms of sovereignty and their
respective genealogies is beyond the scope of this text. The aim here is to simply describe
some of the characteristics and historical specificities of sovereign power. The genealogical
study of power relations provides a grid of intelligibility to perform a thorough analysis of
the mutation of power from one form to another. It avoids the dominant narrative
according to which power undergoes a slow but progressive transformation towards more
rationality and democracy. By critiquing the humanism inherent in certain historiographic
accounts, Foucault demonstrates that it is possible to undertake a historical analysis of power
relations without falling in the trap of normative readings. To comprehend the main
characteristics of sovereign power and its effect on social practices, one should avoid the
tempting exercise of drawing rigid boundaries between “good” and “bad.” How, one ought
to ask, is it possible to conduct an analysis of power without reenacting any form of
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normativity. As Jeffrey Nealon explains, the most practical way to deploy Foucault’s
methodology is by asking, “what does it cost?” This question allows for a genealogical study
that escapes normativity and its moralizing dimension.
Investigating the question of cost in the French context would explicate the functioning of
sovereign power. The foucauldian concept of Sovereignty is understood here as a regime of
power that transcends the juridico-political framework. According to Foucault, the notion of
sovereignty is not simply linked to a juridical concept of power that punishes individual who
infringe the law of the sovereign (the monarch or the prince). The sovereign imposes his will
by exercising his right to take life or let live. In part, sovereign power is based on juridicopolitical modalities that function according to prohibitive sanctions. Foucault writes, “The
juridical edifice was […] formed around the royal personage, at the demand of royal power,
and for the benefit of royal power” (200325-26). Within this context, the sovereign utilizes
law as a way to consolidate its power. In reality, the purpose of sovereign power is to extract
wealth from subjects living within a bounded territory. The juridico-political is deployed to
justify the existence of such power. The sovereign utilizes physical force against the subjects
who challenge its will. Foucault suggests that sovereignty is grounded in a territorial logic
without which it loses its raison d’être. The system of states was therefore the logical political
outcome of such a power.
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, sovereign power was the dominant
form of power in European feudal societies. It emerged and developed as a strategy that
allowed the monarch to collect taxes within a territory that abides to his rule. The event that
solidified sovereign power was the Peace of Westphalia which was concluded between
different European powers and which ended thirty years of war. Centralization is what gives
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sovereign power its singularity. Mitchell Dean observes, “the emergence of the sovereign
state and the formation of internal sovereignty might be first viewed as a take-over and
extension of the dispersed police prerogatives exercised by the estates” (Dean 1999, 92). The
emergence of sovereignty is co-extensive to monarchic political system. The sovereign
doesn’t share his power with others; it’s precisely there that his particularity resides. Without
necessarily tracing the origins of sovereign power, Foucault argues that there is a historical
necessity for its emergence in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when different
European entities were battling each other in bloody Wars of Religion. “The theory of
sovereignty then became a weapon that was in circulation on both sides, and it was used by
both to restrict and to strengthen royal power” (Foucault 2003, 35).
The king, whose body personifies sovereign power, needs an adequate justification
for his usage of excessive force. He gets this justification from the juridico-political system
that backs his power. In other words, sovereign power draws its strength from law, and
paradoxically, what makes its strength is also a source of weakness. Foucault explains that
sovereignty as a political system prevents the efficient deployment of power. Every time a
subject challenges the power of the king, the latter has no choice but to punish with absolute
power. Foucault points out, “[…] absolute power […] cannot calculate power with
minimum expenditure and maximum efficiency” (200336). The inefficient economy of
power led to the progressive weakening and demise of the sovereign. Political treaties and
social actors in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries show that the notion of right was
used to fight absolutist monarchic power. In the end, the cost of power became too excessive
and the need for an alternative solution was absolutely necessary.
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On the economic plane, the emergence and consolidation of capitalism required a
radical transformation of the matrix of power. The extraction of surplus value and the
efficient exploitation of the working class were the initial reasons behind the development
and implementation of disciplinary power. Disciplinary power is expected to keep the
working class in its place. Through repetitive moves, it produces docile bodies that are
expected to be more efficient and less resistant. Unlike sovereign power, it is a concealed
form of power since it is dispersed throughout the social body. Foucault shows that the
economic sphere requires a decentralized power that turns the mechanisms of sovereign
power upside down. Rather than constructing its legitimacy through a spectacular and
violent performance, disciplinary power deploys insidious techniques that are difficult to
discern. This strategy of power aspires to have an impact on the micro-physical without
being “too intrusive.” Foucault explains that the emergence and development of the social
sciences at that particular moment were not coincidental. The objective behind a better
understanding of the biological and social bodies was to enhance its capabilities and to
permit a smoother process of exploitation.
Sovereign power started to be destabilized on several levels in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. The emergent economic rationality was in need of disciplinary
mechanisms to function efficiently.1 To consolidate its vulnerable position within an
emergent and fragile capitalist system, the bourgeoisie developed insidious techniques to
control the working class and regulate its behavior. The spectacular violence of the sovereign
could be enacted on specific occasions only. Its deployment on a large scale was not
possible. ““Punishment… will be an art of effects”, which is to thematize power not solely
as sovereign revenge against each subjective act of resistance, but rather to amply power’s
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effects within a wider economic field of calculation – the development, canalizing, and
harnessing of social and individual capacities on a much more cost-effective mass scale”
(Nealon 2008, 27). Nealon adds that disciplinary power doesn’t substitute sovereign power.
Rather the Foucauldian analytics of power suggests there is a process of intensification that
the technologies of power go through. The sovereign doesn’t disappear suddenly; its matrix
of power is gradually colonized by disciplinary techniques. The same trend takes place when
disciplinary mechanisms become incapable of bringing adequate solutions to certain
problematizations. The biopolitical invest the nodes of power that were previously inhabited
by disciplinary power. It is another example of intensification of power as Nealon suggests.

3.5.

Migrant Are Kept Outside Housing Projects
Sovereign power was deployed in the colonies to racialize and subjugate the

population. Its implementation in the metropole however was more problematic and
challenging. It’s a regime of power that doesn’t use power efficiently and this constitutes an
important limitation. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Afro-French groups were
assigned to secluded and marginal spaces. These spaces (bidonvilles, foyers, dilapidated
hostels, etc…) were regulated by a sovereign power that perceived them as an extension to
the colony. Often times, there was very little statistical or demographic information about
their inhabitants. The management the site was undifferentiated; the population was treated
as a homogenous mass. Not much knowledge was required for such a regulation. Crude
violence was often the sole form of management. In what follows I explore the various
forms of resistance that Afro-French developed to make the usage of sovereign power
inefficient and inadequate. Instead of the official narrative of progressive improvement in
the housing conditions of Afro-French, I argue that their resistance made their
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concentration in such spaces very costly, to use Foucault’s term. Their transfer into public
housing should be investigated from the angle of efficiency and cost. The transition from
sovereign power to biopolitical was not linear or one-dimensional. Instead, what occurred a
process of intensification of power and a systematic deployment of biopolitical techniques.
Sovereign power didn’t disappear, it morphed into a new regime of power.
The Manichean division between migrants’ dwelling and white French’s housing that
Fanon depicts in the Wretched of the Earth is symptomatic of the colonial period in the colony
as well as in metropolitan France as we saw in the previous chapter. There is, to a large
extent, a separation between the bidonvilles, the foyers, and the cités de transit on the one
hand and social housing on the other. Quoting Fanon, Stefan Kipfer remarks, “The
sociospatial organization of colonialism indicates that “economic reality, inequality, and the
immense difference of ways of life never come to mask the human realities” and expresses
the overdetermination of class relations by ‘race’” (Kipfer 2007, 710). Kipfer notes that the
separation is a sign of domination and an integrative part of the colonial project. The
separation and subjugation of other races has necessarily a spatial dimension. Fanon notices
in the Wretched of the Earth that the Manichean separation between the indigenous population
and white French in Algerian cities is not accidental but rather a byproduct of a racial
hierarchy. Describing the relationship between the military conquest and urban design, the
anti-colonial intellectual writes, “world of statues: the statue of the general who carried out
the conquest, the statue of the engineer who built the bridge; a world which is sure of itself,
which crushes with its stones the backs flayed by whips: this is the colonial world” (Kipfer
2007, 710). It’s important to note here that colonial logics were altered once they were
brought to the metropole. For example when Le Corbusier suggests a distinction between
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the various types of Algerians (primitive, civilized, evolved Muslims) and proposes the usage
of biopolitical techniques in conjunction to sovereign power, his goal is to integrate the
Algerian territory into Greater France more fully. In the 1940s and 1950s, French authorities
did not have the same plan for Algerians living in France. It was therefore important to
isolate them spatially from white French. This was not always the consensus as we saw in the
previous chapter. In the thirties certain political forces were for their assimilation in the
metropole. During the Algerian war and briefly after, most political forces were in favor of
an urban apartheid. French authorities believed it was important to concentrate most of the
Algerian population who was conducting a war of independence in the colony, in specific
areas in the metropole. Their control was much easier if confined within a particular area.
This is why sovereign power was deployed to regulate the lives of Afro-French in the
bidonvilles. The handling of Algerians living in Paris in the 1950s and 1960s was to a certain
extent the opposite of what it was in Algiers, in the 1930s, when Le Corbusier proposed his
urban reorganization. This is not to downplay the violence inflicted on colonial subjects
living in the periphery during that period.
Until the late 1960s and early 1970s, most Afro-French didn’t have access to social
housing. During this period, most of it was reserved for the white working class. The
housing crisis was still acute and the government preferred to keep colonial subjects away
from this type of housing. In the mid-1960s, the bidonvilles occupied a center stage in the
public discourse partly because of the very critical living conditions. Politicians started
expressing interest in dismantling them and reintegrating the population in the cite de transit
and public housing depending on whether they were “evolved” or “non-evolved” subjects,
as Le Corbusier puts it. Although the official reason for dismantling these spaces was to end
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marginalization of Afro-French and improve their living conditions, in reality keeping them
in the bidonville wasn’t cost effective anymore. The cost of managing and controlling these
dangerous spaces was too high. In 1964, the national assembly voted a resolution to
dismantle them (Zancarini-Fournel 2002). Thibault Tellier explains that during this early
period, “Paul Dijoub, secretary of state for immigrant workers, signed a document
explaining that immigrant families should be dispersed in the different public housing
projects to facilitate their insertion in French society” (Tellier 2008). Sometimes, high rises
were built in the middle of the bidonville to prevent its further expansion. The destruction
of the bidonvilles and cités de transit was accompanied with a careful transfer of one portion
of Afro-French to the HLM. Most of the time, the projects were built on empty terrains. In
1968, the ministry for the equipment asked the housing organizations to reserve 6.75% of
the apartments to families coming from bidonvilles (Patrimoine en Seine Saint Denis 2004,
9). 1.2 million units were built between 1953 and 1973 to provide housing to the bidonvilles’
residents, the working class, the migrant populations, as well as white French who returned
from the colonies after independence.
Certain groups of the radical left started connecting with the migrant population in
the bidonvilles and struggling alongside it. The foyers witnessed an important mobilization
in the early 1970s when residents started organizing series of strikes to denounce the high
rent and the small and uncomfortable rooms. The strikers were also struggling to end the
disciplinary regime implemented in the foyers. They wanted to change the regulation policy
of the foyers, which prevented them from receiving visitors at certain hours of the day and
scrutinized their behavior to the smallest details (Pitti 2008).
During the May 1968, migrant workers (mostly North-Africans) organized their own
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strike and entered in a conflict with the Confédération générale du travail (CGT is a labor union
very close to the communist party). The most successful strikes were without a doubt the
ones organized in the Renault car factories. In the early 1970s, Afro-French organized strong
movements in the foyers to end the neo-colonial management of their housing. In addition,
they refused to pay rent until their demands were met. Seeing its power challenged, and
disapproving of the migrants’ strategy, the communist party tried to break the strike. In all
these struggles, the radical left found an opportunity to connect with migrant workers and
fight against the bureaucratic practices of the PCF who was opposed to the independent
organizing of migrant workers (Zancarini-Fournel 2002). These conflicts had important
implications on cities controlled by communists such as Clichy-sous-Bois.
Migrant workers also started organizing around the Palestinian question and against
Arab authoritarianism. Arab intellectuals living in France needed a structure to continue their
struggles after the independence of Algeria and the return of many Algerian militants (and
other Afro-French communities) back to their countries. Abdellali Hajjat explains that Arab
political activities founded the Palestinian committees who were composed of Arab activists,
French Maoists, and radical leftists. After the defeat of Arab countries in the war of 1967
against Israel, intense discussions took place in the committees and divergences started
emerging. On the one hand, certain members wanted to focus on national questions specific
to each country while others preferred to maintain a Pan-Arabist political position and a
focus on the Palestinian question. The Mouvement des Travailleurs Arabes (MTA, the Arab
Workers Movement) was formed in 1972. Its main aim was to maintain a total independence
from French parties and labor unions because they have been mostly ignoring the demands
of migrant workers. The MTA’s role was central in many important demonstrations and
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strikes that migrant workers organized in the mid-seventies. The MTA was also critical of
organizations who had a national rather than a Pan-Arab preference. They wanted to avoid
the tutelage of North-African countries over their destines. They argued that their autonomy
from French political parties and North African countries is a necessary step toward
achieving the full emancipation of immigrants. In 1973, the MTA and Arab workers
organized a strike to denounce racism inside and outside the workplace (Hajjat 2008).
Tunisian intellectual Sadri Khiari notes that all these struggles have shaped a common
platform for the various Afro-French populations (Khiari 2006, 2009). Their interactions
with each other during the strikes have shown their tremendous organizational power.
Despite this important political activities and intermixing between the different communities,
the real emergence of Afro-French identities took place in the 1970s and 1980s when the
various groups finally inhabited the same spaces of public housing.
The Marcellin-Fontanet circular, which was passed by the government in 1972, made
residency for foreigners contingent upon providing evidence of employment. Immigration
was regulated by the French industry’s capacity to absorb new immigrants and its need for
manpower. The circular also contained several measures for the integration of immigrants
(Silverman, The racialization of immigration: aspects of discourse from 1968-1981 1990,
114-20). Up until 1970, only a small minority of Afro-French was living in the HLM. The
Sub-Saharan were the most excluded group from this type of housing. In 1970, around
20,000 were living in the Parisian region with almost half of that number were housed in the
public and private foyers, while the remaining were staying in hostels, private apartments,
and other type of housing. Only very few were living in HLM (Donne 2008, 21). By the end
of the 1970s large numbers of migrants started accessing public housing and were living
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alongside white working class families. However, with the strikes and other forms of
mobilization that migrant workers organized in the mid 1960s, they were becoming visible in
the public sphere. Politicians had to address the problem of migrant housing in new ways.
The visibility of migrant and their political activities constituted a threat for politicians. The
usage of sovereign power alone was becoming ineffective and too expansive. During this
period, one of the priorities for politicians was to disperse Afro-French communities and
undermine their struggles. For the conservative government, sending Afro-French into
regions controlled by the communits would achieve two goals. On the one hand, it would
create new problems for communists who were extremely popular in working class areas and
constituted a real force in the Red Belt, the suburbs surrounding Parisian. On the other,
migrant populations didn’t represent any electoral power and were therefore disposable from
the standpoint of the government. By dispersing them in public housing, the government
would reduce the migrants to a new form of invisibility, and undermine their political force.
The new strategy was about the production of a new form of invisibility by the integration of
Afro-French into mostly white suburbs.

3.6.

Conclusion
Afro-French groups had uneven trajectories in metropolitan France that prevented

them from forming a solid shared identity. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the
various diasporic groups lived in different spaces such as the bidonvilles, dilapidated hostels,
poorly furnished apartments, cités de transit, and foyers. They sometimes shared some of
these spaces but their experiences were often different. This is the case of the foyers, which
was a place of containment for Algerian while it provided a space of encounter for many
West Africans. The struggles of Afro-French as well as the structural transformation of the
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French economy after the crisis of 1973 had important impacts on immigration policies.
Starting in the early 1970s, more Afro-French were able to access the HLM. In the
beginning, social housing was only available to ‘evolved’ Afro-French, to use Le Corbusier’s
term. Due to their struggles, Afro-French were able to make the sole use of sovereign power
inefficient. Keeping them in the type of housing they were occupying raised the social cost
for the government. Their organizing and struggles pushed the government to find
alternatives to the bidonvilles and the foyers. The process of accessing public housing was
further facilitated because many white middle class families started leaving public housing to
buy their own individual houses.
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CHAPTER 4
BIOPOLITICS AND MODALITIES OF RACIALIZATION
IN CLICHY-SOUS-BOIS

[W]e need to see things not in terms of the replacement a society of sovereignty by a
disciplinary society and the subsequent replacement of a disciplinary society of by a
society of government; in reality one has a triangle, sovereignty-disciplinegovernment, which has the population as its primary target.
Michel Foucault

4.1.

Introduction
This chapter studies the impact of urban plans and renewal on the racialization of

Afro-French living in Clichy-sous-Bois. It proposes to understand the complex and multidimensional relationship between sovereign power and biopolitics as they work their way in
the spatiality of the city. The aim of these two forms of power is to reorder and manage
social spaces according to specific governmental rationalities. The chapter complements the
previous one while shifting the focus away from Paris to the specific context of Clichy. More
precisely, it explores the discourses and technologies of government that experts and
politicians utilize to racialize the social spaces of Clichy. Unlike the previous chapter where
sovereign power was the main axis of analysis, the present chapter examines the complex
relationship between sovereign power and biopolitics and examines the spaces of
convergence between the two. By considering bio-politics and sovereignty as two distinct
but intertwined forms of power, the study engages with the foucauldian framework to
analyze the spatial racialization of Afro-French living in Clichy. This chapter and the
following one propose spatial governmentality as a grid of intelligibility.
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From the standpoint of national and local politicians, urban renewal in Clichy
achieves several and sometimes conflicting objectives. The study starts with a genealogical
analysis of public housing in Clichy. It examines the trajectory of Bernard Zehrfuss, the
architect who designed the first master plan and executed several important projects in the
city. He had a crucial and lasting impact on the urban history of Clichy. The chapter argues
that his training and experimental constructions in colonial Tunisia are vital to understanding
his architecture in contemporary Clichy. The second section explores the socio-political
history of Clichy and the different ways the communists and socialists have shaped the
spaces of the city. It analyzes the spatial techniques that communists utilized to end the
phenomenon of ghettoization in Clichy and disperse Afro-French communities. The study
shows that the communists’ utilization of sovereign power was bound to fail. On the other
hand, the socialists’ employment of biopolitical and sovereign techniques was much more
effective. The last section explores three important biopolitical programs that the socialists
have implemented to transform the subjectivities of Afro-French and open up the spaces of
the city. Using urban renewal as a strategic site of intervention, the socialists have developed
techniques revolving around questions of public health, gender equality, and social mixing to
end the ghettoization of the city. The study argues that in each case, the genealogy of these
programs should be traced to the colonial past of the imperial French republic.

4.2.

Bernard Zehrfuss Brings Colonial Knowledge to Clichy-sous-Bois
Le Corbusier’s planning in Algiers as well as the struggles of Afro-French in the

1960s and 1970s in the metropole are crucial to understand the recent history of Clichysous-Bois and the formation of Afro-French subjectivities in the city. Clichy-sous-Bois is
located in the Eastern suburb of Paris at approximately ten miles from the center. It was
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isolated from Paris and the main arteries of communication. The city was also poorly
connected to public transportation (there is currently a project for the construction of a
tramway that will cross the city and connect it with other suburban cities).
Until late 1950s Clichy was a small village with a slowly growing population. From
1936 to 1954, the number of residents was fluctuating between 4,000 and 5,000. In 1954, the
inhabitants witnessed the construction of the first wave of collective housing. In the center
of Clichy there were green areas where Parisians used to come for a promenade while
individual houses were located in the periphery. Unlike the surrounding communes, Clichy
didn’t have any bidonvilles. However the dismantling of bidonvilles in the surrounding areas
led to the relocation of a fraction of the population in Clichy(Deschamps and Galloy 1966).
According to the municipality’s archives, between 1954 and 1961 around 1600 units were
built and attracted white middle and working classes who were looking for cheap housing. In
1960, the state decides to build 10,000 new units since there were large pieces of vacant land
in the city. The project was assigned to Bernard Zehrfuss, a renowned architect and highly
influenced by Le Corbusier’s work. In the end, the architect built only two projects, Le Chene
Pointu, which comprises 1526 units, and Les Bosquets (1556 units), mostly located in
Montfermeil and which became notorious in the 1970s and 1980s for its mediatization and
demonization in public discourses. These projects were sold to private owners at relatively
low price. The right wing government was building many cheap condominiums along with
public housing. It’s not possible to distinguish the former from the latter through the
physical appearance of the building because both were poorly conceived and used cheap
construction material. Only a juridical status distinguishes one from the other. Today, the
government is trying to buy these condominiums from individuals in Clichy to demolish the
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dilapidated buildings.
Although Bernard Zehrfuss executed only one portion of the housing projects, he
conceived the first master plan (see illustration below) for the city. Although his initial plan
was modified several times, it nonetheless provided a grid that was previously inexistent.
More importantly, his trajectory exemplified the organic relationship that experts established
between metropole and colony. The idea of the colony as an experimental laboratory for
metropolitan cities is particularly significant in the case of Clichy-sous-Bois.
Bernard Zehrfuss did his studies in architecture at the Ecole des beaux-arts between
1928 and 1939. This was the golden era for urban planning in French colonies. The year of
his graduation, he obtained the Grand Prix de Rome for his project. Ironically, it consisted
of a plan for the construction of a palace for the French colonial empire. In 1942, he joined
the French Free Forces and left for North Africa. He became the city of Tunis’ chief
architect (Edelmann 1996). Zehrfuss was one of the followers of Le Corbusier’s; he
embraced the principles of The Charter of Athens closely. Going back and forth, he designed
and built projects in colonial Tunisia as well as metropolitan France. His trajectory is
paradigmatic of architects of that era who were formed in the colonies and later had a long
career in the metropole. During his formative years in Tunis he thought about the best way
to handle the colonial population. He wrote:
A great effort was put on Tunis’ regional plan. Its main principles are:
•
•
•

!

The habitat should be moved away from the swamps and elevated to
healthier zones,
The business district should remain at the center, nearby the harbor,
Circular and radial connections should be constructed to circumvent
obstacles such as the Medina in the west, the lake in the east, the Muslim
cemetery in the south…
"""!
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•

Tunis should stop growing in a flawed manner; it should become a center for
exchange and not residence(Zehrfuss 1950, 13).

Following Le Corbusier, Zehrfuss maintained that a number of architectural
principles should be applied in Tunis. They were mostly inspired by the Charter of Athens.
According to the French architect, what Tunis needed was a diminution in the number of
pathways, larger green areas, and a good orientation for better ventilation and penetration of
sunlight. He explained, that these principles should be applied carefully taking into
consideration the context and local problems. Zerhrfuss also remarked that his plans
wouldn’t encounter much resistance from the inhabitants because the natives were mostly
unaware of modern urbanism(Zehrfuss 1950).

Figure 4-1: First master plan of collective housing in Clichy-sous-Bois, conceived by
Bernard Zehrfuss
His plan consisted of the creation of new cities around Tunis. These cities would be
interconnected to each other and also to Tunis by high-speed highways. The purpose of his
plan was to reorder what he perceived as the chaotic urbanism of the preceding period. Imen
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Oueslati notes that Zehrfuss’s plan was based on a “harmonious urbanism,” “an ordered
space,” and “a simple geometry.” She explains that the simple geometrical forms used by the
architect could be repeated indefinitely to allow the Arab city to grow harmoniously. Finally
Ouestali praises the architect because he was able to address properly the question of the
separation of the medina from the European city by proposing a zone of transition that
would avoid an abrupt break (Oueslati 2006). Her positive appraisal of Zehrfuss comes as a
surprise since his plans have, to a large extent, been faithful to Le Corbusier’s spirit and his
colonial logic. The separation of the different spaces according to the function of each, as
proposed by Le Corbusier, hides the violence of the colonial projects. The idea according to
which spaces are separated because they serve different functions erases the overarching
racial hierarchy that regulates them. Bernard Zehrfuss did not deviate from that logic when
he proposed a master plan for Algiers. Furthermore, he brought with him certain
components of colonial urbanism to Clichy. His legacy is unfortunately still with us today as
the implementation of urban renewal project attests. The principled he applied in colonial
Algiers guided his planning in Clichy since modernist architecture can be applied anywhere
regardless of the social geography or the history of the space. The urban forms Zehrfuss
erected in Clichy were supposed to provide a better lifestyle to a white working class. In the
early 1960s, public housing was not open to Afro-French yet. Therefore, the separation
between the different spaces which is the foundation of Le Corbusier’s architecture was
meant to exclude postcolonial subjects from these areas. Since few documents were available
to explain Zehrfuss projects, I study his architectural work through its effects as Foucault
has suggested.
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4.3.

Communists and the Regulation of Space (1965-1981)
The history of Afro-French in the banlieues and more specifically in Clichy cannot

be understood outside the political reality of the 1960s. For more than fifty years, the
communist party has been hegemonic in the Parisian suburbs. They formed a red belt
around Paris from the 1920s until the 1960s. After World War One, for reasons I won’t
delve into, the Communist Party controlled many working class suburbs. During that period,
they had almost total control over the municipalities located within the red belt. In the 1960s
however, with a growing number of Afro-French moving into public housing, the
communist party felt they were losing their grip over these territories (Stovall 2001, Petonnet
1985).
Communist mayors issued a statement in October 1969 according to which the
inhabitants of bidonvilles located in their cities would be distributed evenly in the
surrounding regions. They suggested that only one third of the residents of the bidonville
would be housed in the city while two thirds would be housed in nearby cities. The
municipalities preferred to take European inhabitants of the bidonvilles, mostly Portuguese.
In addition to their racialization and demonization, the families of the bidonvilles were
perceived as a-social and difficult to assimilate in the HLM. Even the board of the OPHLM
(public or private organisms that builds public housing in France) refused to take more
foreigners arguing that mayors were reporting racial tensions in cities where they were more
than 10% (David 2010).
The municipalities were pleased to see the bidonvilles dismantled but at the same
time they wanted a large portion of the population to be relocated in the region and only a
fraction within their department (Blanc-Chaléard 2008). Experts argued that the threshold of
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tolerance for foreigners in the HLM should not exceed a certain ratio, fixed at 15% in the
case of Nanterre, the city with the largest bidonville (Kastoryano 2002).
Blanc-Chaléard explains that the percentage of migrants who moved into public
housing started growing significantly at the end of the 1960s. In 1968, it was 12.6% and
reached 26.2% in 1979 and finally exceeded the 30% in 1989. This percentage is mostly
composed of Sub-Saharan and North African migrants although it’s not exclusively made of
these national groups. More recently, a growing number of Turks and Asians started
migrating to France and living in public housing. This number doesn’t take into
consideration Afro-French who are French citizens. Since ethnic statistics are illegal in
France, it’s impossible to gather accurate estimates about the ethnic composition of public
housing. Already in 1975, there was a certain concentration of Algerians in few specific
housing projects distant from the center of Paris (Blanc-Chaléard 1998, 9). Housing
organisms concentrated Afro-French and isolated them in certain areas to avoid that the
image of projects depreciate and white families leave them.
In the case of Clichy, the communists ran the city from 1947 to 1990. The
communist mayor André Déchamps was elected six times in more than four decades. In the
early 1990s, after a period of contested elections and high tension between the mayor and
the communist party, the socialists took over the city in 1995. A detailed political and social
history of the city is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, what I highlight here are
some key moments that would help us build a genealogy of Afro-French in the city.
Although the approach that the communists of Clichy adopted to deal with Afro-French
diasporas is not unique compared to other communist cities, it had nevertheless its own
specificities. Already, in 1969, communist mayors in the Parisian regions were concerned
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about the high concentration of foreigners and French minorities in their communes. They
signed a declaration asking the state, which was controlled by the Right, to solve the problem
of migrants’ concentration in certain projects. The solution they proposed was to disperse
Afro-French in all the neighboring regions, including the wealthy cities, which didn’t have
many housing projects and were refusing to build new ones (Masclet 2005).
Already, in the mid-1960s, the communists in Clichy were discussing the question of
housing in their commune. They wanted more HLM units to be built to provide more
apartments. They explained that they had a long waiting list of inhabitants who needed
housing at affordable prices. The tension between the right wing government of Charles De
Gaulle and the communists was clear in public discourse surrounding the housing situation.
In 1966, Deschamps wrote an article in the municipal bulletin:
We are fighting for a governmental policy that allocates most of the state’s resources
to funding harmonious equipments in our commune rather than spending it on
prestigious weaponry. We are fighting so that our municipalities, among other things,
have the right to acquire the empty lots located in our communes and decide on their
fates. Our primary concern is the construction of large cities that take into
consideration, before anything else, the happiness of human beings (Deschamps and
Galloy 1966, 3).
The communists contested their limited power over construction and land allocation in
Clichy but they had no clear strategy to resist the government’s transfer of Afro-French
populations into their city. They denounced construction companies whose only concern is
speculation on apartments’ prices. Other communists rejected the unethical behavior of
construction companies who “don’t take the scale of human beings into consideration” and
who “only have the capitalist incentives in mind”(Armand 1970). Paradoxically what the
communists were voicing was closer to the government’s initial strategy of dispersing AfroFrench outside the “ghetto-like” bidonvilles. The government’s dismantled the bidonvilles in
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order to prevent the concentration of Maghrebians. The idea was to disperse them in public
housing. However wealthy cities refused to take the quota imposed by the government. This
was combined with a governmental strategy that aimed to undermine the Red Belt. In the
late 1960s one can read in Clichy’s municipal bulletin that communists reject the high rents
imposed by capitalist companies and will stand against the eviction of respectful inhabitants.
In the 1970s the rhetoric of the municipality started changing. Middle class families
started leaving public housing to buy their own apartments in the surrounding areas. The
Barre law voted by the right wing parliament in 1977, granted loans and facilitated the
process of acquiring private propriety. The combination of these economic and historical
factors triggered a flight of white middle class. The vacant apartments were available to
poorer white working classes and increasingly, to Afro-French families. This process among
other things was meant to weaken the communist party and push its constituency to leave
the red belt. In parallel, the National Front, the far right wing party started gaining some
momentum and became one of the important political players in Clichy and other similar
banlieues. The communist newsletter printed in 1980 a declaration in which communist
mayors in several suburban cities accused the government of scaring the population by
allowing small fascist faction to beat immigrants with impunity (renaissance 1980). Due to an
economic crisis and a growing number of Afro-French living in public housing, the National
Front attracted many of the communists’ sympathizers. The socio-political conditions in
Clichy were favorable for the National Front. According to Claude Dilain, the current
mayor, the city had a bad reputation and was considered a city for the poor and those who
couldn’t find apartments elsewhere. The city’s poor social conditions made it one of the
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important destinations for refugees and migrant workers who were looking for cheap rent
and affordable living cost. (Dilain 2006).

4.4.

Afro-French Are Too Visible (1981-1989)
The 1980s constitute a new era in the history of Clichy. In 1981, Francois Mitterrand

won the presidential elections on a progressive political platform inspired by the common
program that the socialist and communist parties have agreed on in 1972. During the first
period of his mandate, Mitterrand raised the minimum wage, instituted a five-week holiday
and 39-hour workweek in addition to several nationalization of important companies. The
regularization of the status of 130,000 undocumented workers, primarily due to the struggles
of Afro-French and other minorities, was a promising moment in Mitterrand’s presidency.
However, as Maxim Silverman explains, the historic victory of the left did not bring the
change Afro-French communities were hoping for. The harsh policies imposed on
immigrant workers in the 1970s, in addition to a structural economic crisis made it difficult
to transform public discourse and everyday practices towards immigrants. Silverman writes:
This is why the tendency to focus on the rise of racism this decade and, frequently,
to link this phenomenon with the Front National is misleading. By locating it within
the extreme right, this approach marginalizes racism instead of situating it as an
integral part of the national and social order. The popularist terminology of the
Front National in the 1980s only emerges from the racialized discussion of
immigration of the 1970s (Silverman, The racialization of immigration: aspects of
discourse from 1968-1981 1990, 128).
The racist discourses and modes of racialization of the 1980s were also the consequence of a
new housing configuration that Afro-French communities were subjected to. For the first
time they were in direct contact with white French in the housing projects. The tension
between Afro-French and white residents was due to high unemployment rates combined to
the an increasing number of working class families were linking the degradation of public
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housing to the new presence of minorities. The National Front exploited the situation; its
slogan in 1981 was “Two million unemployed is two million migrants too many.” The
National Front campaign was accompanied with a wave of criminal acts against young Arabs
who were sometimes shot with a hunting rifle in the middle of the day by an angry neighbor.
The early 1980s French society witnessed also for the first time the new phenomenon of
postcolonial urban revolts. The actors of these revolts were Afro-French youth, mostly
Maghrebian. Policy makers started shifting their attention away from the older generation to
the younger one who was becoming the new dangerous class. The wave of demonstrations
between 1983 and 1985 was mostly organized by the younger generation who for the most
part was born in France (Khiari 2006, 37-49).
In Clichy-sous-Bois, the National Front was scoring important results. During the
European elections for example, the leader of the Front, Jean-Marie Le Pen, got 17.22% of
the votes while the communist candidate got 19.37%. Some of the communist electorate
shifted to the National Front while the Mayor, André Deschamps pushed for a right wing
agenda with a leftist rhetoric. In 1983, one could read in the communist newsletter that the
municipality decided to end the racist practices that the Right had instituted in the past few
decades and which consisted of concentrating migrant workers in specific areas and which
led to the formation of “ghetto zones”. Because of the critically low budget and the lack of
funding, the municipality proposed the full stoppage of migrants’ and asylum seekers’ new
arrival (Budget et immigration en question 1983). At the same time the communist party was
also critical of the repressive national police, which was utilized against the immigrants
within the ghetto to undermine their struggle and organizing. Instead of a national repressive
police, communists requested a local police and a police station for the city. To address the
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question of central planning imposed by the state on the city, the mayor of Clichy created a
semi-public organism in 1987, the SEMINEP, to build new housing projects without having
to allocate any to Afro-French families. In doing so, he explained, he would be able to avoid
the formation of a ghetto in Clichy. Within a few years the SEMINEP declared bankruptcy
and in 2004 Deschamps was convicted for fraud and neglect.
The experience of some of the inhabitants was not greatly affected by Deschamps
actions. This is probably due to the fact that they were not included in the political sphere.
While the mayor was actively demonizing Afro-French, Omar, one of the inhabitants I met
in Clichy, describes life in the 1980s as pleasant and the housing conditions as good. He lived
in Les Bosquets which had a bad reputation due to sensationalist media coverage and
politicians’ scapegoating. The project which was built by Zehrfuss in the early 1960s was also
a site of experimental urban interventions. Omar is Algerian, in his mid-thirties, and has a
university degree and a good paying job which is uncommon in the project. His parents were
part of the first wave of Afro-French to come to Clichy. They found an apartment in Les
Bosquets in 1974. Omar describes Les Bosquets as a diverse and enjoyable housing project.
Omar spoke nostalgically about the early 1980s but was more nuanced about the following
period:
In addition to the many white families, a number of Cambodian families arrived in
1983-84 and before that many Maghrebian families came as part of the family
reunion program that Mitterrand had initiated. The Arameans, those are Christians
who were persecuted in Turkey, arrived in the 1980s. Then we had a wave of Zairian
who were fleeing from the violence of Mobutu.
Interviewer: Do these communities still live in Clichy?
Omar: There are maybe thirty Cambodian families but we don’t see them often.
They sometimes organize picnics in the woods. The Chaldean population was
integrated very quickly into French society. For some reason, they knew how the
!

"#+!

!
system works. The fact that they are Christian must have helped too. In less than
twenty years, they were able to build their own church. Some of them migrated to
Sarcelles et Gonnesse. Maghrebians were in the city since 1967. Today, the older
generation meets at the mosque and in coffee shops. Finally, there is the Turkish
community who still doesn’t speak French and sometimes have hard time integrating
in French society.
Interviewer: Can you explain the decaying situation of the housing project? How did
it happen?
Omar: In the 1960s the housing standards were really good. I remember there was an
aquarium in some of the buildings (La Forestiere for example). We need to
differentiate between public housing and copropriete (the collectively owned private
housing). In the case of public housing, it aged badly probably because the material
they used was not the best. In the case of the copropriete, it’s a different story. It’s
actually one of the major problems in Clichy. The value of property went down very
quickly and those who could sell and move elsewhere did and only the poorest
stayed in the city. Many inhabitants stopped paying their contributions of owners to
common expenses because they saw the situation deteriorating. Often times several
families lived in the same apartment. Furthermore when people with similar origins
live in the same neighborhood, there is no incentive for them to embrace French
culture and try to adapt to it. Finally, the municipality doesn’t have any say on who
lives in the coproprietes. This is why people from common origins usually
concentrate in the same neighborhood or building. The majority of the Moroccans
that you see around here are from Oujda in the east and Algerians for the most part
come from Maghnia, a hundred km from Oran. The concentration of people who
come from the same country are not controlled by the municipality. Sub-Saharan
families sometimes have hard time adapting to a new culture. They behave as if they
were still living in their little village in Africa. For example, they think the central
place surrounded by the high rises is comparable to the central place in their village.
They think that kids are safe in this area since they believe everyone has an eye on
what the little ones are doing. This is not true. In the case of social housing, you can
also find a concentration of a certain community in a building. The housing
organism must have a procedure, which lead to such concentrations. They won’t
reveal these procedures but I think, they do exist. In these areas, the white don’t feel
at home and they end up leaving. It’s not because of a lack of security; it’s just in
their heads (Omar 2009).
Omar’s narrative represents the classic story of white migration from public housing
to individual houses and an opportunity to access a middle class lifestyle. There were two
main reasons for this migration. Firstly, the Right who governed in France for twenty-seven
years, until 1981, pushed for policies that favored private property over public housing.
Secondly, the growing number of Afro-French and their new visibility in public housing
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made white French uncomfortable. Many white families were not willing to live beside
individuals who were, not long ago, their colonial subjects. Omar and many other AfroFrench viewed public housing in the 1970s as an improvement in their living conditions. For
Omar and other Afro-French, the late 1970s and early 1980s were a transitional period.
Afro-French were leaving the bidonvilles and foyers and finally accessing the projects.

4.5.

The Communist Party Splits (1989-1995)
The period from 1989 and 1995 represents an important transition in Clichy but also

on a larger scale. Deschamps’ rhetoric became openly racist and he started harassing
undocumented immigrants by preventing their children to attend school at Clichy. The
communist mayor’s problematization of immigrant was not exceptional. The entire political
spectrum (with few exceptions) was blaming Afro-French for the recession and the dreadful
economic conditions. Silverman notes “Mitterrand declared that the threshold for numbers
of immigrants in France had been reached in the 1970s”(199295). The communists were also
actively harassing migrants who, they argued were overrepresented in their cities. The
municipalities were requesting a more equitable and even distribution of Afro-French. In
Vitry-sur-Seine, a communist municipality, a group of fifty individuals including the
communist mayor, attacked a Malian foyer using a caterpillar; destroyed the heating system;
cut the water and the electricity and tried to expel the residents who were transferred from a
neighboring city. The communist party supported the action of the mayor under the pretext
that he was fighting against the constitution of a ghetto in his city (Subra 2006, 154). The
position of the communist party in the previous decades was that migrant workers were in
France only temporarily and since their countries have finally won their independence, it was
time for them to go back and build their own societies(152-53).
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In 1989 there were municipal elections and the second round was between the
communists and the National Front. André Deschamps, made several racist statements
about Afro-French communities to attract some of the electorate of the National Front. He
told a journalist: “You see Niggers and Arabs like hoards of hyenas in the staircases of the
projects (…) instead of aggressing old ladies, they’d better find a job”(Quemener 1992).
After this statement, for which Deschamps was condemned by a court, the communist party
attempted to marginalize him and support Christian Dhapuis, a ‘moderate’ communist. In
order to win some of the communist sympathizers who were still attached to Deschamps,
the new mayor used a subtle racist strategy. For example, after visiting some of the
apartments in the housing projects, he explained, “there are 38% foreigners in Clichy, we
have to stop the flow (…) I was chocked and scandalized. I saw in some apartments, fifteen
people living on each other and children sleeping in the closets. We have to stop this
humiliation and lack of respect for human beings.” His message was clearly trying to please
communist electorate who was becoming more openly critical of the presence of immigrants
in Clichy. His statement exemplifies a shift in the debate in the 1990s about immigration.
The debate in the public sphere was shifting from one around the tolerance threshold of
immigrants (Seuil de tolerance) in housing projects to one revolving around the need to fight
against the formation of ghettos in cities with public housing (De Laforcade 2006, Silverman
1992).
An article titled “Immigration: the tricky question of tolerance threshold” and
published by the populist newspaper Le Parisien discussed the risks of high concentration of
foreigners:
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If we accept a threshold of 20% in the HLM, this means that 50% of the students in
schools would be migrants’ kids. How do we avoid the city-ghetto or school-ghetto?
Rocard stated that “France cannot solve all the misery of the world” while
Mitterrand talked about “the threshold of tolerance.” The mayor of Sartrouville,
Laurent Wetzel explains: “French don’t have any problem with their neighbor’s skin
color, what they can’t stand is the behavior of some of them! The humming sounds
that adolescents make with their motorbikes at midnight; Antilleans who generate
exotic smells when they cook (Fohanno 1990).
It’s worth noting here how Frenchness is associated with whiteness. Antilleans who are
French for at least a century and a half, are still perceived as foreigners. French from
Maghrebian or Sub-Saharan origins are often lumped with brown and black foreigners and
perceived as immigrés. The discursive war against Afro-French and immigrants was obviously
not confined to the communists alone. It was part of a public discourse, which emerged in
its new form in the 1980s and reinforced itself in the 1990s. This explains why the
suspended mayor won the elections when they were organized a second time and despite a
coalition between the socialist and communist parties against him. The white population felt
that the tolerance threshold was reached and was in favor for more robust measures against
Afro-French. Ultimately, Claude Dilain, the current mayor, won the elections in 1995 as
socialists sized more red cities in the Parisian suburbs. Dilain explains that the communist
mayor and his appointed successor, Gerard Probert, made three important mistakes. Firstly,
Deschamps wanted to build an incinerator in the city to generate extra income without
understanding the extent to which the population was opposed to the project. Secondly, he
decided to step down from his position as a mayor and appointed an inexperienced
collaborator who started disagreeing with him. Thirdly, the new mayor, Gerard Probert,
decided to focus on desegregating the city by creating a new highway that would connect the
north to the south without understanding that such a project would benefit owners of
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private cars but not those who use public transportation and who are a majority.
Furthermore, a highway would bring a lot of nuisance to a calm suburban city.

4.6.

Biopower and the Governmentalization of the State
In this last section I analyze the emergence of a biopolitical regime in Clichy-sous-

Bois. Before doing so, I highlight some of the history and important characteristics of
biopolitics. Experts involved in regulating the behavior of working classes and exploiting
them, found that they needed to address their biological needs and psychological desires.
The crude force of sovereign power was often expansive and not always effective. They also
discovered that subjects aspire for more freedom and that’s important to take into
consideration in a new regime of power. It is within such a context that new technologies of
government emerged and started taking shape. Foucault defines biopolitics as “the endeavor,
begun in the eighteenth century, to rationalize the problems presented to governmental
practice by the phenomena characteristic of a group of living beings constituted as a
population: health, sanitation, birthrate, longevity, race” (Burleigh 1997, 73). The new
technology of power aims to enhance the wellbeing of the population. By doing so,
biopolitics secures the reproduction of labor power that is vital to the capitalist mode of
production. It also makes power relations less visible. Foucault shows that it’s not enough to
produce docile bodies; the capitalist system requires a better understanding of the population
needs and address them adequately.
By decentering the economic logic, Foucault suggests that there is a different
genealogy of power that could explain the emergence of biopolitics. He argues that with the
consolidation of disciplinary power as a mechanism of domination, liberalism emerged as an
alternative to democratize the social sphere. He obviously rejects the conventional narrative
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according to which political thought follows a progression that gradually rejects
totalitarianism and strives for a democratic ideal. As Nealon notes, by asking, “what does it
cost?” to keep disciplinary power in place, the Foucauldian logic can provide a different
explanation for the emergence of liberalism and the co-constitutive biopolitical power.
Sovereignty, which used to represent the right of king “to take life or let live”
metamorphosed in the eighteenth century and became what Foucault names “collective
sovereignty”. Foucault writes:
juridical systems, no matter whether they were theories or codes, allowed the
democratization of sovereignty, and the establishment of a public right articulated
with collective sovereignty, at the very time when, to the extent that, and because the
democratization of sovereignty was heavily ballasted by the mechanisms of
disciplinary coercion. (200337).
The history of sovereign power demonstrates that it is difficult to separate one modality of
power and analyze its genealogy in isolation from the other modalities of power. The
evolution of disciplinary and governmental powers should be understood in relation to each
other. Foucault explains that disciplinary power evolved from being a form of power that
acts on subjects by training them to be more docile, to become a generalized power that
invests all fields of the social and aims to enhance the subjects’ productivity. In the case of
governmental power, it starts by disposing the population territorially with the intent of
policing it. It also penetrates the reason of state to colonize its different dimensions. With
time however, it became a biopolitical power with the aim of improving the wellbeing of the
population instead of supervising it territorially.
In Society Must be Defended, Foucault compares sovereign power with governmental
power. He notes, there is an important difference from a spatial point of view. Sovereign
power attempts to impose its will over subjects living within a definite territory.
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Governmental power on the other hand, is interested in the disposition of the population
within different territories. The question of being sovereign within a well-defined territory, a
state with well-defined borders, is irrelevant from the standpoint of governmental power
which is much more porous. The management of populations requires a set of new
technologies of power. As Mitchell Dean explains, populations are not bound to a specific
territory, they can be scattered throughout a region. Secondly, a population is identified and
problematized according to statistical indicators about its health, well-being, or poverty.
Thirdly, there is a move away from anatamo-political tactics that are usually deployed in a
disciplinary society and which target individuals, to programs based on expert knowledge
and which target a whole population or species(Dean 2002, 21-22).
Biopolitical techniques are developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
because they are more effective, diffuse, and insidious. Instead of targeting specific subjects
located in specific sites, biopolitics colonizes as many spaces as it can regardless of whether
they are public or private. Foucault shows that one of the preferred sites for the deployment
of that new form of power is sexuality, which unlike work in a factory is by definition very
intimate and mostly located within the private sphere. Sometimes, the object of disciplinary
and biopolitical powers is similar, but it is tackled from different points of entry. In Foucault
beyond Foucault, Nealon explains that “the disciplinary criminal is known through her
transgressive deeds, while biopower’s delinquent is known through his abnormal
personality” (200847). Normalization, instead of training, is the focus of the new form of
power. From the standpoint of the biopolitical, the problematic question is the creation of
adequate classificatory schemas to incite subjects to conform to them. Biopolitics
interpellates instead of imposing as in the case of disciplinary power. Creating new labels to
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interpellate groups into normalizing categories is not intrinsically irreconcilable with training
bodies to shape them in specific ways. Nealon (2008) shows that classification represents an
intensification of power since it urges the individual to do the necessary work to fit in one
category or another instead of creating institutions to do the training.
Without regulation, biopolitical and disciplinary powers could be rejected by the
population. Foucault explains that liberalism emerged as a rationality of government with the
aim to counterbalance the impact of these regimes of power. In the first case, the goal of
liberalism is to provide a set of rights that protect individuals against the coercive impulse of
disciplinary power. In the second instance, liberalism acts as a balance between the drive of
bio-politics to optimize the wellbeing of the population and enhance its life chances on the
one hand, and the scarcity of economic and natural resources to do so, on the other hand.

4.7.

Spatial Governmentality and Urban Renewal
In what follows, I explore the implementation of a biopolitical regime in Clichy-

sous-Bois. Using urban renewal as a strategic entry point, I explore three interrelated arenas
where experts have developed biopolitical programs to regulate the lives of Afro-French
communities. As explained in the previous chapter, the management of Afro-French spaces
through the use of sovereign power was inefficient and costly. Biopolitics doesn’t replace
sovereign power but rather improves and diffuses it. The three arenas analyzed below are
important pillars in urban renewal. The first strategic site that planners have utilized is
hygiene. To a certain extent, they have borrowed from the discourses and practices
developed in the colonies. State feminism represents the second nodal point in the renewal
project while “social mixing” is the third one. These sites have different trajectories, and they
all have genealogies that go back to the colonies, but the renewal project has been
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structuring them in specific and unique ways. These strategies have been utilized in many
cities but the recent socio-political history of Clichy gives them a unique shape.
As mentioned above, the socialists have controlled the municipality since 1995 and
Claude Dilain has been the mayor since then. The National Front’s popularity has been
fluctuating but stayed high around 20% and 30% depending on whether the elections were
local, national, or European. Certain neighborhoods such as Vallée des Anges and Résidence
Sévigné, two condominium apartment buildings with mostly white residents have even more
massively for the FN. In the past fifteen years, the right has been governing in France with
the exception of a period of five years from 1997 to 2002, when the conservative president
Jacques Chirac cohabited with a social democratic government. While the percentage of
foreigners is lower than many in European countries, the government has been taking drastic
measures against Afro-French migrants, making the acquisition of citizenship more
challenging, creating a more aggressive police force, normalizing racial profiling, and
criminalizing immigrants and the banlieues (Tevanian, Le legs colonial 2007, De Laforcade
2006). In Clichy, socialists have used more biopolitical techniques to manage Afro-French
living in the city. In 2008, I had a conversation with Laure, a municipal employee in her early
forties. What is interesting in this conversation is how she tackled the problems attached
with public housing. To inform me about their situation, she used the three tropes I explore
below, namely, sexuality, public health, and social mixing. These tropes have been central for
the experts and their problematization of the housing projects. In certain passages, Laure’s
language is inflammatory but in many ways it represents the socialists’ mindset. She says:
Initially they wanted to turn Clichy into a cité dortoire (bedroom town) and there were
plans to construct a highway to connect the city to Paris. The project was not
executed and this marginalized Clichy. The city became a “lawless zone.” People do
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whatever they want here. In La Forrestiere for example there were eleven families
living in the areas available on each floor and usually allocated for bike storage.
Those spaces were occupied and transformed into living spaces. The families got
water and stole electricity from the city. There are no windows. It’s a non-hygienic
space but the families are raising their children and babies in these spaces! Sometimes
there are four families living in the same apartment in La Forrestiere. There are a lot
of problems, and by destroying these buildings we are going to solve these pending
problems. For example, many people are polygamous in Clichy and they are often
undocumented and reside illegally in France. We will check the status of these
families and will try to solve the problem. For example, we will give small apartments
to polygamous families. They will not be able to have such a lifestyle in the new
apartments. They will have to split and live in several smaller apartments. Concerning
those who don’t have valid papers, they will be sent back to their countries. There
are a lot of people who came from le bled (an Arabic word which means country and
used in French. It’s usually associated with North African and Sub-Saharan
populations and has negative connotations) and they do not conform to the French
way of life. We will be able to solve all those problems by demolishing la Forrestiere
and building a new housing project. There are a lot of people who are squatting and
others are not paying rent. There are even young adults who live in the lift shaft.
There is a space on the top of elevators that some people have occupied. They put
mattresses and sleep there. There are rats and all sorts of problems. I work with kids
who live in La forrestiere; they tell me that they are afraid of those who live in these
spaces. We tried to evict them from there but they don’t want to go away. They are
well organized. A lot of people came from over there (meaning le bled) and
sometimes they came from les bidonvilles. Now they are in Clichy. They have no
idea about how to live in such a place. Over there (le bled), they didn’t have any
water or electricity. They are not used to this way of life. We have to educate them.
There were problems with the municipality as well. We had a lot of blonde
employees with blue eyes who were racists. There was a complete disconnect with
the population. Now things are starting to change. For example Sami and Faiza were
hired and they are very active and enthusiastic. They are trying to change things. The
mayor is very smart. He hired more black and Maghrebians. This way if someone
doesn’t speak French, there is a way to communicate with them since some
employees speaks a different language. Some of the public employees who worked
on the city’s infrastructure were very racist. They used to tell the youth “Hey sand
nigger, move out of my way” Some of those people used to get drunk almost on a
daily basis during work. They used to buy alcohol and put it on the account of the
municipality in the form of canteen bills. At some point someone found out and it
was a big scandal. Many of the higher up employees used to live outside Clichy. They
didn’t have any contact with the population. They were only interested in their salary.
(Interview Dec 17, 2008).
During the interview, Laure used a more crude language than others who work at the
municipality. However, her problematization of the housing question doesn’t differ much
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from some of the white employees who work at the municipality or those who are involved
in the renewal project. More importantly, Laure’s rhetoric is radically different from that of
the previous mayor. Instead of the rigid rhetoric utilized by Deschamps and which aimed to
draw boundaries between authentic citizens and undesirable subjects, Laure proposed a
discourse of normalization of Afro-French behavior as an appropriate approach to solve
Clichy’s problems. Unlike the communist party who wanted to send immigrants back to
their country, the socialists are simply proposing a process of adaptation. While Laure does
mention that the destruction of La Forrestiere would allow the municipality to send people
back to their country, this is not the official stance of Clichy’s socialists. Explaining the
implications of biopower, Foucault writes in the History of Sexuality:
Such a power has to qualify, measure, appraise, and hierarchize, rather than display
itself in its murderous splendor; it does not have to draw the line that separates the
enemies of the sovereign from his obedient subjects; it effects distributions around
the norm. I do not mean to say that the law fades into the background or that the
institutions of justice tend to disappear, but rather that the law operates more and
more as a norm, and the judicial institution is increasingly incorparated into a
continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative, and so on) whose functions are
for the most part regulatory. A normalizing society is the historical outcome of a
technology of power centered on life (1990144).
The type of management that Laure is proposing is more porous and dispersed and
therefore more difficult to challenge. While some people would lose their apartments during
urban renewal, the emphasis is put on producing new subjects, new desires, and new
sexualities.
4.7.1. First Technology: A Healthy Clichy
One of the recurrent themes in the archived material that I researched at the
municipality is public health and wellbeing in Clichy. There is a transformative moment in
the way these questions were problematized once white French began to leave the city and
the percentage of Afro-French started to increase. From the early 1960 until late 1970s, the
communists were focused on improving the conditions of working class housing. It was part
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of a struggle to defend the rights of the proletariat against an exploitative ruling class. A
healthy life according to the communists meant more leisure time and less exploitation. In
the early 1960s, the municipality was constantly focusing on building an infrastructure for
the population. The public equipment was also one of the major themes to resist the
capitalist logic of the housing organisms whose actions were driven by speculative logics. In
1984, the municipal bulletin suggested the theme of beauty as a guiding principle and the
need to reconnect the different neighborhoods to each other (BIM 1984). During the 1980s
however, there was a shift in the way the municipality tackled these questions. The civilizing
mission was the prism from which the mayor and the team of experts surrounding him, dealt
with the question of health. It was a dual strategy: 1) there was a need to show postcolonial
subjects the way out of the filthy lifestyle that they brought with them from the colonies; 2)
at the same time, the municipality wanted to preserve an authentically French lifestyle which
is healthier and more adequate. In 1983, for example, the mayor proposed a plan to renovate
the city center, which has been neglected or was inexistent since housing projects were built
in the 1960s. Deschamps proposed to recreate the concept of the village with a church and the
new center would be revolving around the city hall and the old mansion. The nostalgic trend
is clear in the mayor’s conceptualization. For him, these symbols would be reminiscent of
the old Clichy before foreigners invaded and polluted its spaces.
In the early 1990s, the mayor’s rhetoric became more openly racist. He used the
theme of hygiene as a weapon to discipline or evict Afro-French families. An issue of the
municipal bulletin from 1992 explains that the radical measures the mayor and his team are
taking against foreigners are in reality for their own benefit. The article notes, “is it human to
let a family of 10 or 15 members stay in an apartment?” (199212) or “This situation makes it
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impossible to respect hygiene and security norms. The municipality will not tolerate such
behavior in the city” (199214). Gerard Probert, the interim right wing mayor who was
appointed by Deschamps declared during the same period that he would build a campaign
against “danger and insalubrities”. He added, “We need to prevent Victor Hugo’s les
mesirables (the plot of Hugo’s novel took place in Clichy) [to take place again] in the city.” He
promised to conduct regular checks to prevent overcrowded apartments; a strategy aimed at
expelling undocumented residents. Clichy au Coeur, the organization that campaigned for
Probert, titled its flyer: “Local finance, immigration, over-crowdedness.” It explains that
apartments are overcrowded, lack of hygiene, and security. Then it asks the municipality to
stop delivering administrative documents to those who are illegal. It also requests the
municipality prevents their kids from attending school in Clichy. It also demands the
municipality stops providing residency certificates2 to those who do not follow hygiene and
occupation norms. Clichy au Coeur also proposed that people sign a petition and organize a
referendum on these questions.
These repressive measures were the main strategy the municipality adopted to ‘recolonize’ the spaces occupied by Afro-French. In the 1980s and early 1990s, white
supremacy was challenged in different ways. The previously colonial subjects were now the
neighbors of white families. They were also working in the same factories. The white
working class felt that it was using its white privileges. Deschamps’ strategy to stop this trend
was ineffective and the number of Afro-French living in public housing kept increasing.
Using the same technology of public health, the socialist municipality developed a different
strategy to re-colonize lost spaces.
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The socialist mayor, Claude Dilain, who built his campaign against Deschamps and
Probert, used a more technical language whenever he tackled the question of public health.
Often it became an integrative part of urban renewal. In a chapter on the police force, the
mayor describes in his book the garbage accumulation on the sidewalk. He explains that
inhabitants put out their garbage on random days and at random points in the city. Then he
adds, it costs the city a lot of money to remove this garbage. In another chapter on the
market, he explains that merchants often dispose of the garbage in a random fashion the day
of the market on Wednesdays and Saturdays. Finally, he justifies his focus on these questions
by explaining that some of the garbage is toxic and would harm the population besides
deteriorating the landscape. In one instance he suggests that the disciplinary framework was
tried and didn’t work since those who infringe the law usually do it in a discreet way and
even when they are caught they pay an insignificant fine (Dilain 2006). There is a clear shift
away from the disciplinary mode to one about the wellbeing of the population. Although the
wellbeing of the residents of Clichy was not totally absent when Probert denounced the
over-crowdedness of apartments, the right wing mayor threatened with using disciplinary
actions to punish those who infringe the law. The dominance of the bio-political approach
was also clear during my interaction with one of the planners involved in urban renewal in
Clichy. During a meeting with a group of residents, Pierre explained the project in the
following terms:
The project costs around 500 million Euros. It involves the destruction of 1600
apartments and the construction of 2100 new ones. Some buildings are going to be
completely destroyed while others will be renovated. One of the challenges before us
is the process of accompanying the families in this transitional period when they
leave their apartment and move into a new one. One of the things we do is to
propose two to three different options to these families, in order to relocate them. At
the end, a few families refuse all the options and it becomes difficult to advance in
the project. We try as much as we can to find an adequate apartment to older
individuals who have been living in the city most of their life. These people might be
completely disoriented and might have hard time building a new life, if removed
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from their neighborhood. Some of those who are relocated in a new apartment
might behave in inadequate ways. Therefore renovation and relocation requires we
follow up with the new tenants. We want to make sure that the tags and delinquency
doesn’t happen in the new location. There is a need to change the lifestyle of these
families in order to be able to achieve the aim of this project. This includes asking
people not to throw oil in the sink, or throw garbage from the window. Another
important thing is residencialization. This means that we close some spaces and
transform them into private spaces that belong to the residents of the building. This
is extremely important if some people want their kids to play in a secure space away
from cars. Sometimes those private spaces are not respected. For example, some
individuals leave the door of the building open to avoid having to enter the digicode
every time they come back to their apartment. Some people do not appreciate the
extra price they pay for private parking. At the same time we want to build solidarity
among citizens. Therefore FFF’s (the construction company) role is to accompany
the inhabitants and tell them about their rights when they leave their old apartments
and occupy new ones. There are health issues that need to be addressed and
respected. There are risks if rules are not respected. We also focus on issues of
environment. It’s a whole living environment that we try to build here.
Often times people living in this area pay attention to the interior of their houses and
they are very scrupulous but when it comes to the exterior spaces there is no interest
in keeping them clean.
Then Pierre asked us to stand up and look through the window to show us the garbage on the grass
in front of the building. Then he continued:
There are plastic bags and empty containers everywhere. People throw things outside
anytime of the day. Once someone threw a washing machine from their balcony.
How are we going to make new streets if people don’t respect the environment and
their neighborhood? This is why it is important that the conduct of people changes.
In order to achieve this end we organize all sorts of activities. For example, we
organize seminars, bricolage workshops, and other kind of activities. We try to target
all kind of populations. We work with young kids. They are currently working on a
calendar that will be distributed in les Bosquets. It will raise consciousness among the
population. We are also working on blogging with another group. They write
different thing about the city.
The urban promenade is another way to create bonds with people and talk to them
and help them if they need it. We tell them that the promenade can be dangerous for
kids. Everyone needs to have helmets when they visit a construction site. The
purpose of the promenade is to explain to people what is happening in the city. How
we are doing the construction. We explain the construction plan and answer all the
questions of the inhabitants.
Pierre’s colleague: We are going to build on a larger area. The houses are going to be
smaller. Instead of the big rooms (12 or 10 m2) that were common in the past, we
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will have smaller ones. Those are the new norms. Furthermore we have an obligation
to relocate everyone. No one will become homeless.
Pierre: This is what we are trying to avoid in Clichy. There are a lot of
condominiums but that doesn’t work well in Clichy. We are going to demolish 1700
apartments and build 2200 new ones. It’s going to be mostly public housing with
much fewer condominiums. The new apartments are going to be smaller and more
dispersed. We don’t want huge areas where people don’t have enough space to
breath. The apartments are going to be smaller but healthier but we will have more
of them (interview 17 Dec 2008).
The architect’s presentation shows how the discourses of public health and hygiene have
been incorporated in a larger apparatus. According to Pierre, urban renewal requires a
change of behavior to become sustainable. It’s not about demonizing the residents or
criminalizing their behavior as it was in the 1980s and early 1990s but rather about
conditioning them to fit better in a new situation that requires new skills. The lack of hygiene
is not ground for expulsion or other disciplinary actions. Instead it is part of a healthy living
that would benefit everyone equally. As explained above, the resident is not singled out; she
has to fit a certain norm. It’s a question of the wellbeing of the whole population.
Biopolitical power works on transforming subjectivities instead of punishing those who
don’t abide. The process however is highly racialized and in both cases is remindful of a
civilizing discourse that postcolonial populations have to endure. A governmental organism
was created to help in the transfer of residents from their current apartments to the new
ones. The organism gathers information about the inhabitants and organizes activities that
help them pay more attention to questions of public health and good neighborhood
conduct. During my stay in Clichy, the organism invited residents to attend debates about
HIV prevention, and better neighborhood atmosphere creation. One of the employees
explained that “the youth spray graffiti, they pee everywhere, and they are loud. That’s
unacceptable!” A few years ago, the syndicate stopped providing services to the
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condominium residents. The organism explained that rats where living in the area because
the grass was not cut for eight years. They decided to take things in hand and with the help
of the inhabitants they cut the grass and cleaned public areas. The actions of the organism
show that there are two logics at work. On the one hand, the organism embarked on a
civilizing mission to help the municipality dislocate the population through urban renewal.
On the other hand, it played a positive role by helping the inhabitants improve their living
environment. However, the organism chose a non-confrontational approach that encourages
the syndicate’s deceitful actions.
For Le Corbusier, the question was how to build healthy spaces, how to provide
good ventilation and sunlight. It was also about surrounding the inhabited areas with green
spaces. In the colony, Le Corbusier proposed to let some natives to live in public housing
under the condition they are “evolved Muslims.” With urban renewal in Clichy, there is a
shift of paradigm. There is a focus on behaviors rather the built environment. While Le
Corbusier’s idea was to recruit evolved natives, architects working in Clichy are proposing to
produce new subjectivities. Experts came to realize that spatial forms do not necessarily alter
performance. As the architect remarked, in the end, what should be done is create a new
subjectivity not simply alter the urban environment.

4.7.2. Second Technology: Gender Equality
The second central theme in urban renewal is gender equality. In my conversation
with Laure, polygamy was brought up several times and in every instance, the sexual activity
was mentioned to racialize Afro-French communities and criminalize their behavior. I cite
again the passage concerning polygamy:
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[M]any people are polygamous in Clichy and they are often undocumented and
reside illegally in France. We will check the status of these families and will try to
solve the problem. For example we will give small apartments to polygamous
families. They will not be able to have such a lifestyle anymore. They will have to
split into several smaller apartments. Concerning those who don’t have valid papers,
they will be sent back to their countries.
Laure’s statement shows that the municipality utilized urban renewal as a pretext to
intervene and change abnormal behaviors in the most intimate spaces. “Polygamy” is
juxtaposed to “illegal migrants” in Laure’s narrative as if there is an intrinsic relationship
between the two. Laure’s statement signifies that sexual deviance, cruel treatment of women,
and illegal residency are biological characteristics of the populations living in the projects.
What is interesting in the above comment is that her problematization of polygamy is the
result of two different but convergent discourses on polygamy. On the one hand there is a
public discourse that treats the question in a sensationalist way by claiming that polygamy is
the cause of major problems in France. The other approach addresses the question in a less
frontal and subtler way. It perceives polygamy as a cultural difference that is inappropriate in
a French context and should therefore be erased or reformed. The first type of discourse has
been the most dominant in France; many political leaders from the right and left, in addition
to conservative intellectuals, frequently deployed it to demonize Afro-French and criminalize
their behavior. In 2005, many have suggested that there is a direct link between polygamy
and ‘rioting.’ For example, Pierre Cardo, a member of the parliament, explained that, “the
most difficult juvenile delinquents were “often products of polygamous families”” (Sciolino
2005). These discourses are finely calibrated; they are backed with laws that make polygamy
“punishable by a year in prison and a $53,000 fine” (Sciolino 2005).
More recently, a woman was fined for driving while wearing the niqab, a veil that
covers her face. The story became a major issue when journalists reported that her husband
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is polygamous. The minister of interior threatened to revoke the individual’s nationality if it
is proven he is polygamous. Human rights organizations have denounced the minister’s
bombastic statements, but more interestingly, the man who is of Maghrebian origin
explained he is legally bound to one woman only. He married the other three through
religious marriages, which are not recognized by the state. The man in question ridiculed the
government approach saying, “having mistresses is not forbidden in France as far as I know”
(Mouterde 2010).
This first type of discourse on polygamy has been frequently used in Clichy. For
example, L’info du Jeudi, a periodical close to the communist mayor (suspended from the PCF
in 1989), published an article in 1993 explaining that the problem with the housing project of
Les Bosquets is its 80% of foreigners and minorities and their traditions, such as polygamy,
and which are very different from occidental ones (Mora 1993). In recent years, polygamy
was mentioned as a problem among poor families who live in the housing projects. The
problematization was very different however. The aim was not to demonize these families
but reform their abnormal behavior. An expert involved in urban renewal explained that one
of the purposes of the project was to make it more challenging for polygamous families to
stay in the new apartments once the project is carried out. They will have to either split or
divorce but they won’t be able to live in the same apartment. To achieve this goal he
explained:
We will have all kinds of apartments. There will be small studios and apartments with
five rooms. There will be a mix of families of different sizes in each building. We
want to have a socially mixed population. There will be a certain percentage of
apartments in each building available to middle class families to rent. Those
apartments will be available without state subvention (social security). They will be
available to rent at the market value. This way we will be able to have people from
different backgrounds in the same building (Interview 17 Dec 2008).
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Here, polygamy is not even mentioned. But as Laure explained the main purpose behind
small apartments is to prevent polygamous families from qualifying for the new apartments.
The size of apartments is one of the important tools that the municipality is using to
intervene in the most intimate spaces. Unlike the belligerent language used in the 1990s to
demonize and criminalize polygamy and outlaw it, the new technologies of government
intervene much more efficiently and insidiously. Biopolitics prevents abnormal behavior
without naming it or using crude violence against it. Majia Holmer Nadesan quoting Nikolas
Rose explains:
Any impingement on personal liberty affected by such experts was tolerated because
their authority was seen as “arising out of a claim to knowledge, to neutrality and to
efficacy” (Rose, 1996, p. 39). In a sense, sovereign power over life was dispersed
throughout the social field as the emerging professionals articulated biopolitical
standards of normality and difference and mandated particular forms of therapeutic
interventions by the state and/or by biopolitical authorities (e.g., psychiatrists,
psychologists, teachers, social workers, etc.) (Nadesan 2008, 26).
Urban renewal is deployed as a regulatory strategy to eradicate the epidemics of polygamy.
To penetrate and intervene in the most private spaces, the municipally is using urban
renewal. It’s important to note here that the two problematization of polygamy are
complementary. The first one criminalizes polygamous families and makes them seem as a
major problem in the banlieue. It uses coercive power against polygamous individuals by
threatening them of losing their citizenship and sending them back to their countries or
putting them in jail as the behavior of the minister of interior demonstrates. This first type of
discourse frames the polygamous subject in an exclusionary way by highlighting his deviant
behavior. Non-whites are blamed for their awkward sexuality, which in some cases, we are
told, can be the main cause of urban unrest. This was the case during the protest of 2005
when certain intellectuals deployed this type of discourse to explain the social dynamic. The
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distance between, on the one hand Sub-Saharan and North African traditions, and French
culture on the other, is unbridgeable. Polygamy in this instance is regulated by sovereign
power. The aim is to redraw the boundaries between what belongs and what does not.
Polygamy has also a spatial dimension; it happens in lawless zones. In short, it conveys the
idea that polygamous families are not authentic French citizens. The legal apparatus is
brandished as a weapon to discipline those who don’t respect French laws. The second type
of discourse produces novel technologies of government that aim to reform an abnormal
behavior without necessarily naming it. The second approach is not opposed to the first one;
it only differs in the way the problem is handled. It doesn’t threaten with a loss of
nationality; to put it in foucauldian terms, it simply attempts to alter the conditions of
emergence. The question of “what does it cost?” is the guiding principle here. Biopolitical
technology avoids a frontal war because it is not necessarily desirable or winnable. The last
chapter shows that Afro-French have found innovative ways to resist certain effects of
biopolitical technologies. In 2008, I attended a meeting that the municipality organized to
inform the youth about urban renewal. An outspoken young black man told the architect:
“The reason why you don’t want to build large apartments is because you want to see large
families leave Clichy.” The architect tried to reply but he was quickly interrupted by the
young man who said: “you can give us whatever arguments you want; I already know the
truth and I won’t be convinced by your rosy language” (Man 2008).
Gender is deployed in other ways through the renewal project. In an interview with a
journalist, Claude Dilain condemned the machismo behavior of certain young men and
denounced the wearing of the burqa by women. He remarked, “some macho youths
terrorize young women in the name of Islam and this is a serious question – Islam respects
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women and the figure of the mother as much as other religions. This is a problem”
(Dhoquois 2008, 124). In the same interview, he explained that the burqa degrades the image
of women. He added, “in France there is a certain conception of the woman that it needs to
be respected.” Excision is another question the mayor addressed with the journalist. He
denounced the medieval practice, out of respect for women and their rights. Finally, he
evoked the caves where Muslim communities congregate and pray. Unlike his predecessor
who denounced Muslim population simply to demonize them and appeal to white voters,
Dilain embraced a discourse about women’s rights and their protection from Muslim male’s
violence. The mayor’s interest in Muslim women and the need to protect them from their
husbands, brothers, and sons is not solely based on a deep believe in feminist values. It
stems from a discursive apparatus that political leaders have been deploying astutely to
demonize the suburbs and Afro-French who inhabit them. What is interesting is the
treatment of these questions in public space. My conversations with actors involved with
urban renewal have shown that there is a real interest in making the new spaces more
appealing to women who are perceived as real victims in Clichy. A municipal employee, a
white female in her fifties explained that the McDonald is one of the few places where
women can mix with and talk to men. She also explained that architects are trying to create
more such spaces where women would feel safe.
The Urban Contract for Social Cohesion (CUCS) that the city signed in 2007 stresses
the importance of organizing cultural, social and sportive activities where boys and girls can
mix. One of the objectives of the contract is “the development of activated that target
primarily girls and favor gender mixing”(La Commune de Clichy-sous-Bois 2007, 37). The
objectives concerning women living in Clichy are more forceful. For example, one of the
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cultural objectives is stated in the following terms: “[the municipality will] assist actions
intended to improve access to “culture for all,” and the young audiences more specifically,
and those who are remote from knowledge and cultural activities (immigrant women for
example)” (33). The report focuses on the importance of informing immigrant women of
their rights. The prism of Islam is usually the one utilized to liberate immigrant women from
brown men. Claude Dilain writes in his book, “Let’s not be naïf, the irruption of Islam in the
public space create a conflict to which we should necessarily find republican solutions.” He
adds, “I don’t approve of the presence of too many women circulating in Clichy while
entirely veiled in black, with the eyes as the only visible part” (Dilain 2006, 163).

Figure 4-2: Colonial poster used in French Algeria. It
reads: "Aren’t you beautiful? Remove your Veil!”
Finer script: “Poster realized by the army’s fifth bureau for psychological actions
inciting women to remove their veils.”
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The type of state feminism that the mayor of Clichy exemplifies can be traced back
to the French colonies. Under the pretext of spreading civilization and liberating Muslim
women, French colonialism tried to regulate mundane activities in the colonies. By doing so,
its goal was to consolidate its power. Fanon paid close attention to women’s everyday lives
within colonial spaces. He analyzed the double seclusion of women which according to
French experts, takes place inside the traditional architecture of the Algerian house. They
argue that women are expected to stay in their assigned spaces only; Whenever they utilize
the public sphere, they are supposed to remain within the confines of the Arab city; They
cross the boundary that separates it from the European city, only exceptionally. Fanon has
shown that this type of argumentation aims to achieve a fuller control of the local
population. The assumed women’s seclusion calls for their ‘liberation’ and their unveiling
(see above poster). French colonial administrators have contemplated this question and
where persuaded that the consolidation of the colonial project goes necessarily through the
unveiling of the Arab woman as Fanon remarks. But the anti-colonial intellectual has shown
how poorly these experts understand the veil’s signification. Fanon remarks that the
liberation of Algerian women from Algerian men was one of the objectives of French
colonialism. He writes,
It is on the basis of the analyses of sociologists and ethnologists that the specialists in
so-called native affairs and the heads of the Arab Bureaus coordinated their work. At
an initial stage, there was a pure and simple adoption of the well-known formula,
“let’s win over the women and rest will follow” (Fanon, A dying colonialism 1965,
37).
For the colonial administrator, there was no lasting French presence in Algeria unless Arab
women are conquered. Arab women formed one of the pillars of the colonial projects in
Algeria. As Kipfer explains, “The very colonial forms of political and spatial separation made
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it difficult for the colonizers to open up Algeria by `unveiling' its women and by sexualizing
the city by treating women as Merchandise” (Legg 2007, 713). The colonial power wanted to
open up indigenous spaces while at the same time preserve the spatial apartheid. Fanon has
shown however that the colonial attempts to unveil Arab women were bound to fail. What is
more interesting in this context, are the striking parallels between the colonial moment and
the postcolonial present. In both cases, political actors have tried to regulate space by
attempting to liberate Muslim women and subdue the power of Muslim men in the public
sphere.

4.7.3. Third Technology: “Social Mixing”
Before the 1970s, French authorities, with the help of industrialists, were to a certain
extent successful in separating Afro-French communities from the rest of French society.
With the crisis of the bidonvilles and the foyers, mostly due to the resistance of the
inhabitants, the situation changed. The early 1970s announced the failure of spatial apartheid
imposed on Afro-French (with the exception of Caribbean communities whom the
government wanted to disperse since the BUMIDOM was created). It’s important to note
that apartheid was never absolute since a sizable number of brown and black postcolonial
subjects used to rent rooms in various poor neighborhoods in Paris. The 1970s and 1980s
were troubled times for the municipalities of the red belt who saw the percentage of AfroFrench growing in their cities. Their new visibility was highly irritating for communist
representatives as well as the white working and middle classes. In 1974 construction
companies stopped building specific units for immigrants within public housing. AfroFrench who left the foyers and the cités de transit were now theoretically having access to
the same type of housing as white French. This was not accurate since discriminatory

!

"%&!

!
practices remained in place but became subtler. Tanter and Toubon argue that construction
companies kept on assigning immigrants to specific buildings, usually the most dilapidated,
but without making the practice official, as it was the case before 1974. The companies
explained that there is an intrinsic relationship between migration and degradation of
housing units. By preventing migrants from accessing a large portion of the projects, they
would avoid further degradation and preserve the white residents. This is why, early on,
there was a concentration of Afro-French in specific buildings and neighborhoods (Tanter
and Toubon 1999, 81-83). During this period, mayors denounced the formation of ghettos
in their cities and tried to stop or slow down the flow of migrants into their cities.
The municipalities developed and used different spatial tools to prevent the high
concentration of Afro-French in their communes. As explained above, one of the discursive
strategies they used against what they perceived as the high concentration of Afro-French, is
the notion of “threshold of tolerance.” The threshold was sometimes fixed at 10% and other
times at more. The problem is that the notion of threshold was openly racist and was too
rigid since it required a specific rate. Experts needed a more flexible and ambiguous concept.
The 1990s was a period of experimentation; political and urban actors suggested the notion
of social mixing to stop the ‘ghettoization’ of the banlieues. This is why the ambiguity of
social mixing is strategic since it conveniently signifies different things to various actors.
Most experts involved in urban planning will insist that the concept is only about mixing
groups from different class backgrounds. The research has shown however that the racial
logic is the primary grid of intelligibility (Tanter and Toubon 1999, Tevanian and Tissot
2004, Belmessous 2006, Tissot, Une « discrimination informelle » ?. Usages du concept de
mixité sociale dans la gestion des attributions de logements HLM 2005). In the 1990s, the
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main drive behind social mixing was the achievement of an ethnic equilibrium but it is never
framed in such a way. The Besson Law, which was passed in 1990, stipulates that the
allocation of housing units should take into consideration “a necessary diversity in the social
composition of each neighborhood, each commune, and each department” (Tissot, Une «
discrimination informelle » ?. Usages du concept de mixité sociale dans la gestion des
attributions de logements HLM 2005, 56). Urban sociologist Sylvie Tissot argues that the
problem with social mixing is that it’s never clearly defined and this allows urban planners
and other actors involved in renewal to deploy the it according to their specific needs.
The context in Clichy follows to a large extent a similar trajectory and “social
mixing” is one of the important tools used in urban renewal. In 1979, the municipal bulletin
talks about a “critical threshold” being reached in the number of foreigners. The bulletin also
explains that the government used immigrants to divide the working class. The rhetoric of
the municipality is not openly racist yet as it became in the following years. In 1981, the
communist newsletter denounced the formation of ghettos and explained that it is one of
the government’s maneuvers to create racism in Clichy and other similar cities, and divide
the working class (I.G 1981). In the following years, the communist strategy as explained
above became about stopping migration in order to stop racism. Certain articles note that
there is no direct link between delinquency and migration but quickly point out that the
social conditions of migrants explain why some of them become deviant or criminal. In
1986, the municipal bulletin published an article titled “Immigration: finding the just
equilibrium” where it used the metaphor of salty food to convey the following idea:
Without slat, our pottage would be tasteless. Too much salt, it’s uneatable. To obtain
a delicious broth, one should dose carefully. This is what the municipality is
(re)proposing to scullions who salt a bit too much. Will we have regrets? ... The
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municipality is not anti-salt… There are crystallizations or mines of salt, if you
prefer, in certain neighborhoods. This is why the overall taste is too salty and the
cost too high (Municipale 1986).
The author of the article is not rejecting the presence of migrants totally; s/he is merely
discussing the ‘right dosage’. The argument of the author is that dosage is an art and should
be handled carefully otherwise it can ruin the whole city. In 1990, the mayor was suspended
from the communist party and had therefore more autonomy to express his racist views.
Along with the National Front, he drew a direct link between delinquency, violence, and
immigration. Afro-French, and to a lesser extent Asian and Turks, were stigmatized and
demonized in the articles he published during a three year period. His actions were
supported by Clichy au Coeur, the association that he created to support him after his split
from the communist party. During the campaign for his reelection in 1991 he criticized the
communists for being too lenient on immigrants and for their support of the socialist
government, he explained,
We shouldn’t be dreaming, no one in Clichy, not even my old good friends in the
communist party can stand Arabs; I mean the youth… We don’t like them because
they don’t like us. Same thing goes for the others, the blacks… There are tags; torn
bus seats; groups of individuals who ambush and attack you whenever there is an
occasion; all this cannot go on. Something in French society isn’t working properly.
There are too many immigrants who don’t work. People will vote against the import
of unemployment (Charuel 1991).
The rhetoric of the mayor was similar in many ways to the National Front. What is
interesting is that the candidate of the National Front and Deschamps got the highest
number of votes. Both were openly racist and yet a sizable number of residents voted for
them. To avoid a victory of the National Front in the second round, the communist and
socialist parties felt obliged to support Deschamps. Once elected, the mayor created a
housing observatory to control the ethnic distribution in the housing projects. Under the
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pretext of mundane administrative checks concerning late or no payment of rent as well as
over-crowded apartments, the mayor wanted to prevent Afro-French from living in the city.
He argued his goal was to avoid the formation of a ghetto in Clichy. The municipality was
very critical of the socialist government and along with other mayors requested the closing
of national borders to prevent new immigrants from entering the country. The mayor and
his team argued that such a policy would be the only effective way to stop the flow of
immigrants. It should be accompanied by a program that encourages and gives incentives to
those who are in France to return to their countries of origin. To regulate the ethnic
composition of the population living in Clichy, the municipality requested a more substantial
role in the allocation of apartments and the construction of new projects, all of which were
decided by construction companies. It also proposed turning some of the larger apartments
into smaller ones to discourage large families from coming to Clichy (Municipal 1992, 12).
With the election of Claude Dilain in 1995, the racialization of Afro-French took a
different path. The new mayor also denounced the formation of a ghetto in Clichy even
before his election. But with the help of urban planners and new urban policies, his
approach to tackle the question utilized subtler biopolitical technique. As we will see in the
next chapter, his main concern was to shift the focus of the population away from specific
housing projects or neighborhoods to the city as a whole. He explains in his book that one
of the main problems is that the residents of Clichy are mostly attached to their
neighborhoods. He remarks that Clichy resembles an archipelago of villages where
neighborhoods coexist without having much interaction with each other; sometimes they
confront each other.
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In addition to the isolation of the different neighborhoods, the mayor was worried
that the rate of white residents was constantly decreasing. According to one study published
in 1995 (the year Dilain became mayor), the rate of foreign children who attend school in le
Bas-Clichy (roughly the area located outside the perimeter of urban renewal) is 65.5%
(27.9% North Africans, 18.4% Turks, 15.8% Sub-Saharan, 4.9% Asians, 4.4% from Spain
and Portugal, 28.6% other) (Houacin 1995, 23). There are no statistics about Le Haut Clichy
where urban renewal is taking place. However, since the neighborhood is composed of 99%
of collective housing, one expects the number of foreigners and Afro-French to be high.
In his book, Claude Dilain addresses the ethnic question in Clichy extensively. He notes that
the major problem with Clichy is its isolation from the surrounding towns and Paris. He
stresses the importance of the tramway that will reconnect the city to the urban grid in which
it is embedded. The major challenge for the city is the question of geographic accessibility.
Dilain explains that due to its isolation in the past thirty years and the economic crisis,
houses degraded very quickly. What made things more difficult is that a large portion of the
collective housing is privately owned. Only 30% is public housing, which makes the
intervention of the state in these spaces either impossible or limited. These condominiums
were the most harshly hit since owners and tenants were seeing the value of their property
dropping quickly and were unwilling to invest in it. The mayor notes that the crisis is
amplified because a constant flow of poor immigrants come and live in the city while those
who climb the social ladder leave it. He writes:
Communitarian concentrations progress once a family informs another one from the
same origin about a vacant apartment in the building. This is a normal phenomenon;
immigrants from all over the world have a tendency to converge toward the same
spaces. What is worrying is that they have a tendency to expel the others… What we
commonly name anti-French racism is mostly due to that phenomenon. This also
explains why brave individuals, who are fundamentally not racist, end up abruptly
realizing that “[they]’re not at home any more””(Dilain 2006, 101-102).
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The racial concentration of different communities is reduced to individual behavior and
preferences while structural mechanisms are seldom mentioned. Racism against Afro-French
is ignored or justified while discrimination against white is denounced. The mayor adds that
the second reason for the isolation of the city is due to individuals who buy cheap
apartments and rent them at a high price. They attract a desperate group of people who
don’t have other options and are willing to accept anything. Finally, delinquents make this
isolation more acute to be able to sell their drugs more peacefully. The isolation of the city
allows them to control the territory more fully(Dilain 2006, 101-108). What is interesting
about the narrative of the mayor is his constant criticism of Afro-French communities and
his denial of structural factors. In that regard, the explanation of the progressive mayor
doesn’t differ much from his predecessor except maybe in the way it is framed.
In a different chapter, Dilain describes the city spatiality using an orientalist language
remindful of the colonial era. He describes the market in the following terms:
One needs little imagination to realize he is in the heart of an oriental market located
on the southern shore of the Mediterranean. One finds the spiced aromas and
colors, the rutilant couscoussiere, the Tunisian dishes, the tagines, the copper pots
and teapots (Dilain 2006, 133).
The chapter is full of orientalist expressions comparable to the ones used by
philanthropists during the colonial era. The aim of the mayor is to show how much he
appreciates difference and multiculturalism. He uses expressions such as spices, couscous,
“oriental club,” “commercial center with an oriental character,” “Turkish café,” Hammam,
“Orientalism and exoticism”(Dilain 2006, 133-35). By praising the food and customs, this
orientalizing rhetoric used by the mayor is meant to elevate Afro-French culture to a higher
level. At the same time, it is an old colonial strategy that allows the mayor and other
important actors in the city to implement a civilizing mission in the city without feeling
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guilty. Said (1978) explains that there is no relationship between the Orient as an actual
geographic region located in the east of Europe, and Orientalism as a field of knowledge.
Instead, he shows that Orientalism is basically constituted of Western phantasms about the
Orient, and has no connections to the reality of the region that it claims to describe and
represent. Said repeatedly explains that the “Orientalizing” or the Othering of the Orient is
symptomatic of a repressed Western Self. The orientalist discourse serves to dominate and
conquer rather than represent. Dilain’s description of Clichy is remindful of Le Corbusier’s
depiction of Algiers or Istanbul(Çelik 1992). Both show a fascination for the Orient and its
culture. To a certain extent, both fantasize about the Orient (It’s a personified by of women
and traditional esthetic in the case of Le Corbusier; it symbolized by colors, smells, and
visuals in the case of Dilain). Their Orientalizing process pushes subjugated cultures outside
European temporality and turns them into primitive and static customs. In the end it allows
the architect and the mayor to represent and dominate as Said explains. The intended
positive description shows that the essence of the colonial project or the renewal project is
benevolent. It improves the lives of colonial and postcolonial populations.
The ‘interest’ of the mayor in Oriental culture can be contrasted to his depiction of
‘Oriental’ subjects. In a passage in his book, Dilain notes that the police should not be
blamed for racial profiling. Empathizing with the police, he explains:
“Their problem is that robot portraits of those who break the law have very few
specific details: generally it resembles the profile of a large majority of Clichy’s
population” Then he adds “We shouldn’t accuse the police of racial profiling …
because delinquents and respectable people are as alike as two peas in a pod (Dilain
2006, 157-8).
The contrast is clear. The population is disposable while the culture is important to preserve
and protect as the above passage implies. The blatant racism of the police is justified and
normalized in the crudest fashion. At the same time, the mayor is perceived as much closer
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to Afro-French population than his predecessor. As a biopolitical strategy, social mixing
produces new norms that residents should follow. The contrast between the “threshold of
tolerance” and “social mixing” is revealing. The rigid ratios developed in the preceding
decades are replaced by much more flexible and ambiguous techniques. Social mixing is
interpreted and deployed according to the various situations and in relation to the local
context. Most importantly, it doesn’t name the problem it tries to solve. It’s much more
difficult for Afro-French to challenge it since it can be many different things at once.
Sovereign power was often brandished in the preceding period to scare the population. With
time however, this type of power became less efficient and resistance to it much more
effective. Biopower on the other hand is more dispersed and less visible and therefore much
more cost effective. Biopower builds on sovereign power and enhance its potentials as
Nadesan notes. Quoting Mitchell Dean, she writes,
Mitchell Dean (2002b) described the dissimination of sovereignty throughout
everyday life as the “delegation of sovereignty” (p. 124) in order to capture how
parents, families, health experts, counselors, and other members of everyday society
enact decisions about what constitutes normality, security, and the conditions of
public order. Sovereignty was thus intimately connected to biopolitical frameworks
of interpretation and techniques of the various expressions of liberal
government.”(Nadesan 2008, 26)
Sovereignty does not disappear, it’s simply more equally distributed. Every individual
gets a share to help herself and those she cares for, to abide by the norms. The
democratization of sovereignty makes it more insidous and difficult to oppose or even to
notice. If we go back to David’s explanation of urban renewal, we notice that the process of
mixing he descibes is not very different from the threshold of tolerance to which the
communist mayor was attached. David was describing the new apartments to the residents
of Clichy during a small meeting. He said,
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We will have all kinds of apartments. There will be small studios and apartments with
five rooms. There will be a mix of families of different sizes in each building. We
want to have a socially mixed population. There will be a certain percentage of
apartments in each building available to middle class families to rent. Those
apartments will be available without state subvention (social security). They will be
available to rent at the market value. This way we will be able to have people from
different backgrounds in the same building. When we asked people what kind of
kitchens they would like they told us they don’t want American kitchens. They don’t
like it. In several instances, people refused an offer we made to them because of the
kitchen. Since then, we stopped building American kitchens in studios and F2. In the
new building we don’t want to create an environment that would prevent people
from meeting each other. They need to know what their neighbor is doing. Right
now, there is no social control because of the gigantic size of the ensembles. We are
trying to have a new type of population that cares for their neighbors. We are
discussing the new plans with people and to each family we make several offers
(sometimes we make many offers). We try to accommodate everyone. At the end if
some of them are still not happy then we use legal means to expel them from their
houses. Certain families have bad faith but others do not want to leave because they
are too old or because they don’t speak French. In those situations we do everything
we can in order to secure a place for them in Clichy. We try to keep them close to
their initial neighborhood… The new apartments will be available in different forms
and shapes. There will be social housing and rental assistance programs for families
who need it. There will also be apartments without assistance for those who would
like to live in Clichy. The different rent will attract different kind of populations
(Interview 17 Dec 2008).
David’s approach is much more participatory and transparent than the one proposed by
Deschamps to tackle the problem of ghettoization. According to the new plan, tents moving
to new apartments can voice their preferences and chose one of different options available
to them. They can decide what type of kitchen they would like in addition to the size and
location of the apartment. At the same time, they are part of larger program of social mixing
which is mostly controlled by the city and which is, to a large extent, non-negotiable.
According to the renewal plan, 60% of the residents will have an apartment in Clichy while
another 40% will be moved elsewhere. It’s not clear why these ratios were chosen; how they
were calculated; and what they represent. In any case they are specific to Clichy and they
don’t have any racial connotations. Furthermore, mixing (social, urban, functional…) is
supposed to fix most of the problems of the city.
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4.8.

Conclusion
This chapter has shown that many of the debates about the concentration of Afro-

French communities and their dispersion should be understood in the longue durée. The
biopolitical programs that are currently deployed in Clichy have a genealogy that should be
traced back to colonial Tunisia along with other colonies. The chapter also shows that there
are important conflicts of interest between the different players when it comes to the
concentration and dispersion of Afro-French. In addition, the study argues that spatial
regulation of Afro-French population shouldn’t be investigated through the prism of a single
form of power but rather a multiplicity. For example, the socialists’ regulation of power can
only be investigated through a complex and multilayered nexus of power where biopolitics
plays a central role and sovereign power a complementary one. Certain scholars such as
Mitchell Dean have explained that biopolitics represents a “delegation of sovereignty” rather
than the substitution of one form of power by another while Jeffrey Nealon have proposed a
framework where power is intensified rather than transformed. The insight of these scholars
helps understand spatial racialization in the longue durée. However, these frameworks don’t
explain the conflicts and contradiction that occur as spatial governmentality is deployed in
Clichy. Why do these conflicts occur? How are they resolved? These questions will be
explored in the last chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCIPLINARY SPACES IN CLICHY-SOUS-BOIS

“If we want to do an analysis of power… we must speak of powers and try to
localize them in their historical and geographical specificity”
Michel Foucault
“Urban Renewal Means Negro Removal”
James Baldwin

5.1.

Introduction
To comprehend neo-liberal logics and their impact on urban forms in Clichy-sous-

Bois, a poor Parisian suburb, this chapter examines the renewal project in the city. By
exploring the production and management of different spaces located within the perimeter
of the PRU (Projet de Rénovation Urbaine)3, this study aims to comprehend how the
municipality, urban planners, and architects conceptualize and shape the spatial texture of
the city. Urban renewal provides a strategic entry point to explore the policing of space and
the racialization of the population.
To analyze the techniques that govern urban renewal in Clichy, a Foucauldian
analytical framework is used. Drawing on the concept of governmentality, or what Foucault
names “governing at a distance,” this study argues that urban segregation and exclusion are
based on three intertwined spatial powers. This chapter examines disciplinary spaces; the
urban forms that undergo a remodeling in a way that enhances their surveillance and control
capabilities. The previous chapter explored the implications of sovereign and bio-political
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spaces. The combination of these three modalities represents what geographers and
anthropologists, following Foucault, have defined as “urban governmentality” (Clifford,
1994; Appadurai, 2002; Robins, At the limits of spatial governmentality: a message from the
tip of Africa, 2002). The first section of this chapter presents urban governmentality, which
serve also as a theoretical framework for the previous chapters. Such a framework provides
important spatial tools to analyze the significance and impact of urban renewal on Clichy’s
spatiality. The second part presents a brief history of urban renewal in Clichy. The city
represents a symptomatic case study and is often viewed by urban planners and policy
makers as a laboratory where experimental technologies of government are originally
deployed. Marginal spaces such as Clichy play a role similar to colonial cities during French
colonialism when experimental urban policies were tested before being implemented in
metropolitan France at a later stage ((Rabinow, French Modern: Norms and Forms of the
Social Environmen, 1995; Celik, 1997; Wright, The Politics of Design in French Colonial
Urbanism , 1991). Once an urban policy is tested in Clichy and few other similar cities, it is
ready to be deployed on a larger scale. The last section examines three disciplinary
techniques that are integrated in the renewal project. Following Henri Lefebvre(1991), the
final section focuses on the “representations of space” and how urban renewal is thought
and implemented by experts of urbanism. The following three disciplinary techniques are
explored: 1) fragmentation of potentially dangerous space; 2) enclosure of semi-public areas;
3) deterritorialization of symbolic structures. The combination of these techniques is
supposed to improve the municipality’s grasp over spaces where its presence is considered
weak. Unlike the previous chapter, this one will not assess the impact of these policies on the
lives and experiences of the inhabitants. This chapter is less concerned with the effects of the
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PRU on the inhabitants than with the logics that motivate the experts who take part in urban
renewal.

5.2.

Urban Governmentality
In December 2004, the Agglomeration of Clichy-sous-Bois and Montfermeil signed

an ambitious PRU convention with the state and the National Agency for Urban Renewal
(ANRU)4. The Agglomeration’s PRU started in December 2004 and its first phase is
scheduled to last until 2013 (Agence Nationale pour la Rénovation Urbaine , 2008). The
project is based on three main principles: 1) the revitalization of city centers in both
communes (Clichy-sous-Bois and Montfermeil); 2) the creation of an axis that would
connect the two city centers to each other; and finally 3) the irrigation of the territory with a
communication grid and the creation of a unifying hierarchy of roads. The main goal of the
project is to renovate the degraded urban texture through a massive program that involves
the demolition of obsolete buildings and the construction of new ones. It also includes the
reconfiguration of the landscape, the implementation of better transportation infrastructures,
and the revitalization of local economic activities. The initial budget of the project was about
330 million Euros but was increased to 500 million in the following years (Agence Nationale
pour la Rénovation Urbaine , 2008, p. 48). The perimeter of the PRU includes the public
housing and privately owned collective housing located in Le Haut-Clichy5 and Les Bosquets
in Montfermeil. Urban renewal concerns around 23,500 inhabitants. The examination of the
PRU provides an entry point to study the spatial policing of the inhabitants and more
specifically, the youth living in Clichy-sous-Bois. The stakes are high for the city and the
government who has been scrutinizing the project very closely. Because of his high profile
during the revolts of 2005, the mayor of Clichy, Claude Dilain, has become an unavoidable
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reference in questions of urban renewal and spatial intervention for many politicians, despite
their ideological differences. This explains why after the revolts, the budget allocated for the
renewal of Clichy and Montfermeil has been increased by more than 50%.

5.2.1. Neoliberalism and Security
When studying urban renewal in Clichy, it’s essential to situate the logics deployed in
that marginal space in a larger socio-political context. Urban renewal is often motivated by
neoliberal logics that aim to deregulate the housing market and to police inhabited spaces
more efficiently. Neoliberalism, as a political logic, reached a global dominance in the late
1970s and early 1980s. In their influential book, Spaces of Neoliberalism, Brenner and Theodore
(2002) explain that the emergence of the new paradigm during that period constituted a
reaction to the economic recession and the loss of profitability that the capitalist system was
undergoing. Its primary targets were naturally the interventionist welfare state and the
Keynesian discourse that accompanies it. They write, “cities have become strategically crucial
geographical arenas in which a variety of neoliberal initiatives—along with closely
intertwined strategies of crisis displacement and crisis management—have been articulated
(p. 349).” In the same vein, John Mollenkopf astutely notes that new neoliberal techniques
were first tested in global cities such as New York in the mid-1970s before being
implemented on a larger national scale in the 1980s (1994, p. 4). This literature shows that
cities play a role of critical importance in what Brenner and Theodore describe as “actually
existing neoliberalism.”
Marxist geographer, David Harvey, has suggested that the capitalist system attempts
to overcome systemic crises through spatio-temporal fixes (1982; 1996; 2003). When there is
a surplus of labor and an over-accumulation of capital, the system seeks to balance itself
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through geographical expansion or spatial reorganization. The spatio-temporal fix has been a
constant characteristic of capitalism but as Harvey points out, this process intensified during
the neoliberal era:
[T]he neoliberal phase of globalization has been characterized by a reconfiguration of
state powers and the geographical concentration and centralization of politicaleconomic powers within regional alliances of immense strength […] The geopolitical
consequences are marked by a certain spatial fluidity but also by competitive fights
between evolving territorial complexes(p. 29).
Harvey shows that capital has a capability not only to expand but also to move spatially in
order to maximize its rate of profit. Giovanni Arrighi, building on Harvey’s concept of
spatial fix, explains that neoliberalism is driven by two logics; what he terms, “logic of
territory and logic of capital” (2005, p. 27). He demonstrates that the logic of capital is not
sustainable on the long run unless it is backed by territorial dominance. The imperial state
has to secure spaces that are viable for capitalist accumulation and labor exploitation. In that
regard, space acquires even more critical importance in the neoliberal era. These neoliberal
spaces can be located within the nation-state as in the case of urban renewal, or they are
situated beyond it, as in the case of military intervention in foreign countries. In both cases,
the state’s intension is driven by the dual neoliberal logic. Therefore urban renewal in France
and more specifically in Clichy could be positioned within a larger neoliberal logic that
entails an investment of excess capital. The redevelopment in Clichy and other similar cities
achieves two intertwined neoliberal objectives. On the one hand, the state attempts to
enhance its disciplinary grasp over spaces where it perceives its presence as weak. On the
other hand, the government channels public funds into the private sectors by hiring
companies to execute urban renewal. The disciplinary logic cannot be disentangled from the
neoliberal economic rationality. The focus of this study however, is on urban
governmentality rather than the political economy of urban renewal. In other words, what

!

"'+!

!
the previous chapters sought to develop is less an understanding of how capital solves its
crisis of over-accumulation than how governmental rationalities function in Clichy. It’s
therefore crucial to keep in mind that the economy is intrinsically linked to political
rationality. Foucault notes that:
[U]nlike sixteenth and seventeenth century juridical thought, political economy was
not developed outside raison d’État. It was not developed against raison d’ État and in
order to limit it […], it was formed within the very framework of the objectives set
for the art of government by raison d’État(2008, p. 14).
Therefore, this study doesn’t dissociate the economic sphere from political
rationality; it simply emphasizes the latter. To examine these political rationalities, it is
imperative to comprehend the problematization of the spatial question in Clichy. What kind
of problems do urban planners attempt to solve through the renewal of public housing and
privately owned collective housing? What type of spaces does the city seek to create? What
kinds of rationalities are being deployed? And finally, are there any tensions between political
rationalities and neoliberal economic interests? The Foucauldian concept of governmentality
can help us draw the contours of these questions and answer them.

5.2.2. Urban Governmentality
Generally speaking, scholars have suggested that a periodization of Foucault’s work
would present his intellectual trajectory into three major phases. The first one is known as
the archeological period during which Foucault was mainly interested in systems of thought
that are governed by discursive rules, namely the formation of objects, the formation of
enunciative modalities, the formation of strategies and the formation of concepts (Foucault,
1972; 1970). The second period, or what is commonly referred to as the genealogical period,
was inspired by Friedrich Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals (Foucault, 1977; 1979; 1980),
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and during which Foucault’s principal concern is to propose a methodology that is both,
grounded in history, and can highlight the mechanisms of power that enable or constrain the
production of knowledge. The concept of governmentality came at a later stage (1991). As
an analytical framework, it provides conceptual tools to examine the techniques and
knowledges that make the management of population, institutions and individuals possible.
Governmentality represents a continuity rather than a break in the Foucauldian tradition.
Simply put, governmentality is the art of improving rule at the level of the state, institutions
and the self. If an institution faces a crisis of governance, actors within the institution come
up with techniques inspired by current knowledge to achieve an enhanced form of
government. Foucault defines it as “the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures,
analyses, and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very
specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal
form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of
security” (1991, p. 102). Foucault notes that governmentality appeared simultaneously with
Liberalism, which is a political thought that turns its attention to “how not to govern too
much” (2008, p. 13). With the emergence of the population and the economy during the
eighteenth century as two extremely complex and multilayered problems (in the foucauldian
sense), political thought adopted a minimalist approach to government. To govern
efficiently, political thinkers6 argued that the monarch and those who surround him need to
decentralize the process of government. Foucault signals that a new regime of truth emerged
in the eighteenth century. Its goal was to decentralize the government of the population and
the management of the economy. The deployment of governmental techniques starts with a
phase of problematization that involves the identification of a problem and an object of
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study. To solve the crisis of government, a second phase is necessary and consists of
reordering the social through multiple governmental techniques.
Before exploring the significance of “urban governmentality” in Clichy’s urban
renewal in this chapter, it is crucial to reposition Foucault’s work within urban studies and
examine its relevance in spatial and geographic research. As the opening quote demonstrates,
Foucault’s work on power puts a special emphasis on space. The work of the French
philosopher is grounded in historically specific and territorially defined sites. For him, power
relations can be mapped into specific locations within the city’s cartography. In other words,
the Foucauldian grid of power can be translated into two or three-dimensional maps that
give meaning to multifaceted and plural socio-spatial processes. British geographer, Chris
Philo notes, when citing Stuart Elden, that Foucault’s ““histories are not merely ones in
which space is yet another area analyzed, but have space as a central part of the approach
itself,” meaning that; rather than merely writing histories of space, Foucault is writing spatial
histories” (Philo, 2004, pp. 124-5). The Foucauldian approach provides a theoretical model
to analyze discourses and practices within sites that are historically grounded and spatially
anchored.7
To undertake a study of the spatialization of power in Clichy, an exploration of three
dimensions of governmentality is necessary. The study of liberal power represents “in reality
[…] a triangle, sovereignty-discipline-government, which has as its primary target the
population and as its essential mechanism the apparatus of security”(1991, p. 102). Firstly,
sovereign power draws clear boundaries between “the Self” and “the Other” as well as
between spaces of inclusion and territories of exclusion. To legitimize itself, it uses crude
force; when threatened, it takes life away to preserve its existence. Foucault’s study of
sovereign power was not necessarily due to an interest in the topic as such but was rather a
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way to contrast it to disciplinary power (Singer & Weir, 2006, p. 445). Secondly, as part of
his interest in the concept of power during the second phase of his intellectual trajectory,
Foucault studied the genealogy of disciplinary power (2003; 1977; 2003). In Discipline and
Punish(1977), he delineated the historical emergence and slow substitution of sovereign
power by disciplinary power. He writes, “[O]ne can speak of the formation of a disciplinary
society (…) [n]ot because the disciplinary modality of power has replaced all the others; but
because it has infiltrated the others” (p. 216). Instead of a totalizing and all encompassing
gaze of the sovereign-Subject, disciplinary power is individualizing and more insidious. For
Foucault, power is capillary since it invests the body through accurately-programmed
mechanisms that regulate bodily practices at the microphysical level. Its aim is to manage
every movement of the body, to fragment the spaces in which the body dwells and to
regulate the minutiae of its movements at all times. Disciplinary power was deployed at a
larger scale in Europe, in the eighteenth century, because it was more economic and
efficient, as Foucault explains. The ideal type of disciplinary power is the architectural form
of the panopticon, but as we shall see below, Foucault’s analysis of that type of power is
denser and more complex.
Finally, Foucault explains that in the eighteenth century the population emerged as a
central problem that required meticulous study and regulation. Various fields of knowledge
and most notably the field of sociology were reconfigured to study and survey this new
entity. The French scholar shows that at the same time there was a move away from the
normalizing and disciplinary mechanisms that target individual bodies to ones that are more
dispersed, and which aim to enhance the well being of the whole population. Foucault
proposes the notion of government to counter the idea of a rigid sovereign state power. His
project should be understood as a critic of traditional political analyses that posit the
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sovereign state as a focal point in their study. Foucault uses the term biopower to refer to
the techniques that are deployed to regulate birth rates, health states or life expectancy. It’s in
Volume 1 of the History of Sexuality (1978) that he investigates the mechanism and histories
of biopower. In this book, biopower is presented as the antidote of sovereign power since
the former is deployed to foster life while the latter is usually understood as the one that
takes life away. Instead of turning the body of the condemned into a docile one, as it is the
case of disciplinary power, biopower regulates a whole population by transforming
subjectivities or creating new ones. However, as the previous chapter demonstrated,
Foucault’s notions of sovereign and biopower are more complex and the binary separation
between the two is not easily sustainable (Coleman & Grove, 2009).
Foucault’s work on power in specific location has enabled him to examine the social
production of space very carefully. In almost each one of his major studies, it is possible to
identify the implication of space on social relations. Indeed, his scholarship has very clear
spatial dimensions. “From architectural plans for asylums, hospitals and prisons; to the
exclusion of the leper and the confinement of victims in the partitioned and quarantined
plague town […] Foucault’s work was always filled with implications and insights concerning
spatiality” (Crampton & Elden, 2007). The tools that Foucault develops to study the
intertwined relationship among the social, space, and history provides a theoretical
framework to explore spatiality in Clichy-sous-Bois and its implication on social relations. In
the Birth of the Clinic (1973), he undertakes a meticulous analysis of the medical gaze to
explain how it spatializes practices associated with it. His study of disciplinary spaces in
Discipline and Punish (1977) has highlighted the spatial organization of social relations, while
the historical formation of subjectivities is only sketched in Discipline and Punish and
comprehensively examined in his later governmentality studies. Before examining urban
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regeneration in Clichy-sous-Bois, it’s imperative to provide a brief political history of urban
renewal in France.

5.3.

Urban Renewal
The ongoing renewal project in Clichy-sous-Bois and Montfermeil is part of a larger

national program that was initiated and defined by the Borloo law of August 1, 2003. This
program is part of a larger urban policy that the European Union has been utilizing to
implement a neoliberal agenda. This agenda, as explained above, holds an internal tension
between its territorial logic and its incentive for capitalist accumulation. These two logics
sometimes converge toward each other but this is not necessarily the case (Harvey, 2003;
Arrighi, 2005). The national program for urban redevelopment that the French state is
undertaking is an example of this tension. The state juggles between these two
complementary and intertwined logics.
The Borloo law stipulates that poor neighborhoods which are classified as critical
urban areas (ZUS, Zone Urbaine Sensible) shall be the object of an ambitious urban renewal
program which aims to transform marginal spaces into “ordinary ones” as Clichy’s renewal
convention states(La Communauté d'Agglomération de Clichy-sous-Bois/ Montfermeil,
2004). The major objective of the national renewal program (PNRU – Program National de
Rénovation Urbaine) is to reintegrate marginal neighborhoods into their surroundings. Article 6
states that “the objective of the national renewal program is to foster social diversity and
sustainable development in neighborhoods classified as critical urban areas”(l'Assemblée
nationale et le Sénat, 2003). It suggests that urban renewal projects (PRU) shall be
incorporated into already existing urban programs such as GPV (Grand Projet de la Ville). The
law provides specific quantitative objectives for a five-year plan (2004-2008). The initial
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state’s budget allocated to the National Agency in charge of renewal was 2.5 billions Euros.
This amount along with other sources of funding are to be used for the demolition of
200,000 apartments, the rehabilitation of 200,000 apartments, and the building of another
200,000 apartments.
In 2005 a new law regarding social cohesion increased the ANRU budget to 4
billions and raised its objective by proposing the demolition and construction of 250,000
units. The number of apartments that were to benefit from rehabilitation was 400,000. The
Agency also announced that 188 different sites were targeted through the program and an
estimated population of 4 millions shall be affected by its project. The program in itself was
later prolonged until 2013 and its cost was brought to 30 billions. National urban renewal is
financed by the state, the ANRU, and the different cities and regions that benefit from the
aids (L’Agence Nationale pour la Rénovation Urbaine, 2006). Due to the recent capitalist
crisis, in 2008, the National Renewal Program started revising its objectives and downsizing
them. For example, instead of demolishing 250,000 apartments as previously stated, the new
goal became 130,000. At the same time, the geographic scope of the program became wider.
The number of signed conventions between the government and various cities went up to
267. The state subventions to the Agency went from an initial 2.5 billion in 2004 to 6 billion
in 2008.
Along with the creation of the ANRU, two new organisms emerged to study the
evolution and help in the management of these critical urban areas. The first one is the
National Observatory of Critical Urban Areas (ONZUS, L’Observatoire national des zones
urbaines sensibles), the aim of which is to measure the evolution of social inequality within
Critical Urban Areas and to evaluate the implementation of new urban policies. The
Observatory produces annual reports and other documents that provide quantitative and
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qualitative indicators to assess the adequate application of the 2003 law(Observatoire
national des zones urbaines sensibles, 2009, p. 5). The second institution is the School for
Urban Renovation and Neighborhood Management. It is the result of a fusion between the school
of Urban Renovation that was established in 2005 and the School of Neighborhood
Management created three years later. The goal of the institution is to communicate
knowledge and skills to “enact a lasting change in the living environment and the everyday
lives of four millions French” (Ecoles de la rénovation urbaine et de la gestion des quartiers,
2009).
The creation of new institutions to study marginal neighborhoods is concurrent with
the establishment of the ANRU and the National Urban Renewal Program (PRNU). The
simultaneity between these two entities is not a pure coincidence; it’s the result of an
intrinsic relationship between knowledge and power as Foucault notes. The implementation
of disciplinary power requires the creation of institutions that can provide a meticulous
cartography of the banlieues. The ANRU’s ambitious program aims to reorganize spaces
that are usually considered “lawless zones.”8 Redefining their function and reorganizing
social relations necessitate a specific type of knowledge. As we shall see, new disciplinary
mechanisms are integrated to urban renewal. They are co-constitutive of new discourses
about security and surveillance. They redraw the boundaries between the private and public
spaces in order to reconfigure subjectivities.
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Figure 5-1: A map of the PRU (Clichy Magazine, 2008-09)
Urban renewal in Clichy and Montfermeil is therefore the result of a new national
policy that started in 2003 and is planned to last at least until 2013. The PRU in Clichy
concerns only one area (Le Haut Clichy) where most public housing is located (see Figure 1).
The area included in the project concerns both Clichy and Montfermeil. In Clichy, it includes
Le Haut Clichy, which is the southeastern part of the city. Le Haut Clichy represents around
half of the area occupied by public housing and privately owned collective housing. Les
Bosquets, the only neighborhood in Montfermeil9 that is the object of urban renewal, has a
bad reputation since it’s been an isolated and poor enclave for a long period.
To investigate the emergence of these new spatial logics in the city, this study
analyzes urban renewal by examining the documents produced by the PRU since the first
contract was signed in 2004. The plan, as explained above, draws its logic from the Borloo
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law that the parliament passed in 2003. The two conventions that guide Clichy’s urban
politics and which were produced in 2000 (GPV) and 2006 (CUCS) provide an opportunity
to study the evolution of spatial rationalities from the standpoint of the state. By comparing
the urban renewal contract to urban policies implemented before and during renewal, one
can assess the changes that occurred in the thinking modalities of the municipality and urban
experts.

5.4.

Disciplinary Spaces
In its introductory section, the PRU explains that the urban morphology of the city

will be radically transformed once the renewal project is implemented. The objective behind
urban renewal is to deconstruct spaces that are currently viewed as “lawless zones.” In order
to do so, planners aspire to erect spaces that would discipline the population, restrict its
movements, and constrain its thinking. Their goal is to uproot “lawless zones” and replace
them with normalized spaces that would be under constant scrutiny. Some of the disciplinary
strategies examined below are integrated into the renovation of public housing; the
rehabilitation of residential units; the creation of green spaces; and the enhancement of the
transportation network.
It is necessary to examine Foucault’s understanding of discipline and its relation to
space before exploring the different layers of urban renewal in Clichy. In Discipline and Punish,
Foucault explains the emergence of discipline in the eighteenth century as a way to substitute
sovereign power, which was becoming less effective. The sovereign’s use of brutal force and
torture was becoming too costly and out of phase with the emerging industrial society. The
new disciplinary techniques were therefore meant to substitute sovereign power. They
appeared first in the army, schools and prisons to provide a better management of society at
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a lesser cost. Later on, they were transposed into the factory to make the production process
more profitable. As a new rationality, discipline focuses on the body, its movements and
gestures. It attempts to comprehend the economy of the body in order to provide
techniques that would transform it into a docile and productive one. Many of these spatial
techniques constrain the movement of the body by reducing the number of options available
to it and by training it to perform in specific ways. Unlike previous disciplinary mechanisms
that used to target the whole population, the new ones aim to shape the behavior of
individual bodies. Foucault shows in a chapter titled Docile Bodies that the new mechanisms
have a dual role. They seek to “increase the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility)
and diminish these same forces (in political terms of obedience)” (p. 138). To construct
docile bodies, Foucault notes that there is an “art of distributing” them in space. This entails
a thorough understanding of space and movements. The distribution is based on detailed
analyses and calculations that prevent the free movement of bodies in space. It assigns
specific spaces to bodies and imposes a rigorous discipline by training individuals to inhabit
certain places only. The other and complementary dimension of discipline consists of
controlling the activities that a body can undertake in a specific space.
Through a meticulous management of time and a comprehensive organization of
space, Foucault shows that the new economy of power attempts to turn inhabitants into
docile bodies. This art of distribution of bodies in space is based on specific spatial practices.
It involves the enclosure of certain spaces and a clear separation between inside and outside.
Foucault explains that the vagabonds and pauper were among the most visible groups and
were therefore the primary targets of such mechanisms. Less visible groups such as students,
soldiers, and patients were the objects of more insidious technologies of separation. He
explains that the enclosure of different spaces affected everyone in one-way or another.
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Enclosure makes the economy of power smoother and more efficient
In addition to the enclosure of space, Foucault notes that the new disciplinary
technologies generate a systematic fragmentation of space. He writes “[e]ach individual has
his own place; each place its individual. Avoid distributions in groups; break up collective
dispositions; analyse confused, massive or transient pluralities”(p. 143). This fragmentation
of space enhances the control of individuals. The separation of individuals into smaller and
enclosed spaces fragments the population and allows for a better control of individuals.
Communication and contact between individuals is possible and desirable only when it
serves a specific economic goal. Whenever communication between individuals has the
potential to undermine the structure of power, it is prevented. The disciplinary techniques
confine people to certain spaces and compel them to produce and perform specific services.
In Foucault’s perspective, urban planning and architecture structure space and make the
process of production and economic exploitation smoother. To examine the anatomy of
discipline in Clichy, this study focuses on three different spaces; they consist of 1) increasing
the area and extent of spaces of flow to control undesirable behavior more efficiently; 2)
segmenting certain neighborhoods to draw clear boundaries between public and private
space; and 3) segmenting and dispersing spaces that are perceived as dangerous. In the first
part, the significance of the street as a basic urban form is explored to show that it can be
used as a disciplinary technique. The PRU aims to “break the ghetto” by creating islands
surrounded by dense transportation networks to enhance the securitarian flows within these
spaces. Secondly, to comprehend the anatomy of disciplinary spaces, an analysis of enclosed
spaces is undertaken. In the language of the PRU, this process is labeled “residentialisation.”
Although this principle is neither new nor specific to Clichy, its analysis is important to
comprehend the disciplining techniques deployed in the city. Finally, the architecture of the
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Grand Mosque and the choice of its new location are examined. The purpose of the last part
is to study the mechanisms of dispersion and reterritorialization.

5.4.1. The Street: A Disciplinary Tool
The PRU presents the street as a important urban form that would reduce the
isolation of the inhabitants, prevent delinquent activity, and provide an enjoyable urban
environment. The inhabitants are told that poor urban planning could be solved through the
creation of a dense gird of transportation that would connect them more directly to their
city. Planners suggest that residential areas should be integrated in an ordinary urbanism
constituted of small islands (îlots). The PRU considers small islands as the cornerstone of
urban renewal in Clichy because it forms the simplest and most ‘coherent’ urban unit. To
achieved this goal, the PRU embarked into a massive remodeling of space that aims to
segment any large units as figure 2 shows. The PRU explains that the role of urban renewal
is to enact “[…] a transition from large real estate divisions to diverse and ordered parcellary
partitions with small residential entities that are connected to each other through a network
of streets.” This logic is not new but it constitutes an important contrast with the one that
was prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s when most public housing was conceptualized and
built on large pieces of land and as far as possible as possible from the street. The creation of
disciplinary spaces in the XXI century is symptomatic of neoliberal urban regeneration
(Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Holm, 2006; Weber, 2002; Swyngedouw, Moulaert, &
Rodriguez, 2002; Jessop, 2002; Samara, 2010). Modern urban renewal took off in the sixties
and targeted primarily ‘unsanitary’ housing located within Paris to remove the few pockets
where minorities and poor groups were still living Invalid source specified.. Urban
restructuration in the Banlieues began in the 1970s when post-war public housing (built in
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the mid-1950s and 1960s) started deteriorating. The PRU is only the most recent chapter in
urban regeneration.
As we saw in the previous chapter, urban planning in the 1960s was following a
Corbusian logic. The goal of Le Corbusier was to increase green areas by building vertically
rather than horizontally. The main concern during the previous period was to reduce the
perimeter of areas with cemented structures and to increase green areas as well as other
collective spaces that residents can use together. Le Corbusier was also interested in reducing
the number of streets by maintaining a certain distance between inhabited areas and
transportation networks. The idea behind such design was to maintain a clear separation
between built environment and the street. Separating inhabited areas from transportation
grids prevents nuisance coming from the surrounding streets and cars to reach the
inhabitants. Most public housing was therefore isolated and elevated above streets level.
Inhabited areas were accessible mostly through small pedestrian paths.
The opposite logic is being implemented in Clichy today. The PRU attempts to undo
what Bernard Zehrfuss10 and other disciples of Le Corbusier have done from the mid-1950s
and up to the 1970s. There is a clear effort on behalf of urban planners working in Clichy to
connect the built environment to a dense network of streets and passages. Some of the
residents living in public housing are welcoming this move since they consider such planning
will reduce their isolation. In some housing projects, residents have to park their cars far
away from their building’s entrance and carry grocery bags and other belonging for a long
distance. Connecting the building’s entrance to a street makes the execution of certain
chores easier. Streets might decrease the level of isolation but it also transforms the
relationship of the inhabitants with collective and public spaces. The street is presented by
experts as the most effective way to improve the inhabitants everyday life. Urban developers
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don’t explain that streets also improve police access and intervention in previously isolated
neighborhoods, or increase the level of surveillance.
Urban planners are taught in urbanism institutes that the street has characteristics
that can solve many urban problems. It creates flows that have the potential to decrease
undesirable or delinquent behavior while it transforms urban enclaves into attractive spaces.
The street is therefore used to segment housing projects that are considered too large. It
undermines “lawless zones”11 and makes their penetration less risky for the police. Small
streets are connected to the main arteries to improve the ‘irrigation’ of the city. The Institut
d'aménagement et d'urbanisme de la région Île-de-France12 published a report in 2006 where it
proposes a wholistic strategy on how to integrate security to urban renewal (2006). The
report addresses the question of security in the context of ANRU projects. It explains that
the street provides a space for “natural surveillance.” The experts of security and urban
renewal explain, “natural surveillance is made possible through users’ dense and continuous
roaming. By cancelling a portion of a street one would diminish tremendously its potential to
prevent delinquent activity”(Institut d'aménagement et d'urbanisme de la région Île-deFrance, 2006, p. 70). According to the study, an urbanism revolving around the street would
prevent criminal and delinquent activity because it is a space that enables constant
observation and better surveillance. Unlike the disorderly urbanism that characterized public
housing of the previous era, the study notes that the street helps delineate the limits between
the private and the public. The existence of streets adds a new intermediary space. It
valorizes building entrances and the spaces that are located between the public and the
private. For urban planners, this demarcation between the public and the private is central
since it defines spatial limits and gives a sense of safety.
City representatives echoed the same discourses during public debates and other
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similar forums. Even when a focus group was organized to hear the inhabitants’ opinion
about the PRU, the participants were told multiple times that the street is crucial in an
“ordinary urbanism” and that it could solve many of Clichy’s problems. In a conversation
between city representatives and the inhabitants, the later were reminded that what makes
promenades in Paris enjoyable is its “normal” texture, which is composed of a dense grid of
streets where commerce and coffee shops are located. The inhabitants are then told that one
of the renewal project’ goals is to reproduce Paris’ healthy and pleasurable urban climate. An
examination of pamphlets and brochures that advertise the urban renewal of Clichy shows
that the street plays a central role. It is presented as an efficient way to intervene on the
urban and to break with the urbanism of the past in a radical fashion. Planners explain that
there is a need to move away from a state of exception in which Clichy finds itself confined
today, to a state of normality to which it should aspire.
The street is integrated into a larger schema based on segmenting public housing
projects and replacing them with islands. The urbanism of the 1970s reintroduces the island
as an ideal urban structure that is supposed to create a healthy neighborhood in the
banlieues. Describing public housing projects in the banlieues of Paris, French architect,
Jacques Lucan writes, “the open space represents the most radical experience of antiurbanism” (Lucan, 1998, p. 176). To counter that trend, the challenge of new urbanism is to
propose a space that would have a better impact on the inhabitants. It is also imperative not
to go back to the Haussmanian model where the vacant area is located inside a built
bloc(Faillebin, 2007). Internal courtyards are potentially dangerous because out of sight. The
island geared towards the street seems to be the most adequate and coherent solution from
the standpoint of the municipality and the police. Starting in the 1970s, it becomes the
building block for a healthy urbanism. When the socialist party led by François Mitterrand
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took power in 1981, it created a community police, called “the islander” (l’îlotier), while the
process of patrolling around the block is known as islanding (îlotage). The idea behind
community police is to transition from a repressive force to a dissuasive one. Community
policemen spend extended hours with the local population to build a relationship. Moreover,
by its presence, community police can dissuade individuals from committing criminal or
delinquent activity. More importantly, the police is modeled after the urban form of the
island. The premise is that it is more effective and can gather valuable information through
its local presence. However, the community police was disbanded when the right gained
power in the 1990s(Mouhanna, 2002). More recently, the right proposed a more repressive
local police, (police de quartier) to be tested in few neighborhoods among which is the
agglomeration of Clichy-Montfermeil. These practices show that the island is viewed the
police and urban planners as the ideal disciplinary form.
The concept of the island is emphasized in many pamphlets and reports related to
Clichy’s urban renewal. The PRU convention notes that the structure of real estate would
experience “[…] a transition from large real estate divisions to diverse and ordered parcellary
partitions with small residential entities that are connected to each other through a network
of streets.” It elaborates the idea further by explaining that “the urban morphology of the
city will shift from an urbanism that is predominantly composed of towers and high-rise
buildings to an “ordinary” urbanism comprised of small and fragmented islands with little
residential entities occupied by small buildings.” It adds that the program will also create
clusters of individual housing (La Communauté d'Agglomération de Clichy-sous-Bois/
Montfermeil, 2004, p. 7). This description sums up the logic of urban renewal in Clichy. The
main objective is to create fragmented spaces that can be controlled easily by state and nonstate agents. It is combined with a neo-liberal logic that favors individual units and private
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spaces over collective housing and public areas.
To turn large parcels of land into small islands, planners working in Clichy proposed
a new layout of streets. The PRU map suggests that approximately thirteen new streets will
be crisscrossing Le Haut Clichy by the end of redevelopment (see figure 2). Some of them
are completely new, while others will be improved and undergo a modification of path. The
high concentration of new streets is located in the vicinity of the new mosque. The purpose
of such design is to detach the edifice from its surrounding as the last section of this chapter
demonstrates. The other dense grid of new streets is situated mostly in the western part of
Le Haut-Clichy, in the proximity of Les Bosquets and La Forestière, the two poorest
neighborhoods in the city. The municipality and urban planners view these neighborhoods
as too closed and isolated. To reduce their isolation, they will be connected to the rest of the
city by new streets. Conversations with the youth in Les Bosquets and La Forestière seem to
suggest that they have a stronger affinity with their neighborhoods than their friends living in
other housing projects. The new layout of streets is supposed to break this pattern by
forcing the inhabitants of the two housing projects to shift their focus away from internal
physical and social spaces to turn it to ‘the exterior’ in the direction of the city as a whole.
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Figure 5-2: A map of the PRU planned new streets (Clichy Magazine, 2009)
The goal behind creating new streets is to weaken the sense of belonging to the
neighborhood that many of the youth have learned to develop. The mayor perceives such an
attachment as a threat to the city and a lack of identification with the French Republic on
behalf of the youth. For him, it’s a residual form of identity that needs to be erased in order
to help the population develop an organic relationship with their city. Dilain explains that,
Bernard Zehrfuss, the Corbusian architect who planned the second wave of public housing
in Clichy, in the 1960s, was not interested in building an integrated city but only a series of
public housing projects. Evaluating Zehrfuss work, the mayor notes, “it’s clear that this
Corbusian disciple has voluntarily rejected the Haussmannian street and sidewalk, and has
built uncertain spaces instead. According to that model, the neighborhood is privileged while
the city is secondary”(2006, pp. 110-11). He adds, the objective of the PRU “is to break the
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logic of the island or the neighborhood and replace it with the more conventional one: that
of the street” (p. 112). The assumption of the mayor is that, when the internal spaces of
public housing are either destroyed or enclosed behind fences, the resident will develop a
stronger attachment to their city.
The question is whether there is a tension between the rhetoric of the mayor and the
logic of the PRU. The former is interested in infusing into the population, a sense of
belonging to the city, at the expense of an attachment to the neighborhood. The latter is
proposing a logic based on the fragmentation of the city into small islands where disciplinary
“spaces of flow” are more present. The mayor would like to see “islands” disintegrate while
urban planners are creating new ones. Is there a contradiction between the municipality,
which values a spatiality with a centripetal force and the PRU, which is destroying internal
areas to replace them with spaces that function according to centrifugal logics? A closer look
at both processes shows that the contradiction is only at the surface. On a deeper level, both
logics complement each others. By disempowering local spaces and strengthening a central
one revolving around the idea of the city, the mayor intends to replace the multiple
coexisting Gemeinschaft with one unifying Republican Gesellschaft. The PRU follows a similar
path by enhancing the capabilities of disciplinary spaces to undermine the sense of
community that may exist within the housing projects. In other words, the mayor and urban
planners are referring to different kinds of “islands.” Following Lefebvre, the first strives to
destroy the island that produces an inclusive social space, while the other aspires to create the
island that produces a disciplinary mental space.
By fragmenting space and creating an “ordinary urbanism” based on the model of
the island, planners argue disciplinary spaces will be more effective. The demolition of old
buildings is presented as a necessary phase to accomplish their goals. They also justify
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demolition by arguing that it reduces the isolation of the inhabitants. Cutting a housing
project in two by laying out a street in-between is often presented as the ultimate answer to
reduce criminal and delinquent activities. Urban experts explain “the Haussmanian texture is
exemplary in matters of situational prevention since it allowed for the “purification” of
insecure and unsanitary areas (insalubres) within the organic medieval city center” (Institut
d'aménagement et d'urbanisme de la région Île-de-France, 2006, p. 64). By creating a dense
grid of streets, developers intend to establish a coherent network with two main arteries
around which urban renewal takes place. This vision is presented as a return to a situation of
normality.
There is a missing piece in the discourse of normality in which urban renewal
envelops itself. The report doesn’t explain the radical urban transformation of poor suburbs
and housing projects. It highlights the importance of reviving an ordinary and coherent
urbanism that values small buildings and individual housing located within small terrains and
irrigated with a dense network of streets. Clearly there is no connection between the
neoliberal turn that characterizes the new urban discourse and the various recent urban
renewal projects. There is a clear but silent move toward a neo-Haussmannian model in the
suburbs. More than a century after the urban revolution led by Baron Haussmann to control
the streets of the capital and to evict the poor populations form it, there is a tendency among
urban planners and other city experts to replicate the Parisian strategy into deprived suburbs.
Haussmann was suggested as a model to follow to end the urban and social crises in the
suburbs. Few weeks after the 2005 urban revolts, during a hearing about housing and urban
planning at the National Assembly, a draftsperson suggests to parliamentary members,
“there is a need for a Haussmann of the XXI century, someone who would have the courage
to design new cities […] someone who has the honesty to tell people who live in public
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housing that it is possible to live better” (Assemblée Nationale, 2005). The NeoHaussmannian trend took off after the Corbusian vision proved its failure in the 1970s.
Without doubt, Haussmann was the most influential urban planners in French history
however as the above discussion in the parliament shows, there are other reasons behind his
revival.
During the second half of the nineteenth century, Napoleon III appointed
Georges-Eugène Haussmann, the Seine prefect, to execute a massive renewal project in Paris
and to solve one of the major economic crises of the Second Empire. From 1852 to 1870 he
was in charge of public work in the imperial city, a period during which the French capital
witnessed a radical urban transformation. In 1848, few years before urban renewal, Paris and
other European cities were sites of important urban upheavals of the poor and the working
classes. These episodes were formative in the life of the conservative prefect (Jordan, 2004,
p. 100). One of the central missions of Haussmann was to prevent such an insurrection to
occur again in Paris. Policing the capital and controlling its population were two guiding
principles for him. David Harvey explains that what characterizes the ambitious
Haussmannian project was a process of “creative destruction,” a need to remove the old and
replace it with new. Haussmann’s project was driven by an urge to destroy old, unsanitary,
and disorderly habitat and to create new, large ones, in addition to establishing a new gird of
straight boulevards (Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, 1990, p. 16). Streets with
dead ends were undesirable because they were difficult to access and keep under close
scrutiny. They were quickly replaced with wider and straight ones. Harvey writes:
Violence is required to build the new urban world on the wreckage of the old.
Haussmann tore through the old Parisian slums, using powers of expropriation in the
name of civic improvement and renovation. He deliberately engineered the removal of
much of the working class and other unruly elements from the city centre, where they
constituted a threat to public order and political power. He created an urban form
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where it was believed—incorrectly, as it turned out in 1871—that sufficient levels of
surveillance and military control could be attained to ensure that revolutionary
movements would easily be brought to heel(2008, p. 33).
Besides policing the capital, there was an urge to solve the economic crisis that
erupted in the 1840s. Harvey notes that large-scale renovation in Paris was the direct result
of a major crisis in capitalist accumulation. In the 1840s, the second empire was facing a
crisis due to over-accumulation of capital with no real investment opportunities. In addition
to the burden of over-accumulation of capital, Paris had an important surplus of labor that
could be potentially dangerous for the stability of the Empire as the insurrection of 1848 has
shown. The implementation of massive infrastructural work was thought to be the most
efficient way to solve the economic crisis of the second empire(2008, pp. 25-6).
Urban planners working in Clichy draw their inspiration from this Haussmannian
heritage. The “creative destruction” that Haussmann has implemented in Paris is being
revived in the Parisian suburbs at a much larger scale. National and local politicians alike are
persuaded that draconian measures are necessary to discipline ‘the rebels’ living in the
periphery. Haussmann’s plans were presented as improvement, modernization and
beautifying of Paris. Likewise, the disciplinary mechanisms implemented in the suburbs are
enveloped in discourses of betterment, development, and privacy. The social destruction that
Haussmann left behind doesn’t seem to be an issue for developers or politicians. The
cleaning up of Paris from its poor inhabitants and their displacement to the suburbs is
unfortunately rarely evoked in these milieus. To describe the Haussmannian destruction after
the ‘improvement’ of Paris, Roy Benjamin writes, “his plans of improvement and
modernization “wrecked hundreds of buildings, displaced uncounted thousands of people,
destroyed whole neighborhoods that had lived for centuries” (Berman 150–1). […] [T]he
orphaned house-men become urban nomads belonging to no street as new tree-lined
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boulevards demolish their homes” (Benjamin, 2007, pp. 141-2). Likewise, the loss of
apartments and displacement of the poor population of Clichy is either considered an
acceptable price to pay or simply an individual problem.
The population’s resistance to the neo-liberal logics and their rejection of new
disciplinary technologies forced the city to increase the number of apartments to be built to
equal those that were bound to be demolished. After the inhabitants’ pressure, the city
created a re-housing procedure that obliged it to provide housing to those who lost their
apartments. The creative destruction of space and the Foucauldian fragmentary potentials of
the island are only one aspect of Clichy’s urban renewal. The following section shows that
planners enclose old and newly created spaces to reinforce the separation between public
and private, and to insure a better control of the population.

5.4.2. Residentialization
The French concept of “residentialisation” refers to the process of turning an urban
form into a residence. It is a procedure that urban planners employ extensively in Clichy to
produce disciplinary spaces. Since the 1990s, it has been one of the pillars of urban renewal
in France. it represents an intermediary level in urban renewal; it enact on spaces located in
between built forms and their surrounding. It comprises all the disciplinary mechanisms that
target the buildings on its proximity but excludes the redevelopment of public equipments.
These spatial techniques refashion space to make it more amenable to surveillance and other
mechanisms of control. Residentialisation is usually invoked to solve problems of security
and privacy and is viewed as an efficient way to delimit the boundaries between private and
public.
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The experts of urban regeneration present the violent process of fragmenting and
secluding the population, as a way to privatize residences, make the habitat more secure, and
improve the surrounding environment. After the revolts of 2005, urban planners have made
residentialization one of their priorities in Clichy. The budget allocated to it as well as the
number of units and areas affected by it are important. A whole rhetoric has been
constructed to make it more acceptable and even desirable. The Urban Contract for Social
Cohesion (CUCS), that the city signed in 2007 explains that Clichy will focus on “the
prevention of urban revolts through the reinforcement of security around collective
equipments” and adds that “the integration of security shall be an objective in each one of
the phase of urban renewal (conception, construction…)” (La Commune de Clichy-sousBois, 2007, p. 40). To preempt urban violence, the PRU integrated mechanisms that would
discard ‘non-coherent urbanism.’ Urban renewal in Clichy has incorporated a neoliberal
agenda inspired by a long Anglophone tradition.
Residentialisation represents a response to the Corbusian logic of the 1960s. The
large green area with a small built space in the middle was one of the cherished concepts in
Corbusian urbanism. Developers from that era favored the creation of large and collectively
owned areas. From their standpoint, such spaces create healthier communities. For the
urban planners of the XXI century this type of space is undesirable because it blurs the
boundaries between the private and the public. According to them, private and collectively
owned areas could create conflict and insecurity because they are easily accessible by nonresidents. Their classification within a continuum that spans from the intimate and private
spaces to the open and public ones is complex. One of the goals of residentialisation is
therefore to undo such spaces and to introduce new ones with well-defined boundaries.
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Residentialisation is presented in Clichy’s PRU as one of the four axis of the renewal
plan. There are two main types of residentialization. The first one targets the built space
directly by enclosing the entrance, installing locks, and digital keypad. It can also refer to the
removal of a porch under which the youth gather and ‘obstruct the residents’ movements.’
The second layer affects the surrounding area of a building and consists of erecting different
kinds of fences. The process of fencing is non-negotiable for planners; what they will
negotiate however, is the material, color and pattern of fences. Sometimes they use subtler
and lighter structures such as a green bush fence to avoid reprisal from the youth who might
not see the new configuration approvingly Developers have acquired a language that makes
residentialisation desirable among the inhabitants since it is always presented as beneficial on
different levels. The residents are told that once the limits of private areas are delineated, the
inhabitants will feel more attached to their residence. The image of their neighborhood will
improve and have a positive effect will reverberate throughout the city. Developers working
in Clichy explain that once residentialisation is executed, it will deter inhabitants from
throwing garbage from their windows or disrespect green areas located within the enclosed
area. Finally, enclosure is often presented as a way to preserve children’s security. The
architects explain to the inhabitants that the goal of residentialization is to keep the kids in a
safe space within a close proximity to their parents. To examine urban transformation from
a neoliberal perspective, it’s crucial to study the intricate and complex relationship between
public and private spaces in which residentialisation is the most symptomatic aspect.
This trend didn’t start in Clichy; it has its origins in the neoliberal turn of the 1970s.
However, Clichy could be considered a laboratory where new urban disciplinary strategies
are implemented before being generalized on a larger scale. The new form of planning favors
smaller, partitioned, and disconnected spaces that are connected to each other through a
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dense network of streets. To preempt urban violence, planners introduce technologies that
would replace old and disorderly urbanism with a new and ‘coherent’ one. The renewal
contract announces the residentialization of 1,353 units out of a total of 3,684 that are
located within the perimeter of project. In other words, one third of all built areas will be
affected in one way or another by the process. Clichy-sous-Bois Magazine, the newsletter
issued by the municipality notes that a residentialization in the southeast area of the city have
been completed. It adds that “in order to delimit the boundaries between private and public
spaces, fences have been installed and private outdoors areas have been redesigned.” The
same article concludes, “the inhabitants’ lifestyle has thus been improved because private
parking and green areas, among other things, have been created” (Bulletin d’informations
municipales, 2009, p. 8).
Residentialisation, which is the idea of intervening on the urban texture in order to
prevent crime and delinquency, is not new. Its genealogy could be traced back to the
Anglophone concept of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design13 (CPTED). One of the
founders of that tradition is the American urbanist Jane Jacobs who argued in the 1960s that
urban renewal had destructive implications on community life and the multilayered urban
texture attached to it (Jacobs, The death and life of great American cities, 1992). Her writing
influenced the work of Oscar Newman on “defensible space” (Newman, Defensible space,
1972) and Ray Jeffery who coined the term CPTED (Jeffery, 1977), both of which are based
on the idea of crime prevention through the remodeling of urban space. The work of these
scholars constitutes a reaction to modernist urbanism, which was symptomatic of the 1950s
and 1960s. Unlike modern urbanism, which was based on central planning and state
intervention, the emphasis in CPTED is on decentralizing the planning process and on
shifting the responsibility of creating a secure environment onto local inhabitants.
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With the global neoliberal turn in the 1970s, CPTED had had an important impact
on theories of urban renewal in England and the US. Its influence reached France a decade
later and since then, it has impregnated all aspects of urban regeneration. Generally speaking,
its equivalent in the French tradition is residentialisation. In 1992, the government created an
Interministerial committee of cities (Le Comité interministériel des villes CIV) to oversee
urban renewal and its social implications. This structure introduced the idea of prevention as
a major axis in urban planning. Figure 3 shows an illustration taken from a manual about
security and urban renewal and which explain the basic residentialisation unit. The idea of
integrating prevention mechanisms within urban renewal has been institutionalized in 1997
with the creation of Local Security Contracts (contrat local de sécurité CLS).

Figure 5-3: urban renewal and security
(Institut d'aménagement et d'urbanisme de la région Île-de-France 2006: 67)
Clichy singed a first CLS in 1999 which proposes disciplinary and preventive actions
to create a safer space and to reduce criminal activity. The city signed its second CLS
contract in 2008. The new generation of CLS contracts is supposed to improve the
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communication between the police and the municipality. It aims to create mechanisms of
measurement and evaluation to assess the adequacy of specific security techniques (Dallier,
2007, p. 41).14 In order to consolidate the relationship between urban renewal and security,
the ANRU has made the funding of any project conditional upon its approval by the local
police who is supposed to examine the plans and provide a feedback to planners and
developers. At a later stage, the police can send experts to the construction site to ensure its
proposals are being implemented in a proper fashion. The project is required to enhance the
“fluidity of movement” as well as “to get rid of passages with dead ends.” The ANRU also
provides funding in case the city is interested in establishing a video-surveillance network
(Institut d'aménagement et d'urbanisme de la région Île-de-France, 2006, p. 18).
The leading research center in the field of urbanism and urban renewal, the Institut
d'aménagement et d'urbanisme de la région Île-de-France explains, in a report about the integration of
security in urban renewal, explains that the purpose of residentisation is “to reshape the
urban environment to control urban space more efficiently, create more intimate residential
housing, and to “break” the spaces of trafficking” (2006, p. 13). In that regard,
residentialisation is considered a light intervention on urban space, as opposed to the more
costly and radical spatial processes such as demolition and construction. It aims to remodel
the inhabited environment according to neoliberal strategies while the PRU diffuses
discourses to prepare the population to accept the changes. In some cases, residentialisation
is considered insufficient to fulfill parameters of security set by the police. In these cases, a
more radical transformation is required. For example, the report describes a project that did
not get the approval of the ANRU until the municipality agreed to switched from a light
residentialisation it originally proposed, to a demolition of a high rise that the police has
requested (p. 20).
!

")*!

!
The logic of CPTED permeates all aspects of residentialisation in Clichy. It utilizes
insidious techniques to segment and control space. It’s not clear the extent to which the
police in Clichy15 is involved in CPTED but the first CLS indicate that there is a close
relationship between urban planners and the police. The ANRU clearly suggests that the
police gives its approval before a project is implemented. In any case the mayor does
everything in his power to make the police feel at home in Clichy. After justifying the police
racial profiling in Clichy by explaining that “the delinquents’ “robot portrait” has very few
distinctive traits: globally it fits the profile of the large majority of the population, especially
the young one […]” (Dilain, 2006, pp. 157-8). More importantly, the mayor is exasperated
with the inhabitants’ antagonistic relationship with police agents. He notes, “young
delinquents live “like fish in water” in the neighborhoods and the police is globally rejected”
(p. 159). According to him, one of the priorities of urban renewal in general, and
residentialisation more specifically, is to reverse such a relationship. The construction of a
large police station at the center of the public housing projects represents an important step
forward in that direction.
By delimiting the private and the public clearly, the intention of urban planners is to
facilitate the police surveillance and intervention. Those who don’t belong to a space are
either denied access or made uncomfortable. Figure 4 shows the market in Clichy
surrounded by several housing projects and their upcoming residentialisation. These two
projects were considered two massive and developers decided to segment and fence them.
Several issues are taken into consideration when developers decided to create new
boundaries. One of the problems that planners attempt to solve is drug dealing.
Conversations with architects and inhabitants show that one of the pressing issues is the
eradication of drug dealing activities. Urban developers are aware that such activities don’t
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stop right away. Previous cases have shown that when a space is residentialized, drug dealing
repositions itself and look for ‘friendlier’ spaces. Inhabitants living in public housing in Le
Bas-Clichy, which is located outside the perimeter of the PRU, have complained during an
interview16, after the residentialisation of several projects in Le Haut-Clichy. They explained
that a segment of the dealing activity was routed towards their neighborhood because of the
fencing and securitization that took place in Le Haut-Clichy. The second question concerns
everyday degradation of the building and its surrounding areas. By deploying multiple
residentialisation techniques, developers hope to prevent such activities. Their aim on the
long term is to forge a new subjectivity among the inhabitants by pushing them to embrace
whole-heartedly the idea of private and residentialized space.

Figure 5-4: Residentialisation in orange around housing projects (Clichy Magazine,
2008-09)
Another central challenge for planners is to neutralize negative ‘elements’ residing
within public housing undergoing a process of residentialisation. Developers who work in
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Clichy often complain about delinquents who live within the housing projects because of
their potential to undermine the impact of residentialisation17. CPTED was initially
developed as a set of urban techniques to prevent criminal activity coming from outside.
Such techniques are not as efficient when applied in poor and marginal spaces where the
potential ‘criminal population’ resides inside. It’s comprehensible therefore that developers
encounter problems in adapting CPTED in Clichy. Segmenting the terrain and creating more
efficient spaces of flow might not be sufficient from the standpoint of the municipality or
planners. Other techniques need to be employed in a space such as Clichy.
One of the central goals of urban renewal in Clichy is the deployment of CPTED
modalities in various spaces, without alarming a population that has learned to be suspicious
of any governmental intervention in their city. More specifically, the PRU has been
introducing one of the two principles that Ray Jeffery, the father of CPTED, cherishes most.
It consists of creating a “natural surveillance” in what he calls “defensible spaces.” These
spaces create a safe sphere where residents can observe their surrounding environment to
prevent delinquent activity from taking place. According to CPTED, it is also essential that
the potential delinquent realizes that he might be under “natural surveillance.” The objective
for planners is to allow the inhabitant to “see and be seen” in a continuous fashion. For
example, the fences that developers use in Clichy are either see-through or of a limited
height to allow residents to have a view on the street. The same principle applies for hedges
when they are utilized. On a different register but following the same principle, the
municipality has been spending enormous amounts of money to establish a robust and vast
lighting network to facilitate the “natural surveillance” of different neighborhoods. Planners
argue drug dealers, who have been breaking the bulbs in the past to work peacefully during
the night, will not be able to sabotage the new network easily.
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The different spatial mechanisms that developers employ in Clichy, create spaces
where people can ““see and be seen.” The information travels in both directions. Unlike
Foucault’s panopticon where information is transmitted only in one direction, the
disciplinary residentialisation in Clichy represents an attempt to establish a schema where
every individual can potentially take part in the disciplinary network. If successful, planners
would help the municipality and the police to keep an eye on dangerous spaces at all time.
However, ethnographic observations and conversations with residents suggest that many of
the youth gather information about the police’s habits and their movements in the city. It is
also clear that most youth and a good number of adults in Clichy respect an omnipresent
“law of silence” that seems to be articulated around racial lines. The principle of “seeing and
being seen” which might be effective in downtown London or Paris, don’t necessarily have
the same effect in marginal suburbs. It is doubtful that residentialisation would reverse the
suburban culture and planners are well aware of that. To improve their rate of success, they
don’t hesitate to employ other spatial techniques such as the dispersal of potentially
dangerous structures. The study of how the choice of a site and a design for the new mosque
will highlight this procedure.

5.4.3. The Grand Mosque: An Ideal-Type
The construction of a new mosque in Clichy represents an important example of
how the municipality is attempting to control the Muslim Afro-French population. Few
years ago, after long deliberations with the inhabitants, the city decided to replace the current
mosque with a new one. The municipality was probably motivated by the potential to
translate such a decision into favorable electoral votes, but more importantly, it wanted to
conquer important political and social spaces. Examining the displacement of the mosque
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from its old location to its new one will shed light on how disciplinary mechanisms are
conceived and deployed in Clichy.
Bilal Mosque, which is located behind a coffee shop in the market and is surrounded
by public housing units (see figure 5), has been the target of multiple disciplinary
technologies. It was initially a storage area that local inhabitants converted into a mosque. It
is the largest Muslim worshiping space in Clichy, and is used along with two apartments
converted for the same purpose. Bilal Mosque is accessible only through a narrow passage.
Its location makes it potentially a dangerous space from the perspective of the police and
intelligence services. Since 9-11 many such places have been put under close scrutiny and
surveillance. This explains why Abderrahmane Bouhout, the imam who supervises the
mosque, is a sympathizer of the UMP, the ruling party of Nicholas Sarkozy and is also close
to the Moroccan regime who keeps good relationships with imams, throughout France and
with the approval of the French state, to control Moroccan citizens.
The mosque became one of the symbolic places during the youth revolts of 2005. It
acquired a national stature and was very mediatized because politicians and journalists alike,
used it to tarnish the image of a legitimate youth revolts by turning their fight into a clash of
civilization between a Christian world and a Muslim mob. After the death of Zyed and
Bouna, the youth started burning cars during the night, to express their anger towards the
police who let their friends die in an electric plant without rescuing them (AFP, 2009). The
population requested an official inquiry from the government to get clarifications about the
tragic deaths. But the government refused and claimed the police was not involved in any
chasing of the youth (Toscer, 2005). Later, the government retracted from its initial position
and recognized the pursuit of the youth by the police. When the revolts started, Bilal
Mosque became one of the important platforms where the population was debating the
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death of the two teenagers and the revolts and was trying to appease the younger generation.
The police presence was dense and provocative. During the first three days, the revolts
didn’t spread beyond Clichy and their intensity was starting to decrease. On October 30th
however, the police attacked Bilal Mosque with tear gas while Nicholas Sarkozy, minister of
interior at the time, turned a blind eye on the escalation. In addition to tear gas inside the
mosque, the police harassed and humiliated the population that assembled in and around the
mosque. From that point and on, the youth revolts spread to many poor suburbs throughout
France and during three weeks, they became a national conundrum for the government. The
mosque was the object of close scrutiny for the media and the police during and after the
revolts (André, 2006).
Spatially speaking, Bilal Mosque is located within the infamous and much publicized
neighborhood of Les Bosquets. Eric Raoult, an MP in the ruling party, once described Les
Bosquets as “a ghetto where public housing administrators stack foreign families like
radioactive waste” (Montvalon, 2005). His description might seem extreme but in reality it
represents a narrative that is well ingrained in the French imaginary. The presence of a
mosque in such a neighborhood revives many mainstream phantasms about Islam. For
example, Muslims are sometimes believed to conspire against the republic and Islam is often
considered as incompatible with the secular ideals of the nation. On October 30th, after the
police’s attack on Bilal Mosque, local mediators attempted to speak with the youth to avoid
an escalation of the anger and violence. French and Western mainstream media chose to
present the event as a confrontation between two irreconcilable paradigms. On the one hand
the French republic, represented by the police, and on the other, the local population,
composed essentially of devout Muslims. Some segments of the media chose to present the
mediators as religious fanatics who tried to calm down the youth by shouting “Allah Akbar”
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(Allah is the Greatest). Ivan Rioufol explains in Le Figaro, a right wing newspaper, that during
the riots the government was unfairly presented as the oppressor. Therefore, it was unable to
integrate the rioters back into the national community. The journalist adds, “the state
appeared as weak in the eyes of those who viewed a conquering Islam as their point of
reference. On Monday evening, the "brothers" helped maintain order in Clichy by shouting
"Allah Akbar!” Since then they have requested and obtained the withdrawal of the
police”(Rioufol, 2005). The indignation of the journalist is clear. More importantly however,
to explain the eruption of the revolts, he employs a register that blames Islam and its
irreconcilable roots with the western world. This register was unfortunately symptomatic of
mainstream coverage in general. Le Monde, the most popular liberal daily, published an
article on November 3rd that opens in its first paragraph with “their arms were up in the air
and they were shouting “Allah Akbar!” with a loud voice. They were walking around the
housing projects to ask their “brothers” to remain calm”(Bronner & Smolar, Quand les "
frères " musulmans tentent de ramener le calme, 2005). The mediatization and repetition of
Islamic exclamations, in addition to a continuous footage of youngsters running in all
directions in the vicinity of Bilal Mosque after the attack of the police set the tone for a
caricatural media coverage. The media representation of the events attempted to relegate
Clichy and its inhabitants to a space located outside the boundaries of the French republic.
The epicenter of this foreign terrain was Bilal Mosque. Even the socialist Mayor of Clichy
presented an insulting image of Muslims. When asked about the place of Islam in Clichy, he
stated, “[t]he Muslims are very many in Clichy and in Le Plateau of Clichy-Montfermeil.” He
added, “Initially, there were “caves.” They removed some Muslims out and put them in a socalled mosque made of whatever comes to hand and situated in an old commercial center.
That was Bilal Mosque, the one that became notorious during the events of 2005”
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(Dhoquois, Deux maires courages: Dialogue sur la crise des banlieues, 2008, pp. 128-9).
The implications of the revolts on the construction of a new mosque are crucial. The
PRU contract, which was published in 2004, a year before the outburst of the 2005 revolts,
doesn’t mention the new mosque. Since the mosque is not funded nor built by the city, it is
understandably absent from the convention (La Communauté d'Agglomération de Clichysous-Bois/ Montfermeil, 2004). However, after the revolts, in 2007, when the third
amendment of the PRU convention was published (La Commuauté d'agglomération de
Clichy-sous-Bois / Montfermeil, 2007), the document mentioned that the municipality has
decided to provide a terrain for the construction of the new mosque and added that the
initial land allocated for that purpose was modified. The document doesn’t provide further
information about the reasons for which the terrain was modified. The inhabitants explained
during several conversations that after long deliberations and contentious negotiations
between on the one hand, Mrs. Xavier Lemoine and Claude Dilain (respectively the mayors
of Montfermeil and Clichy-sous-Bois), and on the other the Muslim communities in both
cities, the municipalities decided to allocate a new terrain for the construction of the
Mosque. Montfermeil’s right wing mayor was initially against the erection of a Mosque in the
agglomeration. In an article published in the Israeli daily, Haaretz, Lemoine explains the
significance of his Manichean combat:
it’s either them or us. If they win, we are dead ducks. I am a proud French Catholic
and I have no intention of living as a ’dhimmi’ (a non-Muslim enjoying protected
status in a Muslim country - D.B.S.) in my own country. We are different from them,
and these people do not represent France. We are caught in the middle of an Islamic
war being fought all over the world - in Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Everything that happens over there has reverberations here in France and influences
the immigrants (Simon, 2006).
Muslim communities are presented as the radical alterity of Frenchness. Catholicism is
identified as the savior in a spatial combat against Islam. One year after this statement, the
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mayor of Montfermeil changed his position. Was he trying to embrace a pragmatic posture?
Was he offering multiple accounts to different audiences? Is it rather the pressure of the
population and the effective lobbying of Claude Dilain on behalf of the inhabitants of his
city that compelled Xavier Lemoine to change his mind and accept the construction of a
new mosque? A spatial examination of the issue could provide some elements to answer the
question.
For a long period, Lemoine was unwilling to accept the construction of a new
mosque anywhere close to Montfermeil. He was firmly opposed to allocate a terrain on
Etienne Laurent Street, on a land located within Clichy, because it was apparently too close
to Montfermeil. A different terrain located on the same street but few blocks away, further
in the depth of Clichy was finally chosen. The choice of the new site was carefully decided. It
had to be situated outside the infamous Les Bosquets neighborhood to keep the new
mosque at a distance from the old and degraded public housing. Furthermore, Les Bosquets
is often perceived as the epicenter of drug trafficking and other criminal activities. Many of
the inhabitants living in this neighborhood are poor or unemployed and from the
municipality’s perspective, they could be recruited by fundamentalists. The socialist mayor
explains, “It’s time to banalize the Muslim presence in our society […] In this sprit and in
order to marginalize radical imams, I accepted to work with Muslim association on the
creation of an official Mosque for the Muslims inhabitants of Clichy-sous-Bois and
Montfermeil” (Dilain, 2006, p. 167 [my emphasis]). He tackles the question of Islam as if it’s
a foreign concept to the French society. In his narrative, it become clear that he has allowed
Muslim communities to build a Mosque to domesticate a religion that ‘is out of phase’ with
the ideals of the French secular republic. He notes, “Let’s not be naïve; the eruption of Islam
in the public space has created a strife that requires a republican solution. I do not approve
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of too many women, integrally veiled in a black clothing that shows their eyes only, to
circulate in Clichy. I do not approve of the pressure and interdiction that young girls have to
undergo to oblige them to behave and look in a certain way” (Dilain, 2006, p. 163). When
Islam spills over into the public sphere, it’s necessary to take charge and attempt to put it
back into its proper place. The construction of the new mosque should be understood from
that perspective.
The mayor of Montfermeil softened his position concerning the construction of a
mosque but was totally opposed to the erection of a minaret. The minaret is often
considered a sign of Muslim conquest in French public discourse. The recent Swiss ban on
the construction of new minarets through a referendum in November 2009 is symptomatic
of a European neo-conservative ideology that presents these towers as outposts of a future
Muslim invasion. In the case of Clichy, after long deliberation, the two mayors decided to
give a permit for the construction of a Mosque with a green laser beam that would illuminate
the sky five times a day to announce the prayers’ time. The laser beam is not the result of a
consensus in the city; it is simply a lesser evil for many non-Muslims. To reconcile
apprehensive citizens, Dilain suggests that he agreed to build a new mosque to prevent
Muslim communities from ‘colonizing’ public spaces. He explains that no public funds will
be utilized to build the mosque and adds, “[w]e have been very clear, we want a transparent
financing of the mosque. We will tolerate the recitation of the prayer in Arabic but the imam
will have to deliver his preach in French” (Clichy_Magazine, 2005, p. 12). Since Muslims
cannot pray in any language but Arabic, the mayor is simply saying that he will allow the
Muslim community to pray. More interestingly however, Dilain’s statement shows that
visibility and transparence are the main priorities when it comes to the mosque. A spatial
analysis shows that the discourse of visibility governs the logics lying behind the
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construction of the mosque.

Figure 5-5: The initial location of the Mosque on the periphery of Les Bosquets and
its new location on Etienne Laurent Street
Different spatial mechanisms are deployed to control the Muslim population living
in Clichy. The Mosque is moved from its initial location and put in a ‘safer’ space (see figure
5). The new location is at the angel of Etienne Laurent and Romain Rolland streets. This
exposure makes the new edifice highly visible compared to Bilal Mosque which was hidden
behind the market, and was accessible only through a narrow passage. Larbi Chouaieb, the
president of a religious association that lobbied for the construction of the mosque explains,
“the mosque is open towards the city and the world and is the fruit of an exemplary
cooperation between associative, municipal and technical actors” (Clichy_Magazine, 2009, p.
14, [my emphasis]). The architectural visibility of the future Mosque doesn’t seem to satisfy
the two mayors who think that it should be more exposed from all sides. This is probably
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why the PRU decided to create a new grid of streets around the edifice but more specifically
on its third side, making the Mosque even more visible from outside (see figure 6). On the
fourth side there is a center for economic activities, which is managed by the municipality.
The municipality has also decided to build a school on the other side of the street, facing the
west segment of the mosque and renovate another school on the east side. A parking will
occupy the terrain located in the back, while a McDonald already exists in the vicinity. The
map shows that the mosque is surrounded mostly by non-residential spaces. Preventing the
construction of residential building in the neighboring areas of the mosque seems to be the
main concern of the municipality. Finally, the new location keeps the mosque at a very close
distance from the new police station, which is currently under construction. On a symbolic
plane, one could view the positioning of the new worship edifice in between two schools, a
police station, a McDonald, and an economic activity center represents a form of
domestication. Muslim worshipers are invited to readjust their religion to the principles of
the secular and republican school that bans girls who wear the veil from accessing its spaces.
Muslim communities are also encouraged to embrace a neoliberal culture, of which a
McDonald and a center for economic activities located on a free economic zone are the
symptomatic signs. If neoliberal and secular acculturations don’t function as planned, the
police station is a reminder that coercive force could be used as a last resort.
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Figure 5-6: Police station (green); New Mosque (Red); Center for Economic
Activities (yellow); Schools (orange); new streets (blue); parking lot (black);
McDonald (white).
The location of the new mosque as well as its implantation within such an urban grid
represents a crude implementation of two basic Foucauldian disciplinary mechanisms. The
first one consists of exposing the new structure to a gaze that puts it under constant scrutiny.
In a famous chapter about Panopticism, Foucault lays out the disciplinary principles,
according to which inmates are incarcerated within individual cells. He explains, “[t]he
panoptic mechanism arranges spatial unities that make it possible to see constantly and to
recognize immediately […] Full lighting and the eye of a supervisor capture better than
darkness, which ultimately protected. Visibility is a trap” (1977, p. 200). To secure a smooth
functioning of power, the aim of the Panopticon is to convince inmates that they are under
the permanent gaze of their guardian. The second principle consists of a radical
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fragmentation of space as in the case of the new mosque, which is separated by streets from
its surroundings. The purpose for dislocating the Mosque from its original organic location
is to disrupt activities that might trouble the logic of the secular republic. Foucault describe
partition in the following terms:
One must eliminate the effects of imprecise distributions, the uncontrolled
disappearances of individuals, their diffuse circulation, their unusable and dangerous
coagulation; it was a tactic of anti-desertion, anti-vagabondage, anti-concentration.
Its aim was to establish presences and absences, to know where and how to locate
individuals, to set up useful communications, to interrupt others, to be able at each
moment to supervise the conduct of each individual, to assess it, to judge it, to
calculate its qualities or merits (1977, p. 143).
The fragmentation of the terrain prevents the mosque from ‘coagulating’ with the
surrounding spaces and forming an ‘incoherent urbanism.’ The new location is therefore
separated from the adjacent buildings by streets and public institutions. Even when it comes
to residential buildings located in the adjacent spaces, the municipality has been choosing the
families who will occupy the future apartments very carefully.

Figure 5-7: A Model of the New Mosque
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In addition to fragmenting the terrain surrounding the mosque, the architect chose
to build a patio as the entrance to enable external observers to have a panoramic view of the
different architectural units by simply glancing at the edifice. The mayor was closely involved
in the choice of the architect and the design of the mosque. He explains to a journalist that
the Muslim associations wanted to build a replica of the Grand Mosque of Istanbul but he
was opposed to the project. He explains his unenthusiastic reaction by noting that what “is
appropriate for Istanbul is not for Clichy.” He clarifies that the structure of the new mosque
is open and well integrated to the surrounding urban renewal. According to him, the
architecture is well adapted to the France of the XXI century. He ends on a more negative
note: “[w]e won’t be able to close all worshiping locations. Some of them are very
clandestine and not very welcoming. We don’t control all of them and some of the stories
about these places are incredible” (Dhoquois, 2008, pp. 129-30).
The main concern behind the new design is therefore motivated by a radical reversal
of the pattern that governs Bilal Mosque. The municipality hopes to end the clandestine
condition of spaces that presently attract Muslim worshipers. The emphasis is put on making
the new architecture as transparent as possible. To enable what urban planners term “natural
surveillance,” the mosque shall be visible from all sides. The architecture seems to abide to a
basic Foucauldian disciplinary techniques that would prevent Muslim radicals from engaging
in any potentially illegal or terrorist behavior. But the new mosque’s architecture facilitates
the surveillance of street activity from inside. The architecture follows the principles of
CPTED. Unlike Foucault’s panopticon, which channel information in one direction, the
architecture of the new mosque allows information to circulate from both sides. Instead of
Foucault’s “faceless gaze,” the new experts of urbanism recommend ‘transparence’ from
both sides. The mosque represents another instance where the principle of “seeing and being
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seen” is deployed to deter a delinquent from engaging in criminal activities (LoudierMalgouyres, 2004, p. 34). The gaze is omnipresent.

5.5.

Conclusion
This chapter argues that the renewal project in Clichy deploys three important

mechanisms to discipline urban spaces inhabited by Afro-French and Muslim populations.
The PRU has appropriated the logic of CPTED by remodeling it and making it more
appropriate for the French context. Fragmentation, enclosure, and dispersion have been
deployed in Clichy to break what local and national politicians view as “lawless zones,” and
integrate them into the dominant neoliberal logic. As shown in this study, some of these
techniques are less effective in poor suburbs than they are in central metropolitan areas such
as wealthy and middle class neighborhoods in Paris. The problem with their transposition
into a marginal enclave like Clichy is that these techniques are supposed to protect a ‘normal’
population from external elements who might undermine power relations within its spaces.
A different narrative unfolds however, when undesirable elements are located within the
space where the intervention is taking place. Are disciplinary mechanisms of CPTED
enough to intimidate Afro-French and to dis-empower the spaces they inhabit?
The second question is more theoretical and concerns the relationship between
disciplinary spaces and productive forces as defined in the Foucauldian perspective. Foucault
is certainly critical of economic extremism and his theoretical project can be read through
that angle. He points out that the extraction of “surplus of power” is an important question
with a logic that is independent of the ontology of capital. However, he initially proposed the
concept of disciplinary power as a mechanism that turns disobedient individuals into docile
and productive social actors. In Discipline and Punish for example, the management of space is
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directly linked to the logic of capital. In the case of the renewal program in Clichy, and more
generally, the national program for urban renewal in France, the disciplinary mechanism
don’t seem to be used to integrate Afro-French into the labor force. In a conjuncture of
austerity and high unemployment rates, it’s very probable that the aim of renewal is to
integrate marginal population into the conventional circuit of capital.
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CHAPTER 6
SPATIAL RACIALIZATION AND AFRO-FRENCH INSURGENT DIASPORAS

6.1.

Introduction
How relevant is the notion of the nation as a cultural practice and a political

constellation in the lives of Afro-French diasporic subjects? This chapter explores the
political and analytical intersections between “Afro-French diasporas” and the “French
republic”? It examines poststructuralist conceptualization of diaspora through the work of
leading contemporary thinkers and explores their relevance in the context of postcolonial
France. In order to study the role of urban planning in shaping Afro-French cultures, I trace
in the first section the various ways space was racialized by spatial techniques. Using the
concept of spatial governmentality, I look at three different spaces that were shaped by
sovereign, disciplinary, and biopolitical powers. In the second part, I examine Afro-French
diasporas through the lens of Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy. More specifically, I analyze the
different subject positions that the diasporic subject occupies focusing on empirical
fieldwork I conducted in Clichy-sous-Bois. The narratives of the projects’ residents highlight
how deterritorialized subjects shape their modes of identification with their homeland as well
as with the host nation. The chapter argues on the one hand that Stuart Hall concept of
“differance” and Paul Gilroy notion of the “changing same” are powerful tools to examine
the lifeworlds of Afro-French and to delineate the boundaries around their diasporic
cultures. On the other hand, the chapter argues that the concept of Afro-French can be
traced back in the longue durée of French colonial history but it is only in the past few
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decades that Afro-French became a diasporic group that shares an experience of the
“changing same.” While one can find many instances of solidarity and complimentarity in
the previous centuries, the spatial patterns and geographic distributions imposed by the
French state prevented the intermixing of the different Afro-French communities in the
colonies and the metropole. The situation changed rapidly since all these communities
started sharing the spaces within public housing since the mid 1960s. I argue that the
consolidation of Afro-French diasporas should be located at that critical moment.

6.2.

Spatial governmentality and Afro-French subjectivities
Using spatial governmentality as a point of entry, the preceding chapters examined

the significance of spatial racialization in Clichy-sous-Bois and the impact of the
technologies of power on Afro-French subjectivities. The study takes urban renewal as a
point of departure to comprehend the different techniques that planners and other experts
employ to construct Afro-French subjectivities. At the same time, it’s important to posit
urban renewal within a larger socio-historical framework. It represents an assemblage of
power and knowledge that transcends the spatiality and temporality of Clichy. Architects
involved in renewal are the product of governmental technologies that should be studied in
the longue durée as well as the extensive imperial geographies.
The previous chapters studied three main dimensions of spatial governmentality.
These dimensions represent the three axes of the foucauldian nexus of power. The second
chapter explored the impact of sovereign power on the production of racialized spaces in
Paris and the colonies. The spaces that Afro-French occupied in Paris were racialized
according to logics that depended not only on the ethnic origins of the group who inhabited
them but also logics inherited from the colonial era. The third chapter shifted the focus to
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analyze the modes of racialization of Afro-French in public housing in Clichy. Examining
the confluence of two types of power, namely sovereign and biopolitical powers, the chapter
showed that spaces can be racialized according to conflicting and sometimes opposing
logics. The fourth chapter scrutinized the urban space in Clichy through the lens of
discipline, fragmentation, and training. The impact of each dimension of spatial
governmentality has distinct implications on the racialization of Afro-French.
Let’s start with sovereign power, which is to a large extent attached to the
production and reproduction of the nation-state. It delineates the boundaries that separate
the inside from the outside of an imagined community. Chapters one and two have shown
that the geographic meaning of the French nation was in a constant flux. For example, a
historical investigation of the colonial era would show that the French nation had various
meanings, including territories on the other side of the Mediterranean when “Algeria” turned
into “French Algeria.” When colonial administrators had high expectation for the Greater
France they proposed a geography in which “[t]he Mediterranean crosses France as the Seine
crosses Paris” Invalid source specified. to show that they were serious about their colonial
territories and had no intention to giving up. Le Corbusier took up the challenge of
integrating in his planning North Africa into Greater France. He tried to produce new
colonial subjects through a novel urban planning. He proposed to integrate evolved Muslim
in the European city in Algiers. To make Algeria an intrinsic part of France, the Algerian
population had to be ‘assimilated’ into the French imagined community. Le Corbusier’s
plans and more generally, colonial urbanism was driven by this ideal until the beginning of
the Algerian war. Sovereign power determined what lied inside the nation and what was
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outside. “The outside” of the nation constituted a radical alterity regardless of whether these
spaces were geographically located within metropolitan France or not.
In the Parisian context, extra-national spaces were more or less porous depending on
political priorities and specific needs of racializing Afro-French communities. For example,
the bidonvilles were the least porous spaces while public housing in the 1970s was much
more open. Spaces located outside the purview of sovereign power are paradoxical. On the
one hand, they symbolize an outside that is necessary for nation building. This is the case of
the Casbah in Algiers and the bidonville in Paris. On the other hand, they show the
limitations and weaknesses of sovereign power because they theoretically represent spaces
from which such a power is banned. Ironically, “external” spaces become the target of that
same sovereign power because they keep it “out.” The colonial force has constantly tried to
penetrate the Casbah to open it up because it cannot resist the temptation of colonizing new
spaces. In the metropolitan context, the French police (Brigade Z more specifically) has
often reproduced the colonial logic of spatial regulation within the bidonville. When the
French authorities realized that the ‘colonization’ of the bidonville was becoming too
expansive and was doomed to fail, they decided to erase the space entirely.
The study shows that three types of power have been used in Clichy to shape space.
These types of power do not target a specific group but rather all Afro-French communities
at once. The mechanisms that were initially deployed to racialize a specific ethnic group in
the past were now utilized against all groups at once. The previous chapters have examined
the implications of each type of power on Afro-French.
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Firstly, the deployment of sovereign power to racialize Afro-French living in Clichy
was a different version from the one utilized in the colonies or the Parisian bidonvilles.
According to residents who have been living in Clichy for a long period, Afro-French were
not present in the city until the mid-1960s when public housing became more accessible to
them. There were a few exceptions since several Antillean and Maghrebian families were
offered apartments in Clichy since the mid sixties. With the increasing number of AfroFrench moving to the projects in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the communist municipality
took several measures to stop the flow. It initially reacted by proposing a tolerance threshold
that many communist mayors were trying to implement in other cities. The spatial apartheid
was evidently not as rigid as in the case of the bidonville but with increasing numbers of
Afro-French residents in Clichy, the separation started to slowly materialize in the housing
projects. In the beginning, Afro-French were put in specific building and later they were
confined to particular neighborhoods and banned from others. This is still the case today in
Clichy since white residents occupy the better projects such as La Pelouse and La Vallée des
Anges. The youth are often prevented, through smooth and coercive mechanisms, to leave
the city or to go to areas where white French live. They are also discouraged from spending
time in the wealthy neighboring cities such as Le Raincy. Furthermore, public transportation
makes it difficult for Afro-French to go to Paris. The police harass them whenever they
leave the housing projects by checking their IDs. The metro fare is one of the smoother
mechanisms used against poorer populations since it dissuades them from going to Paris.
Most youth have their own stories of police harassment. Amadou who is eighteen, a French
citizen with Malian origins, told me “one day I had to go through eight ID checks. They [the
police] just wanted to mess with me. For the most part it was the same cops. They don’t
want us to leave the ghetto that’s why they harass us. I don’t think the renewal project is
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going to change any of that.” Every black and brown young man has experienced this type
of harassment once they leave the perimeter of the project. The checks and harassment
intensify if a young man decides to wander in a neighborhood with individual housing. To
avoid the harassment, the vast majority of the youth end up avoiding this type of
transgression by staying most of their time within the perimeter of the projects.
Keeping a safe space for the white population is a complex and multilayered process.
It takes the form of direct harassment but it can also be the result of subtler mechanisms.
White parents, for example, can exercise a symbolic pressure to put Afro-French back in
their place. The Municipal Service for the Youth (SMJ) (a neighborhood center where the
youth can perform urban dance or participate in rap workshops), represents a refuge for
some youth. Nadia who is seventeenth is one of the talented female rappers whom I initially
met at the SMJ and had seen every week thereafter. She was very dedicated and had a
passion for the music she was performing. I was taken by surprise when she told me about
her earlier enthusiasm for classical music. She used to go to the conservatory, which is
located along with the public library in a mostly white neighborhood with individual housing.
In that regard, one can identify a spatial distribution of municipal institutions organized
along a racial axis. The conservatory and the library are located in the white neighborhood
and require fifteen-minutes walk from the closest housing projects. They attract mostly a
white audience; Nadia felt awkward at the Conservatory because she was the only “nonFrench to attend the music classes” as she puts it. Nadia is born in France and has a French
citizenship but she felt out of place because she was the only non-white at the conservatory.
Her dedication for classical music was not enough to feel at home at the conservatory. The
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deployment of sovereign power to preserve the purity of a territory doesn’t require the
intervention of the police in this case.
The racial line is maintained in both directions: on one side, Afro-French territories
and white on the other. Whites don’t often venture into the housing projects because they
feel insecure. Many avoid going ‘there’ because they think it’s too dangerous. During a
meeting the municipality organized to discuss the future redevelopment of the city-center, a
white resident told the audience that things are much better now at the commercial center of
Chêne Pointu. He explained, “in the past there was a small door at the entrance of the
commercial center and it was extremely dangerous to walk there; they would cut your throat
to take your wallet.” More surprisingly, if a white person ventures into the area of the
housing projects, the police warn her. Samir was born and lived most of his life in Clichy and
is currently a student in a Parisian university. His parents migrated from Algeria some thirty
years ago. He has several good white friends who live outside the projects. He was bitter
when he told me what had happened to his white friend who came to visit him a year ago
for the first time. He said,
Last year, I was spending some time with my French (read white) friend at the Park
in Clichy. When he left, the project, the cops started asking him questions and
searching him but they couldn’t find anything. They asked him what he was doing in
Clichy. The cops assume that the only reason a French guy would come here is to
buy drugs. They finally asked him not to come back because Clichy is too dangerous
for a French guy like him.
When boundaries between white and Afro-French spaces are transgressed, sovereign power
is mobilized to re-impose spatial racialization and prevent any racial mixing. Sovereign power
conflates different categories such as “whiteness,” “Frenchness,” and “white spaces.” They
become one. The paradox is that it acts against the mechanisms of “integration” of Afro-
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French that the state had launched a few decades ago. The sovereign recreates “the
bidonville” within public housing by imposing strict racial identifiers for each territory.
Sovereign power rejects racial mixing that political leaders have tried to implement in the
1960s and 1970s after they dismantled the bidonvilles and dispersed the population. The
police patrol the streets of Clichy to enforce a precise racial cartography. Afro-French
became one category in public housing; it doesn’t matter if they are Caribbean, Maghrebian,
or Sub-Saharan.
Secondly, disciplinary power was deployed in Clichy as a middle range technology to
regulate the movements of Afro-French. Disciplinary power, as explained in the fourth
chapter, was utilized in the city to fracture an Afro-French culture that started to emerge as
the percentage of black and brown communities became sizable. At the same time, an
increasing number of white French left their apartments in public housing to move to white
neighborhoods. In Clichy, urban planners utilized the street as a strategic spatial tool to
fragment territories perceived as too Afro-French. The street achieves several goals as we
have seen in the previous chapter. It fragments non-white communities that might represent
a threat to the Republic. The street allows also for a clearer delimitation between the public
and the private. In that regard, planners use it to achieve a neoliberal agenda.
Residentialization, which is one of the spatial dimensions of neoliberalism, is possible only
when projects are fragmented into smaller entities. Architects explain that the combination
of on the one hand a clear separation between the private and the public, and
residentialisation on the other reduce or prevent delinquency. In reality, delinquency
migrates and readapts but doesn’t disappear as residents have explained to me multiple
times. A resident of Chêne Pointu, a project located outside the perimeter of renewal,

!

#"%!

!
remarked that the ongoing redevelopment has very detrimental implications on their lives.
He explained that drug dealers leave the area affected by renewal and come to Chêne Pointu
to sell their products.
Finally, biopolitical power has been extensively used to undermine “the ghetto” from
inside. The municipality implemented three programs revolving around public health, gender
equality, and social mixing to intervene in public housing and reshape Afro-French
subjectivities. The effect of these programs is uneven but the main intension was to erase
Afro-Frenchness through a process of interpellation. Biopolitics speaks to subjects by
producing needs and desires. Unlike sovereign power, which achieves its goals through
coercive force, and disciplinary power, which utilizes insidious and capillary techniques to
reshape space, biopolitics deploys subtle programs to alter subjectivities. Biopolitics
intervenes in private and public spaces by interpellating Afro-French youth and proposing to
them an authentically French paradigm. The spaces in which it is deployed are much more
porous than those inhabited by sovereign power. At the same time, the study has shown that
no separation is possible between sovereign, disciplinary, and biopolitical spaces. Mitchell
Dean (2002) reminds us that biopolitics is about the democratization of sovereign power or
what he calls the “delegation of sovereignty” over to private citizens. In the twenty-first
century, sovereign power is not attached to the figure of the king as it used to in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Today, every citizen can be sovereign and use this type
of power as a tool within a larger biopolitical regime.
While the three types of power can be complementary as Dean (2002) and Nealon
(2008) have argued, the preceding chapter has highlighted some divergences in certain
situations. For example, there is a latent need to end spaces where there are high
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concentrations of Afro-French. This is why the bidonvilles were eradicated in the 1960s and
1970s. Instead of the aspired for dispersion of the population, new concentrations of AfroFrench emerged in public housing. This is a latent conflict between sovereign power, which
produces alterity, and biopolitics, which interpellates and strives to integrate. This leaves us
with an important question. How do we explain the conflict between these different forms
of power? Is there an overarching logic that drives spatial governmentality?
William Connolly’s (1991) approach to identity and difference might help us
comprehend the conflicting logics and the opposing forms of racialization. Connolly’s
analysis shows that what constitutes identity and difference is unstable and fluid. What
matters from the standpoint of the nation-state, is the consolidation of hegemonic logics
over bodies, representations, identities, and narratives. Afro-French communities constitute
a problem for the nation-state because their diasporic cultures/spaces trouble the dominant
narrative. From the standpoint of the nation, the figure of the diasporic oscillates between
being, on the one hand, an interiority, and on the other, an exteriority. The purpose of an
exteriority/exclusion from the perspective of the nation-state, is to strengthen the dominant
discourse by drawing boundaries around an authentic and uncontaminated citizen who
inhabits the ‘inside.’ Interiority/inclusion serves another logic. It pretends that the nationstate can absorb differences because of its location above and beyond any specific cultures.
In this instance, the diasporic is posited as a specificity. She is portrayed as a multi-cultural
citizen (space) who enriches the nation-state but who doesn’t alter its essence or core values.
Biopolitical power functions at this level by integrating Afro-French subjects (spaces) and
accepting some of their differences, as long as they don’t threaten the core values of the
nation. Sovereign power on the other hand rejects difference and produces alterity.
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Disciplinary mechanisms are integrated into sovereign or biopolitical powers in a process of
intensification as explained by Nealon.
William Connolly explains this process in his widely debated book, Identity/Difference
(1991). He contends that the processes of identification or differentiation require a middle
figure, or a mediator. He notes that the processes of identification has to be grounded in a
logic of equivalence by which certain identities are fixed while others are not, depending on
the socially organized differences. In this configuration, difference and identity are dynamic
and they undergo constant change. During the construction of the national narrative, it is
therefore important to include certain differences within what defines the nation. The
nation-state draws the boundaries on how much difference is acceptable within its imagined
community. The notions of “difference” and “identity” are both calibrated in relation to the
concept of “the Other.” When the nation faces a crisis, it rearticulates a new logic of
equivalence that “involves the conversion of some differences into otherness, into evil or
one of its numerous surrogates” (1991, p.64). Connolly explains that nationalism is a
constant process of absorption and rejection of difference. Difference plays two distinct
roles depending on the national needs and the historical contingency. Diasporic subjects play
a central role in this configuration where difference travels from “sameness” to “otherness”
and the other way around. For example, the diasporic can be demonized during a cultural or
economic crisis. She can also become part of a ‘multicultural’ community during a period of
prosperity.
The differences within Afro-French communities are undeniable; they are the
outcome of their different historical paths, varied cultures, and diverse societies. The danger
arises from the instrumentalization of these differences by French politicians and
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administrators to fragment Afro-French communities. In that sense, Sub-Saharan
populations have occupied, in certain cases, the position of the middle figure or mediator.
Sometimes they were pushed toward more alterity when they were compared to
Maghrebians, and were considered a malicious group. This took place in the 1990s when the
younger generation of Sub-Saharan became French citizens and refused to be treated the
way their fathers and mothers were. Prior to that period, Sub-Saharan didn’t represent a
threat similar to that of the Maghrebian population in the 1950s and 1960s during the
Algerian war. In the 1970s, when the migration door was closed to Maghrebians, it was
widely open to West Africans. Sub-Saharan were thought to be more docile and less radical
than Maghrebian and as such they were massively recruited by French employers. In the
1980s, a growing number of Central African, many of whom Christians, started migrating to
the French metropole. With their black skin and Christian religion, African were in many
ways similar to Antilleans. To borrow from Le Corbusier, Africans, like Antilleans, had the
potential to evolve and become full citizens. This situation didn’t last too long however; in
the 1980s, French society witnessed a radicalization of black Africans many of whom
embraced an Afrocentric paradigm. Unlike their parents, they younger generation refused to
be invisible or docile; in addition the French state couldn’t threaten them with the possibility
of revoking their work permit or expelling them since they were French. Furthermore, in the
1980s and 1990s, Sub-Saharans and Maghrebians lived in the same housing projects and
experienced the same challenges in their everyday lives. The trajectory of Sub-Saharan shows
how their image was altered in public discourse. In Connolly’s language: Sub-Saharan who
were different in the 1970s and 1980s became an alterity in the 1990s.

!

#")!

!
The racial cartography presented above is determined from above. The foucauldian
analytics assumes that racial subjectivities are already determined by a nexus of power. The
importance of the foucauldian framework is that it challenges the self-founding subjectivity
which is central in Western philosophy up until the emergence of structuralist and
poststrucutralist trends. The foucauldian framework questions the degree of independence
that individuals possess to construct their subjectivities. In Discipline and Punish, he writes,
These “power knowledge relations” are to be analyzed, therefore, not on the basis of
a subject of knowledge who is or is not free in relation to the power system, but, on
the contrary, the subject who knows, the objects to be known and the modalities of
knowledge must be regarded as so many effects of these fundamental implications of
power knowledge and their historical transformations. In short, it is not the activity
of the subject of knowledge that produces a corpus of knowledge, useful or resistant
to power, but power-knowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and of
which it is made up, that determines the forms and possible domains of knowledge...
(1977, pp. 27-28)
While Foucault recognizes the place of resistance in shaping these power-knowledge
relations, it’s not clear how such resistance can materialize when governmentality is at work.
It’s also not clear how struggle and resistance can constrain or reverse governmental
programs. In any case, the margin of maneuver is limited in governmentality and agency is
not always acknowledged enough. According to Foucault, subjectivity is already part of a
grid of power and as such is structured by it. It’s interpellated by specific structures that are
already in place. In such a context, it’s important to differentiate between subjectivity and
agency as Lawrence Grossberg warns us. He writes,
[w]e need to construct a theory of agency in light of contemporary critiques of a
particular historical model of agency. As a result of these critiques, we can no longer
equate agency with subjectivity. But this need not be taken to deny that people make
history, nor that they are engaged in real practices. Of course, they do it in conditions
not of their own making, and, I would add, they do it in such a way that history is
often made “behind their backs” (Grossberg, 1997, p. 323).
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The distinction that Grossberg proposes is crucial if we want to understand AfroFrenchness on the youths’ own terms. In the preceding chapters, the focus has been on how
governmentality shapes and determines subjectivities and racializes residents through spatial
techniques. The concept of diaspora is used in this chapter to highlight the agency and
resistance of Afro-French communities living in Clichy. The concept of the diasporic can
help us understand the resistance of Afro-French to the co-optation of the nation-state.
Instead of being constantly positioned in spaces of alterity and difference, the diasporic can
create a complex web that transcends the nation-state and its grammar.

6.3.

The Diasporic Condition
In what follows I explore the relevance of the concept of diaspora as presented in

the field of Cultural Studies. Such a concept can help us understand the condition of AfroFrench communities and their postcolonial struggles in public housing. The concept is also
important because it presents a constructive tension to the foucauldian framework used in
the previous chapters. In this section, I examine the concept through the work of two
scholars who draw on poststructural perspectives and whose scholarships belong roughly to
the field of Cultural Studies. More specifically, I examine the concept of diaspora in the work
of Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy and study its relevance in the French context. Such a project
opens up new possibilities for analytical examinations and strategic political alliances.
In Cultural Identity and Diaspora (1990) Stuart Hall provides a comprehensive reading
of the concept of diaspora. In this seminal article, he theorizes the complexities of Jamaican
identity in England, and explains that it occupies a subject position at the confluence of two
distinct identities. The first one is a shared collective identity in which people recognize their
own history and the heritage of their ancestors. It resists change. This form of identity
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represents what Hall calls “oneness” of a true and authentic Jamaican experience. He writes,
“This 'oneness', underlying all the other, more superficial differences, is the truth, the
essence, of 'Caribbeanness', of the black experience” (1990, p. 223). Drawing on Frantz
Fanon (1963), Hall explains that this oneness corresponds to an identity grounded in a “retelling” of the past. This is obviously not a project based on an essentialist subjectivity or
immutable being; rather, it is an imaginative rediscovery of what constitutes the Jamaican
experience. The second level of identity is, according to Hall, multivalent and dispersed. It
revolves around the singularity of each individual. It is contingent upon specific historical
events and particular spatial and social locations. This form of identity is embedded in a
“grid of power” and exists only in relation to other identities. According to this perspective,
Jamaicaness occupies a subaltern position. Only the second form of identity, Hall explains,
has the power to render ‘the colonial experience’ visible. In this case, identity is not
essentialized but is the product of specific relations of domination and subjugation.
Hall argues that “[w]e might think of black Caribbean identities as 'framed' by two
axes or vectors, simultaneously operative: the vector of similarity and continuity; and the
vector of difference and rupture.” (1990, p. 226). To explain the meaning of difference
inherent in the second dimension of identity, Hall uses the Derridian concept of differance,
which signifies both “to differ” and “to defer.” Difference in this context is a perpetual
process of becoming that prevents any closure or fixation of identity. This Derridian move,
allows Hall to refute essentialist theorization of the concept. He explains:
[the diasporic] experience as I intend it here is defined, not by essence or purity, but
by the recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity; by a conception of
'identity' which lives with and through, not despite, difference; by hybridity (Hall,
1990, p. 235).
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Clearly, Hall uses the concept of diaspora metaphorically here; it doesn’t necessarily refer to
a scattered community with an umbilical relation with a fatherland. According to him, it is
primarily a social group with a certain cultural tradition that constantly questions the
premises on which the nation-state is build.
Hall was mostly interested in providing new horizons to discuss the question of the
nation and nationalism. His conceptualization of diaspora was meant to provide political
tools to black activists struggling against British chauvinistic nationalism and neoliberal
Thatcherism of the 1980s. While there are many parallels between British and French
imperial histories, there are also significant differences. The question is whether the historical
specificities of Afro-French and Jamaican diasporas can help us examine the theoretical
relevance of Hall in the French context.
This chapter explores the political implications of the concept of Diaspora in the
context of French suburbs. While the situation in Franc differs from Britain, the past few
decades have witnessed the emergence and consolidation of an Afro-French diaspora that
shares a lot with the British counterpart. In the 1980s, Afro-French realized that Mitterrand
would not be very different from his predecessors when it comes to improving their living
situation. Filled with high hopes, Afro-French were quickly disillusioned when socialists
sized power in 1981 and prevented any significant improvement in the minorities’ living
conditions. An increasing number of Afro-French became overtly critical of French
nationalism and its negative implications on their lives. Many youngsters distanced
themselves from Frenchness in the 1990s to embrace an African identity (North or SubSaharan as well as Caribbean). This is why today Frenchness and whiteness are one in the
youth’s mind. In everyday situations, Afro-French often use the term “French” when they
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mean “white.” Blackness and Browness have many meanings but what they share is a certain
form of belonging to the African continent. Many of the youth living in Clichy don’t think
of themselves as French.
As a consequence, embracing French identity is perceived as shameful by many
young men living in Clichy. During my fieldwork, I witnessed countless situations where
Afro-French were rejecting French identity to subscribe to another form of belonging. One
of the sites of contestations over question of citizenship, belonging, and nationalism is
soccer. When the French soccer team plays against an African nation, the vast majority of
the young men I met in Clichy side against France. After the game, one can hear discussions
about it in stairways or in front of the project. The youth make a clear distinction between
“the French” team and “their” own. It’s not uncommon to hear the following in Clichy:
“our team played better than the French,” or “if the referee was less biased we would have
won the game against the French yesterday.” The probability of coming across a young man
who supports the French team against an African one is slim in Clichy. The soccer game is
perceived as a site where Frenchness can be contested. The paradox is that the majority of
the players in the French team are Black and Brown. This is why conservative personalities,
often denounce the underrepresentation of white players in the team. Reactionary
philosopher, Alain Finkielkraut explained in an interview to Haaretz:
Let's take, for example, the incidents at the soccer match between France and Algeria
that was held a few years ago. The match took place in Paris, at the Stade de France.
People say the French national team is admired by all because it is black-blanc-beur
["black-white-Arab" - a reference to the colors on France's tricolor flag and a symbol
of the multiculturalism of French society - D.M.]. Actually, the national team today is
black-black-black, which arouses ridicule throughout Europe. If you point this out in
France, they'll put you in jail, but it's interesting nevertheless that the French national
soccer team is composed almost exclusively of black players (Finkielkraut, 2005).
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In the same interview, he notes that despite the overrepresentation of minorities,
when the French team played against the Algerian, young Afro-French booed the French
national anthem and waved Algerian flags. More recently, some figures have proposed to put
a quota on the different ethnic groups that compose the team. It’s within such an oppressive
context that we should understand the attachment of the youth to African teams.
I witnessed a passionate debate about the merits of the different African soccer
teams during one of the rap workshop I was attending at the SMJ. The rap group was
composed of four young men from Maghrebian and West African origins. One of the young
men interrupted a discussion about East Coast rap that we were all engaged in to ask a
question about that night soccer game. The animator tried to prevent the discussion before it
starts but it was too late. A long and passionate debate followed; it lasted about one hour.
While the youth discussed the quality of each African team, the animator who has Malian
origins reminds everyone that they should be interested in the French team instead since
everyone is French. But his strategy didn’t pay off. Realizing that he wouldn’t be able to shift
their attention, he finally decided to take part in the discussion. He smiled and corrected
certain information about the Malian team. Seeing that I was extremely interested in the
discussion, he says, “What you’re seeing right now is the Malian in me!” I surprised by the
amount of knowledge each one of them had about the different teams. One of the youth
said, “if we play against France, we would win.” At that point another animator entered in
the room. I asked him why no one was interested in identifying with the French team?
Without waiting for further explanation of my question, he immediately interrupted me
saying, “they don’t consider us French. They don’t view us as true French. We’re not white
French.” Then he added, “the Jews have synagogues, Christians have wonderful churches
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and we still pray in caves. We don’t even have a mosque. We don’t have access to good jobs.
Only 4% of us can get a grade A job. Most jobs Maghrebians and Africans get are grade C”
(Nov 20, 2008).
The explanation of the animator shows that a benign debate about soccer in reality
represents a much more profound discussion about the conditions of Afro-French diasporas
in postcolonial France. In such circumstances, Africanness overshadows other forms of
belonging. The youth I worked with are very attached to their countries of origins especially
when they have never set foot in them. Buying a house and returning to “the homeland” in a
couple of years is the dream of many. They see their bright future “there,” not in France.
Their parents who left several decades ago strive to return to the homeland after their
retirement while the sons nurture a myth of return to start a new life and a career away from
their infernal experience in the public projects.
My conversation with Fadi, a street educator in his late thirties with Maghrebian
origins, illustrates Afro-French cultures. I met Fadi in a coffee shop outside Clichy to make
sure that “people don’t overhear our conversation” as he puts it. He explained that the myth
of return is one of the recurrent narratives that he has to address with the youth all the time.
He explained,
As an educator, I try to organize trips to their countries of origin. If they keep
idealizing their country without having seen it, it’s not good. Once they have seen
their country, they can integrate better here. But if they don’t know their country,
they will be phantasming about it their whole life. It helps to see one’s country and
to realize that there are problems there. It’s not the white against blacks and Arabs.
It’s blacks against blacks and Arabs against Arabs. If you go to a public institution in
Algeria, it’s a scandal. This way, they will realize that it’s not too bad here. They will
start to do something about their situation. Then they can say, “it’s my country, and
something should be done about discrimination.” It’s true that there is
discrimination and we have to put more energy than others to succeed. I tell them,
!

##&!

!
“If you want to go back to your country, well you should. Don’t stay here.” There
are many young men who are in this ambiguous position. They end up not doing
anything.
Interviewer: Are there young men who embrace multiple identities?
Educator: There are people in that situation. Many will say they’re French but will
keep their original citizenship. It all depends on where they are from. Moroccans
have easier time saying they’re French. With Algerians it’s trickier. There was a civil
war for fifteen years. Algerians are much more into the phantasm than Moroccans.
Moroccans don’t have a feeling of hatred against France. History plays a big role in
this. The war is still in the heads of the youth. It’s never been explained to them in
school programs or anywhere else and that’s why it can be an explosive situation.
The politics of identification of Black and Arab young men should be read in the
long durée as the educator notes. The idea that Moroccans can integrate more easily while
Algerians face a greater challenge due to the colonial history of their country shows that
Afro-Frenchness is crisscrossed with histories, conflicting interests, and forces. What is clear
however is that the vast majority of my interviewees with three exceptions felt that Africa
plays an important role in their identities. The need for anchorage is due to an official
French history that doesn’t have a place for non-white populations. There are haunting
silences over the colonial past of imperial France in public discourse as well as in school
curricula. Afro-French subjects find refuge in Africanness because it provides a safe space of
historical continuity and legitimacy. Stuart Hall remarks, “our cultural identities reflect the
common historical experiences and shared cultural codes which provide us, as ‘one people’,
with stable, unchanging and continuous frames of reference and meaning, beneath the
shifting divisions and vicissitudes of our actual history” (Hall 1990, 221). Despite their
differences, many Afro-French living in Clichy inhabit the idea of Africa on their own term.
And sometimes they inhabit it out of necessity. This is the case of Toumani, a young man in
his mid-twenties who was born in France and whose parents migrated from West Africa in
the late seventies. When I asked him to talk about his identity, he explained,
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I am black and therefore I come from elsewhere. I am not French that’s for sure. We
didn’t experience slavery like African Americans but we had colonization. My
ancestors were colonized by the French. France is useless, it would never recognize
us as its sons. I was born in France and lived all my life here but I don’t feel I am
accepted. On a personal level, I feel very French but they don’t accept us. It’s been a
while since I dropped the ball. There is nothing that I can do about it. We are black;
we don’t count as French (Dec 4, 2008).
The ambiguous politics of identification of Toumani is not uncommon in Clichy.
Many of the youth I interviewed tell a variation of the same story with more or less sense of
belonging to the French nation. Toumani starts by explaining that he is not French but later
confesses that he tried to be one but was not successful. A certain attachment to the African
continent is what anchors many of the youth who live in the projects. While young men
acknowledge their respective differences, most of them explain that Africa represents an
important part of who they are.
Hall notes that the first dimension of diasporic identity - the one that represents
continuity and commonality between the different communities - should not be understood
in a static fashion. Examining such identity requires a genealogical approach, rather than an
archeological one; it’s an approach that takes fields of power and fluidity of historical
narratives into account. Hall contends, “Oneness” is “not an identity grounded in the
archaeology, but in the re-telling of the past?” Noting the centrality of Africa in Caribbean
identity, he writes, “Africa is the name of the missing term, the great aporia, which lies at
the centre of our cultural identity and gives it a meaning which, until recently, it lacked”
(224). This type of identity consolidates the sentiment of solidarity among the different
Afro-French communities and limits the fragmentation that the power elite tries to trigger. It
provides a space that they cannot find within the French official narrative.
Nourou is one of the educators who introduced me to several youth during my
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research in Clichy. I asked him about the relations between Antilleans and Africans. I was
intrigued by this relationship since I succeeded in meeting only a few Antilleans in Clichy. I
told him that I had recently read the Senate’s report about the revolts of 2005 in which Eric
Raoult, a conservative senators involved in Clichy’s politics since the early 1990s, told the
Senate that the first cars the youth set on fire where the ones that belonged to Antilleans and
Portuguese living in Clichy’s projects. Before I elaborate further, Nourou interrupted me and
said:
Well they are lying. It’s a lie. They like it when Blacks fight among each other or
when there are conflicts between Blacks and Arabs. There is a lot of solidarity among
Blacks. I see the youth from Antillean and African origins all the time. They don’t
have any problems with each other. There are rap groups with Antilleans and
Africans. The police doesn’t really differentiate between an Antillean black or an
African black. They don’t ask for an ID before they start harassing the youth.
Let me tell you what happened to me few weeks ago. I was driving in Paris and I
parked in a spot assigned for delivery of merchandise. A white taxi driver started
saying I can’t park there and I needed to leave immediately. He found him amusing; I
didn’t pay attention to what he was saying. Then he asked a black cop, who was most
probably Antillean, to come and penalize me. The black cop was on a motorcycle.
He came to me, gave me a wink, and told me to leave. I really liked his reaction. I left
but the taxi driver was mad and he decided to follow me. He said, you can’t leave,
where are you going? You are going to be penalized. I said, that’s none of your
business and I left. This is to show you that there is some form of solidarity among
us blacks (Nourou, June 5, 2009).
The complicity between the Antillean policeman and Nourou is based on a certain idea of
blackness as well as a need to protect one another from a white supremacist society. The
paradox is that the police, who is usually perceived a racist institution that harasses AfroFrench, had the potential to produce such a situation. What the policeman and Nourou
share is a certain imagined community that finds its origins in Africa.
Such an incident is unusual; what usually happens in cities like Clichy is the police
constant harassment of the youth. On average, an Arab is controlled by the police seven
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times more often than a white person. A black individual will be stopped in the street six
times more often than a white (Bronner, 2009). Each young man I interviewed in Clichy told
me that he was harassed by the police numerous times. A Central African young man even
once bragged in front of his friends saying,
I was controlled only 3 or 4 times my whole life. I think it is due to my clean physical
appearance and my glasses, which make me, look like an intellectual. But I know a
ton of cop stories. Once my Antillean friend was stopped in Paris and he was asked
to present an ID. When he asked about the reason, the officer said, “today I am
controlling all Arabs and Blacks” (Dec 4, 2008).
Police discrimination against Arabs and Africans and racial profiling against them is very
common. The police doesn’t miss an opportunity to harass a Maghrebian and especially if
it’s a young man. The police is involved in many cold-blooded murders in postcolonial
France in addition to its violent role against colonial subjects living in Metropolitan France in
the 1950s and 1960s. The massacre of Algerians perpetrated by the police on October 17,
1961 shows the degree of violence that can be deployed against Afro-French subjects who
dare to transgress.
However, colonial violence, as Hall argues, is invisible from the vantage point of the
first type of cultural identity. It requires the second type, which emphasizes ruptures,
differences, incoherences, discontinuities, conflicts, and relations of power. Hall reminds us
that beside the many similarities between diasporic communities, “there are also critical
points of deep and significant difference which constitute ‘what we really are’; or rather - since
history has intervened – ‘what we have become’” (Hall: 225). The second type of identity can
help us understand the postcolonial conditions of Afro-French. Conflicts and tensions
require however more time to identify and are more challenging to understand. In the
context of Clichy, the task is even trickier because the city has been used as a laboratory for a
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long time. The residents are suspicious of urban or sociological studies and know that they
can be used as weapons against them. Some youth have refused to give me their real names
until the second or third encounter. Others have questions the real intensions of my study.
When I asked about the potential conflicts between Sub-Saharan, North African and
Caribbean communities, my question seemed surprising to many of my interviewees and was
often dismissed. Sometimes I was politely told that “there are no conflicts around here, we’re
all brothers!” After insisting and asking the same questions in different ways, some
participants finally would say that what they are about to tell me, they would never share
with a French person (meaning white French).
Only the longue durée of colonial violence can explain this deeply ingrained
suspicion of white people. Afro-French living in Clichy have a few white friends but unlike
those who come from outside, they are familiar with the culture of Arabs and Blacks. In
some cases, the demeanor and clothing of certain white youth makes it impossible to
distinguish them from other minorities living in the city. Examining the second type of
cultural identity as Hall suggests requires a better understanding of colonial histories and
power relations. It also necessitates a thorough analysis of the web of power in which
notions of Whiteness and Afro-Frenchness are embedded. Diaspora in this sense is not
simply about a shared history or a common destiny; it’s also about a certain relation to the
present and a precise understanding of the nexus of power. The second type of identity
entails a thorough analysis of processes of racialization. It requires a precise examination of
postcolonial spaces and Afro-French modes of identification. In postcolonial France, the
racialization of the youth is determined to a large extent by the “racial epidermal schema”
that Frantz Fanon describes in Black Skin, White Mask. The Caribbean intellectual explains
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how he became aware of his blackness through the gaze of a white child on him when he
was in metropolitan France. He writes,
Disoriented, incapable of confronting the Other, the white man, who had no
scruples about imprisoning me, I transported myself on that particular day far, very
far, from my self, and gave myself up as an object. What did this mean to me?
Peeling, stripping my skin, causing a hemorrhage that left congealed black blood all
over my body. Yet this reconsideration of myself, this thematization, was not my
idea. I wanted simply to be a man among men (Fanon, Black skin, white masks,
2008, p. 92).
The diasporic condition of Afro-French is not only shaped by their origins and histories but
also by the way they are racialized in postcolonial France. The epidermalization to which
Afro-French are subjected internalizes the sentiment of inferiority in them. From police
harassment to everyday discrimination, Afro-French subjectivities are constrained by various
institutions and discourses. However, these diasporic identities are also shaped by desires,
emotions, and cultural preferences. They are an assemblage in which not only the past plays
a role but also the desires of the present and strategies of the future. In other words, Hall’s
second identity permits a better understanding of Afro-French agency and the mechanisms
of resistance to the dominant racialization. As explained above spatial governmentality
doesn’t provide a space to examine this agency while the concept of diaspora opens a field
of possibilities. To escape the epidermalization that denigrate them, Afro-French should go
beyond nostalgia for the past or what Fanon calls the “reviving a black civilization unjustly
ignored.” They should liberate themselves from the past and refuse “to sing the past to the
detriment of [their] present and [their] future” (Fanon, p. 201). The oneness of the first axis
that Hall invokes should not be celebrated at the detriment of discontinuities and
multiplicities of the second axis of diasporic identities.
An examination of the second axis entails an approach through which we can
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evaluate Afro-French communities’ contradictions, conflicts, and discontinuities. One
should be able to engage and comprehend the contradictions without necessarily
downplaying the continuities. The reverse is true as well; when commonalities are
emphasized, differences should not be silenced. How do we understand certain tensions
when they emerge between various communities. For example, how do we explain the veil
controversy, which erupted in 1989 when three young girls were expelled from school
because they refused to remove their veil in class. The principal who took the decision of
expelling the students was a black individual from Martinique. The motivation behind the
expulsion as he explained, was that public school is a secular institution and religion should
therefore be kept away from its premises. It was convenient for the French political class to
have a black individual instrumentalize the veil to achieve political goals. No one could
accuse him of being racist. It’s interesting to note here that the same principal was adamantly
opposed to a similar instrumentalization of the veil in 2004 when a new debate took place
again (Brizard, 2004). What is the impact of such conflicts on the respective communities as
well as the Afro-French diaspora in general? The divergences exist also within each
community whether they are Antillean, Maghrebian, or Sub-Saharan. These divergences or
what Stuart Hall calls discontinuities or breaks. He reminds us that cultural identity is located
“beneath the shifting divisions and vicissitudes of our actual history.” Hall’s interpretation of
diasporic identity is appealing but it doesn’t tell us how to draw the boundaries between
within and outside. How do we know if the divergence is acceptable or excessive? And how
do we determine who belongs and who doesn’t? These are abstract questions that cannot be
answered at the theoretical level and require an empirical analysis.
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6.4.

Two Vignettes About Difference
In what follows, I examine two vignettes to explore the relevance of the paradigm

proposed by Hall in the context of Clichy. They are not representative of larger patterns;
instead they illustrate certain critical moments that would help us understand conflicts and
their impact on Afro-French diaspora. The first vignette is about Felix, a twenty-one old
Martinican. He works outside the city and has an acute understanding of Antillean history.
One day I was having lunch with him at a Turkish local restaurant when he started
explaining to me the differences between the various Antillean communities. He started by
informing me about the small Antillean community who lives in the city. Then he described
young Antilleans’ modes of identification with their islands and with Africa. He explained
that Martinicans have a tendency to identify more easily with the French republic than
Guadeloupeans due to the less violent colonial history and the racial composition of the
population. I asked him why certain Guadeloupeans who live in Clichy don’t like to be called
Antillean. He interrupted saying, “they don’t like it because they don’t want to be conflated
with Martinicans. They feel more African than we do. We are too French for their taste. We
are too Francized while they claim an African identity.” I asked him if he can differentiate
between Antilleans who live in Clichy and those who are in Paris. He said, “Well, in Paris
they think that they are French. In Clichy, 70% of the Antillean would say they are French
but then there is another 30% who see themselves African first. They feel they are closer to
the African populations living in Clichy than the French living in Paris (Conversation with
Felix, July 30, 2009).
The modes of belonging that Felix describes depend on specific spaces and
geographies. Young Antilleans who live in Paris have a tendency to identify more readily
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with mainstream ideas about Frenchness while those who live in Clichy have been socialized
differently. They claim an African identity more easily because they encounter more
discrimination and racial violence than their friends who live in Paris. There is also a peer
pressure in Clichy that doesn’t leave much space for identifying with mainstream notions of
Frenchness. Finally, the difference between Paris and Clichy that Felix describes is also due
to an interaction between the different Afro-French communities that doesn’t exist in the
same way in Paris. Clichy, like other suburban cities, created a space where the youth can get
informed about their cultures more easily than in the capital.
Concerning the divergence between Martinicans and Guadeloupeans, one has to
investigate the colonial history and the processes of migration from the French Caribbean to
find a plausible answer. The divergence between the two communities doesn’t appear in the
first type of identity where the focus is on celebrating a certain idea of Africa. Hall contends
that the colonial history, which shapes diasporic identities, cannot be unraveled through the
first type of identity, through oneness. It has to be traced back from the postcolonial present
as well as projected into future political undertakings. Afro-French identities should be
posited within a larger colonial matrix. A grid of intelligibility that ignores the colonial
situation deforms our understanding of Afro-Frenchness. According to Felix the difference
between the two communities can be explained by the uneven history of slavery and racial
oppression in the two islands. His narrative demonstrates that the sons and daughters of
these colonial subjects not only are informed about the colonial violence their ancestors
endured but they also have to deal with racial mechanisms which imprints are inscribed on
their bodies. This doesn’t necessarily translate into stronger or weaker forms of belonging to
the republic but has necessarily an unequivocal impact on postcolonial diasporas. On several
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occasions, Moroccan youth told me that their reconciliation with the French republic is less
painful compared to Algerians’ because of the different colonial past of the two countries.
“Algerians are enraged against France because of the war” participants would tell me. The
colonial past is an important component of diasporic subjectivities and as such it has a great
impact on Afro-French. Afro-Frenchness is also shaped by subjective forces that escape
structural dimensions. In that regard, diasporic identities are simultaneously determined by
historical sedimentations and structural factors, and are codified by the agency of individuals.
Between the structural and the subjective, there is field of possibilities.
The second vignette concerns discrimination and conflicts between Afro-French
communities. One afternoon I was chatting with a friend at the terrace of a coffee shop in
Clichy when I overheard a conversation between three Maghrebian young men. They were
between twenty-five and thirty years of age and were speaking loudly. I have seen two of
them in the same café in the past weeks. One of them (I learned later his name is Hassoun)
was probably away from the city for some time since he was doing most of the talking and
telling his friends about a trip he recently came back from. Hassoun was laughing and
shouting anytime he wanted to say something. He told his friends that he didn’t have any
pictures of himself with his family because he was in prison during family occasions and
gatherings. In the meantime, every time a woman walked in front of the terrace he would
shout, “look at us, we are here, we are here”. When he saw a teenager who seemed to have
south Asian origins, he interpellated him and said, “Where do you think you are? In India?”
The teenager didn’t really pay attention to what Hassoun was saying and kept walking.
Few minutes Hassoun saw a group of three black kids. He shouted at them: “ Hey
African monkeys, stop doing the monkeys, you have a monkey face anyway.” He was
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amusing his friends and having fun himself. Later, he saw a Turkish kid, he started making
different sounds that were supposed to sound like Turkish. He turned toward his friends and
started laughing. A bit later, he started doing the “African accent” by rolling the “R” when
he saw two black kids. He seemed to enjoy himself by imitating different accent and making
all types of stereotypes about the kids. He finally saw two kids who were probably four and
seven. He asked them if they were Turkish. The older kid said “no, he is Arab” pointing his
finger toward his little friend. Hassoun said, “I know he is Arab, what about you?” The kid
seemed uncomfortable, but he conceded he is Turk and kept walking. Hassoun shouted at
him, “see, I told you; you have a Turk's head” (July 25, 2009).
Hassoun’s remarks were not surprising since I had overheard similar statements on
multiple occasions in Clichy. What I didn’t anticipate was the openness in which he was
making these remarks. In other cases, I have witnesses Sub-Saharan, Maghrebian and
Antillean friends insult each other in a playful way and repeat certain stereotypes that white
French use against them to make fun of each other. In this case however, Hassoun wasn’t
insulting his friends and he was loud. Other individuals with Turkish and Sub-Saharan
origins were drinking their coffees at the terrace and they heard the conversation just like
me. Hassoun’s behavior was therefore acceptable since it didn’t provoke any reactions from
the clients at the café. When I asked my friend what he thought about what we just saw, he
told me that “Hassoun is being playful and everyone knows it. It’s not harmful.” Obviously,
it’s difficult to draw a line between a discriminatory behavior and auto-derision. Before I
leave the café with my friend, Hassoun started making jokes about drug dealers and claiming
to be one and then laughing about it. He told his friends “what if the cops came here, would
it be possible to hide the stuff in the table’s holes?” It’s not clear what Hassoun was
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insinuating with his remarks. Was he laughing at stereotypes about Clichy and other
suburban cities, which are presented in the media and public discourse as hubs for young
Maghrebian and Black drug dealers? It’s very possible since I have heard the same critique
about the negative image of the city multiple times. Was he insinuating that I am an
undercover policeman since he might have suspected I am stranger to the city?
Was Hassoun making fun of certain stereotypes, which is something that many
youths do among each other? Or was he rather using these stereotypes against defenseless
kids who cannot confront him. It wasn’t clear. While there is a certain ambiguity in
Hassoun’s behavior, I have witnessed on many occasions more engrained conflict between
the different communities. One day I was chatting with few young black men at the entrance
of a building. We were talking about Obama’s elections and the significance of that on
minorities in France. Some of the men were very happy about the news but others were
convinced that their situation wouldn’t change if a black president were elected in France.
One of them said, “racism has always existed. Everyone is racist. Arabs are racist. Africans
are racists. Whites are racists. They all hate each other.” Then he pointed at an apartment
and said, “you see this apartment on the second floor? They’re Maghrebians. The father
doesn’t want his kids to talk to Africans. What is this?” His friends agreed with him. They
explained that the older Maghrebian generation has bias against Africans but the younger
one is not like that. This Sub-Saharan’s sentiments toward Maghrebians is spread to a certain
extent in Clichy. One of the youth from Central Africa with whom I became good friend
told me one day, “Africans and Maghrebians coexist with one another but we don’t like each
other. I am telling you this but I would never say this to a white person.” The claims about
the similarities of Afro-French communities are true but it would be inaccurate to minimize
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difference or reduce it. Describing the second type of identity, Hall writes, we need
“conception of ‘identity’, which lives with and through, not despite, difference; by hybridity.”
The divergences between Sub-Saharan, Maghrebian, and Antillean communities take
a thousand different forms. It can be based on tension due to everyday interactions or on
stereotypes that individuals brought back with them from their countries. The most
dangerous form of conflict however is the one superimposed by white dominant culture.
While the white racial matrix plays a determining role, the vast majority of my participants
were extremely aware and critical of it. The isolation of the city and the marginalization of
Afro-French cultures make it easy for them to identify the violence of white supremacy and
resist it. Focusing on divergences between the various Afro-French communities without
positing them within a larger racial framework skews the reality of Clichy. As I show in the
previous chapter, using disciplinary power, French authorities tried to provoke the
fragmentation of Afro-French communities because they are perceived as a threat to the
republic. Many of the stories I heard either from municipal employees or Afro-French
residents about everyday conflicts between Black and Brown youth exemplify differences
within, rather than differences between communities. This is a tricky terrain since it’s
difficult to distinguish between instrumentalized difference primarily used by mainstream
politicians to undermine any form of solidarity between Afro-French and genuine difference
due to historical and social specificities. Determining the boundaries of diaspora is a
complex political and cultural project. To what extent are Maghrebians part of black France
for example? We need to reflect on Hassoun’s comments and think about his intention to be
able to answer the question.
To answer the question we need also to reflect on Hall’s concept of “differance.”
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Building on it, Paul Gilroy proposes the notion of “changing same” to understand the
complex relationships that connect individuals to each others. In The Black Atlantic (1993),
Gilroy proposes a comprehensive analysis that foregrounds his work on black diaspora in a
Duboisan framework. The book draws on a long tradition of black intellectual production
coming from both sides of the Atlantic. He explores the significance of W.E.B. Dubois
concept of “double consciousness” on both sides of the Black Atlantic. Gilroy’s project uses
double consciousness as an entry point to re-tell the counterhistory of the West through the
experience and narratives of black subjects living on both sides of the Atlantic. These black
individuals, Gilroy contends, acquired a double consciousness as a consequence of their
ambivalent subjectivities, which constantly shift between Europeanness, Americanness and
Africanness. He defines the Black Atlantic as a fluid formation situated within a “changing
same.” This fluidity within sameness is what makes the Black Atlantic a complex and
heterogeneous system. The question becomes then to what extent divergences within AfroFrench communities represents a process of “changing same”?

6.5.

Geo-temporalities of Afro-French
Before exploring the theoretical relevance of the question, I start with three short

stories about Clichy to illustrate the relevance of “changing same.” The first one is about the
conceptualization of geo-temporality in Clichy, the second is about the significance of
memory, while the third represents a transgression of mainstream media. Combined
together, these stories show that Afro-French communities have developed insurgent
identities in the past few decades.
On March 2009, the municipality invited the residents of Clichy to attend a meeting
to debate various projects concerning the redevelopment of the city-center. The meeting
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was very well attended, since more than two hundred residents showed up. There was a
number of young individuals. One of the residents who is actively involved in the tenants’
association and who is Maghrebian told me that he heard about the meeting by coincidence
and informed as many people as he could. According to him, the municipality didn’t do a
good job to have the word out in the public projects on purpose. He explained that they care
more about the owners of individual housing who are mostly white. “They think we are
troublemakers.” The attendance of the meeting confirmed his assumption since the majority
was white while Cilchy’s population is predominantly non-white. The meeting was over two
hours long and was extremely difficult to facilitate. The municipality had fixed an agenda and
made it clear that it would not discuss any additional topics, probably because angry tenants
disrupted previous meeting. The mayor explained that a professional facilitator would
organize the discussion and only individuals who have the microphone can speak. After a
brief speech where the mayor laid out the different proposed projects the floor was open for
questions. The debate was very heated and a clear polarization emerged very quickly. On the
one hand, Afro-French tenants came to the meeting to complain about their housing
situation and took the floor to make their issues known to the city and to other tenants. On
the other hand, the majority of white residents wanted to follow the agenda proposed by the
municipality and which would have focused on the redevelopment of the city-center. The
discussion was very lively; the tenants of the housing projects wanted to talk about the
expensive rent, the broken elevators, the water leakage, and other related issues. The
facilitator was overwhelmed, while the mayor tried to prevent angry tenants from speaking
three consecutive times, unsuccessfully. It’s not until forty minutes later and due to the
active shouting of white residents that the Afro-French tenants were silenced. The mayor
finally summarized the situation in the following terms:
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I am ready, one more time - this is not the first time - to talk about what we have
been doing for Le Chêne Pointu, not since fifteen days, not since six months, not
since one mandate, not since two mandates, but since three mandates. I know that
it’s not always easy to see the results right away but I can tell you what has been
done. It’s not enough, and we need to keep struggling. We need to keep struggling
together. However, there won’t be a permanent solution if we don’t think together
about the future. We all knew, I warned about this a hundred times, when we
prepare for a debate like this one, we have to expect it starts like it did. Indeed, it’s
almost impossible to ask people to dream a little bit about the future. We are not
talking about tomorrow but after tomorrow. So it’s hard to project oneself when we
are in such a dire situation. Despite that, I am confident we can work together.
This meeting is symptomatic of the situation in Clichy. There is a noticeable polarization that
is very telling about Afro-French identity. On the one hand, there is an Afro-French
constituency who came to the meeting “without being invited.” They were predominantly
tenants of the projects who currently inhabit the city-center. On the other hand, there was a
white group that one never encounters in the city-center. White residents attended the
meeting massively to have a voice in the redevelopment of the center. More interestingly,
Afro-French were mostly talking about the history of the projects and the problem they have
in the present. The mayor and the white residents of individual housing were mostly
interesting in discussing the future and in erasing the past and the present. While the citycenter is not part of the renewal project, the debate between the experts, the municipality,
and white residents on the one hand, and Afro-French communities on the other,
symbolizes the significance of urban renewal for each group.
The second story took place at the youth center (SMJ) between myself and three
Sub-Saharan young men who were between twenty-three and thirty years of age. We were
discussing the history program in schools and the lack of interest in the French colonial era.
Kondy explained, “there is no interest in the history of Africa or the Caribbean. The fact
that there was a very important revolution in Haiti does not represent an important fact for
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them to include it into school programs. They teach the French Revolution and the Shoat.
That’s all.” Kondy was very emotional when he was speaking about the curriculum. Then he
started telling us his version of the French Revolution. He looked in my direction and
paused for few instants. Then he said,
Do you know that the story of the revolution is in reality a story of women?
Napoleon was put in prison and he was in love with a woman. He escaped and
returned to France and said things cannot go the way they are. Several people
followed him and that’s how they did the revolution. All these people we know, they
added their names afterwards. They said, let’s put Robespierre, Donton, and all the
others. This is the story of the famous FRENCH REVOLUTION. They say that the
history of colonization and massacres in Africa and the Caribbean are not that
important while they emphasize the false history of the French Revolution.”
Kondy’s friend interrupted him to say,
You know the revolution in Haiti is way more important than the French Revolution
but they never mention that in the classroom. The kids don’t know about it. The
problem is that blacks in France are too scared. You know the French are afraid of
the Algerian and Arabs in general but they don’t care about us. They don’t care
about us. They aren’t even scared of us. We don’t like to sacrifice. We love life too
much to take any risks. Arabs fight back. That’s why they are respected. That’s our
central problem (Kondy, Feb 3, 2009).
It doesn’t matter here whether the historical elements in Kondy’s story are accurate or not.
What is important is that he is using some accurate historical facts to tell his own version of
the French Revolution. The fundamental critique of the official version of French history is
undertaken here with sarcasm. Kondy knows that his version is not necessarily very
plausible. What he tried to do is make his audience doubt the hegemony of the official
narrative. He made his friends react and he launched a discussion that went on for several
hours. This re-telling of the past is extremely astute since it merges elements from the official
historiography mixed with elements from his own imagination to undermine the oppressive
power-knowledge apparatus deployed against him. Finally, Kondy’s friend started discussing
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the strength and weaknesses of the different Afro-French communities and the ways they
can be more aware of their own histories. Our fascinating discussion lasted several hours and
ended a little bit before midnight.
The third story is interesting because it represents a radical critique of the media and
its instrumentalization of Afro-French identities to maintain the racial matrix in place. After
coming back from my fieldwork, I found an article on the Internet about Abdel, one of the
young men I met in Clichy. He was contacted by a journalist from Le Point, one of the
important mainstream weekly magazines. The journalist wanted Abdel to help him conduct
an interview with a woman who is married to a polygamous man. Abdel agreed to help the
journalist but found out that he wanted to speak with the woman on the phone without
taking the pain of coming to Clichy. Abdel had already told me during our conversations
how much he was upset with the journalists’ coverage of the revolts of 2005. He explained
that their ultimate aim was to denigrate the image of the city. He also told me that after the
revolts they put pressure on the mayor to prevent any journalists from reporting on Clichy
without being accompanied by an inhabitant of Clichy. The journalists who didn’t abide by
the rule were harassed and sometimes their cameras and other equipment were taken.
When Abdel was invited on TV to tell his story, he made it clear that he wanted to
teach lazy journalists a lesson. When the journalist called to speak to Bintou, the woman who
is supposedly in a polygamous relationship, Abdel answered the phone and imitated the
voice of a woman with a pronounced “African accent.” He started telling the journalists the
most extravagant stories about her relationship, her husband and her many children. She also
described her physical appearance and her living situation in a tiny apartment in the housing
projects. During the phone conversation, Abdel taped himself with a camera. The article was
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very detailed and was even featured on the magazine’s cover. The journalist wrote a
sensationalist piece where he claimed he had met the woman in her apartment in Clichy.
Once the article was published, Abdel sent the video to the television and denounced the
journalist’s unprofessional reporting(Israel, 2010).
The most interesting aspect of Abdel’s story is the humor he used to convey his idea.
The taped video is extremely funny because all stereotypes about polygamy families, the
violence of African men, poverty, ignorance, etc are included in the video. Abdel’s
intervention was more than a response to an article. It gave the journalist ammunition that
was used against him but more generally against mainstream media. Abdel used many of the
stereotypes that are frequently deployed in the media and made them obsolete.
These stories among many others represent an assemblage that Afro-French have
been producing through their everyday resistance. While there is a tension, as we have seen,
between the different Afro-French communities, their stories represent a complex unity.
Their geo-spatiality allows for a de-centering of the nation-state as a locus of power. This
move is possible, through the transgression of national histories and official cultures. To use
Gilroy’s framework, “[T]he Atlantic as one single, complex unit of analysis,” can “produce
an explicitly transnational and intercultural perspective”(1993, p. 15). By putting the black
diasporic experience at the center stage, Gilroy challenges the hegemonic agenda of the
nation-state. He proposes a politics of transgression that
partially transcend[s] modernity, constructing both an imaginary anti-modern past
and a postmodern yet-to-come. This is not a counter-discourse but a counterculture
that defiantly reconstructs its own critical, intellectual, and moral genealogy in a
partially hidden public sphere of its own. The politics of transfiguration therefore
reveals the hidden internal fissures in the concept of modernity. (pp. 37-8)
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Gilroy explains that traditionally, black intellectuals turned away from modernity and instead,
embraced an Afrocentric culture that represents its anti-thesis. This move led them to
cherish a so-called authentic African identity, which they assumed was lost. It was therefore
their duty to revive this authenticity again. Unfortunately, by doing so, they privileged a
linear temporality that is paradigmatic of the modernity they attempt to challenge. The above
stories exemplify how the linear temporality of the republic can be troubled and challenged.
To a certain extent, Afro-French diasporas reproduce the Black Atlantic on their
own terms. Their histories trouble the temporality of Western historiography. The
experience of Afro-French alters the dominant history by introducing narratives grounded in
multilayered temporalities. By examining their stories we shift our attention away from
exclusive and essentialist forms of belonging to ones that are more open and plural. The
different colonial experiences of black and brown subjects converge when one considers the
history of pain and suffering. Gilroy argues, “[The colonial experience] was used broadly so
as to include slavery, colonialism, racial discrimination, and the rise of national(ist)
consciousness(es) charged with colonialism's negation.” (Gilroy, 1993, p. 195).

Gilroy

explains that it is important to focus on the discourse of the same and homology, among
blacks, not only on discourses of ‘the Other’ and heterology. The commonality can be found
in black and brown individuals’ shared experience of pain, suffering, and subjugation. Gilroy
contends that culture constitutes the main site of political action and struggle. I would add
that spatial performativity is another site of resistance and transformative change.
Gilroy stresses the importance of fissuring Western linear and empty temporality. He
stresses the significance of plurivocal and multilayered narratives of black peoples. Finally he
shows that the decentering of the nation-state can be triggered through the fluid and
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dynamic terrain of the Black Atlantic. The fluidity of the framework undermines hegemonic
Western modernity, and essentialist Afrocentricity. However, Gilroy is not advocating for
absolute relativism since he locates his project in a tradition of “changing same.” This
continuity is achieved through the convergence of an experience grounded in subjugation
and discrimination. It is also built in a counterhistory of modernity, a term that Foucault uses
to refer to the stories of those who are subordinated (Foucault, 2003). Counterhistory, like
the “changing same,” is therefore necessarily posited against the meta-narrative of the
nation-state.
The past interviews I conducted with Afro-French youth from Caribbean and
African origins show that these communities have uneven relationships with French
modernity. Their lifeworlds correspond to distinct temporalities as well as uneven everyday
experiences. Afro-Caribbean youth generally locate their point of departure in the first
French colonial empire and the history of slavery. Whereas, North African and West-African
diasporas usually remember the second moment of modernity which is characterized by
French colonial violence in the African continent. Their point of entry into the colonial past
begins in the 19th Century with the gradual colonization of the Maghreb and West Africa.
While these histories are dissimilar, they are also organically linked through French imperial
power relations. While Sub-Saharan and North African didn’t experience the significance of
the middle passage, they have been subjected to imperial logics brought from the Caribbean
back to the African continent. We have also seen that colonial logics have been traveling
between the margins and centers of the French imperium. In that regard, Afro-French
communities living in the colonial margins and the metropolitan core had a diasporic
experience that can be qualified of “changing same.”
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6.6

Theoretical Contributions
The contribution of this dissertation is fourfold. Firstly, it proposes an approach to

studying the history of the French empire by suggesting a unit of analysis that encompasses
metropolitan France as well as its colonies. Secondly, it deploys the notion of ‘Afro-French’
as an entry point to analyzing the experience of diasporic communities living in postcolonial
France. Thirdly, it strives to understand the spatial significance of governmentality in the
context of postcolonial suburbs. Finally, the study negotiates the sometimes-rigid boundaries
between ethnographic and archival research.
The main goal of this study has been to construct a multilayered and non-linear
methodology to analyze the interconnections between the multiple colonial spaces of the
French empire. It shows that dispersed colonial spaces and temporalities can have a singular
logic behind them, even if it is a heterogeneous and complex one. The above analysis
navigates between metropolitan centers and colonial peripheries to explore the multiple and
overlapping temporalities of the French empire. As explained above, the singular logic of
empire is not void of conflicts and antagonisms. Nevertheless, the study has shown that it is
possible to unearth singular underlying logics.
The second dimension of this study revolves around the notion of Afro-French. It
suggests that such a notion highlights the struggles of postcolonial brown and black
communities. As explained above, “Afro-French” can shift the focus away from seemingly
disconnected categories such as “Maghrebian” or “West-African” and show that they have
parallel past genealogies and similar future trajectories.
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The study also builds an analytical framework based on Foucault’s concept of
governmentality. The third dimension of this analysis explors the significance of
governmentality in the context of colonial and postcolonial spaces. At the same time, it
avoids a mechanical application of the analytics of government. Instead it develops an
iterative approach that constantly navigates back and forth between local places, regional
spaces, and global scales. Governmentality has often been deployed in critical studies to
show that technologies of government follow a unified logic. Conversely, this study shows
that while governmentality is full of contradictions and antagonisms it is still a useful
theoretical tool.
Finally, this study explores the relationship between two research methodologies,
namely ethnographic and archival work. It contends that it is possible to renegotiate the
boundaries between the two and hence allow for a more comprehensive analysis of
postcolonial situations. As anthropologist Brian Keith Axel (2002) explains, such an
investigation shows that one can initiate a productive dialogue between history and
anthropology; two disciplines that are seemingly distinct but which are in reality organically
linked to one another. Following Axel, this study shows that imperial archival material is in
many instances the product of ethnographic research conducted by ethnologists and other
social scientists. Likewise, present ethnographic work turns into archival documents with
time.
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1

Before the emergence of disciplinary power, Foucault shows that there is a transitory
period in the 17th – 18th during which a social power becomes the dominant mode. In
Discipline and Punish, Foucault explains that a number of jurists suggest that reform is most
adequate way to administer society. When capitalism becomes the dominant economic logic,
disciplinary power started targeting actions instead of souls as its predecessor did.
2
A law was passed in the previous years that made a certificate mandatory if an individual
would like to host in her apartment a guest coming from abroad
3
The first phase of the PRU started in 2004 and was scheduled to last until 2008 but it was
prolonged until 2013 few years after the municipality signed its first convention with the
state.
4
Unlike in the US, where urban renewal was implemented on a large scale in 1944 with the
G.I. Bill, and later in 1949, with the Housing Act, urban renovation in France became a state
policy in the 1960s and only marginally. The main purpose of French urban redevelopment
during this period was to displace poor populations from the center of Paris to stack them in
the suburbs. Urban renewal in poor suburban neighborhood became a strategic choice for
the French government in 1980s, when it decided to pacify an increasingly rebellious young
population through urban interventions. When the US started deploying a developmentalist
discourse to justify its postwar urban interventions, France was still using a hygienist
discourse to relocate its poor populations. These public discourses demonstrate differences
in the genealogy of French and US imperial logics.
5
Le Haut-Clichy is located in the southeast part of Clichy and is composed of 82% of public
housing and 18% of privately owned collective housing.
6
Foucault notes that “the formula “do not govern too much (pas trop gouverner)” is from the
marquis d’Argenson (Foucault, 2008, p. 24).
7
Soja (1989) among other scholars, have described Foucault’s take on space, especially the
analysis that the French philosopher articulates in his book, The Archeology of Knowledge (1972),
as metaphorical and not attentive enough to the actually existing spaces. Instead, Soja has
argued that the most comphrensive account on space, in Foucault’s work, is to be found in
Discipline and Punish. Lefebvre notes that Foucault fails to provide a comprehensive definition
of space because he doesn’t differentiate “between the theoretical (epistemological) realm
and the practical one, between the mental and the social, between the space of the
philosphers and the space of people who deal with material things” (1991: p.4). The next
chapter will show that this criticism is not satisfactory since Foucault has provided a
meticulous framework to explore modalities of space that are very different from the one
offered in Discipline and Punish.
8
The next chapter will show that the phrase “lawless zones” is often deployed in public
discourse to criminalize Afro-French populations and to racialize them in the public
imaginary. Certain banlieues are portrayed like racialized colonies that need to be conquered
by the French Republic.
9
Unlike Clichy, a small portion of Montfermeil has public housing.
10
Bernard Zehrfuss, a student of Le Corbusier, was asked to build public housing composed
of around 10,000 units in 1960 in Clichy. He began to execute his project but did not finish
it. The project was cancelled because a highway, which was initially planned to pass through
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Clichy, was never realized. The work of Zehrfuss is mainly concentrated outside the
perimeters of the current PRU.
11
The expression “lawless zones” is often used in the media and political spheres to refer to
poor enclaves with a high percentage of foreign and Afro-French populations.
12
The Institut d'aménagement et d'urbanisme de la région Île-de-France was created in 1960
with the mission to create a grand plan for the Parisian region and more specifically to guide
the development of the banlieues and transportation networks.
13
Ray Jeffery wrote a book titled Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design in 1977.
The name was subsequently coined to refer to an urban and planning movement that
adopted the principles introduced in the book.
14
The city doesn’t provide access to local security contracts. There is a brief summary of the
contract in Clichy Magazine.
15
The police that patrols the streets of Clichy is currently dispatched from Raincy, a
neighboring city, since there is no police station in Clichy.
16
17
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